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In traditional accounts, Colbert’s sweeping forestry reforms of the 1660s and 1670s 
were seen as the epitome of the centralising modernising ‘absolutist’ state. Six 
decades later, the legal framework that he had established appeared superseded by 
practices that embodied another set of classic views of ancien régime institutions: 
dysfunctional and corrupt. This study of mid-ranking forestry officers of a 
Pyrenean forestry district at the beginning of the eighteenth century deconstructs 
these orthodoxies.  
 
The establishment of Colbert’s new-style forestry institutions in small towns like 
Quillan proved, ultimately, to be a mixed blessing for their officers. The forestry 
office might offer professional stability and social prestige, but its gages were 
hardly sufficient to support their place among the urban oligarchies. A narrow legal 
specialism and lack of promotion opportunities drove them instead to strengthen 
existing ties with successful local wood merchants, with whom they professionally 
cooperated. This generated a highly ambiguous situation because of the inherent 
risk of collusion and abuse of power. In 1736, excessive misuse of this symbiotic 
system triggered a Réformation Forestière in the forestry district of Quillan. 
Analysis of the judicial part of this high-profile governmental intervention 
uncovered two thought-provoking biases: a clear pro-merchant stance, and the 
absence of political commitment to contain endemic ‘corruption’ within its ranks. 
 
There was more to this tolerant attitude than political pragmatism giving priority to 
stability over disruption. Outwardly, Réformations were an authority-enhancing 
exercise in public visibility, re-affirming Colbert’s forestry code as a valid, central 
frame of reference. Behind this façade, the authorities were happy to apply a 
decentralised and more effective approach to ordinary forestry business, under the 
loose watch of the regional head. This allowed maîtrises to continue operating 
smoothly, regional economies to be kept supplied, and yearly returns from wood 
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A revealing incident 
 
In 1736, the intendant of Languedoc Louis-Basile Bernage de Saint Maurice subdelegated 
an avocat of the Toulouse Parlement, Jean Rouquet, to help investigating serious 
allegations of malpractice and corruption in the Pyrenean forestry district of Quillan. Their 
inquiries started with hearing statements of all the officers who had worked at the maîtrise 
between 1721 and 1736. Urged on by Rouquet, former deputy head André Boire recounted 
the extraordinary sequence of events that had occurred back in 1722 after he and two other 
officers, procureur du Roy Pinet de Brézilhou and garde-marteau Estienne Loubet, had 
identified a load of timber as misappropriated from one of the royal forests upstream.  As 
the three officers met at Loubet’s house to discuss further action, a heated dispute ensued. 
The rightful action would have been to issue a joint formal report, but Loubet refused 
pointblank. Pressed by his colleagues he eventually admitted having used the royal seal 
‘abusively’. When lieutenant Boire exclaimed “vous êtes donc le maistre des forêts du 
Roy!”  Loubet replied “je n’ai pu m’empêcher de le faire sur les fortes solicitations de cette 
proserpine madame de Rouzaud.” 1 The Proserpine in question was the widow of Jean 
Rouzaud, the former head of the local maîtrise particulière of Quillan. 2 Boire insisted on 
reporting the case, but Loubet turned violent. “Si tu verbalises, et si tu veux exiger que je 
verbalise je te tueray”, at which point “il prit un tranche-lart qui estoit sur la table et voulut 
se jetter sur le répondant.” Things would probably have taken a turn for the worse, had it 
not been for the swift intervention of procureur Pinet.  
 
Due care must be taken with testimonies such as these. The scene so vividly depicted here 
might have been embellished over time or coloured by personal enmity or partisanship. On 
the other hand, independent statements broadly corroborated the alleged facts. More 
important than the accuracy of Boire’s account are the assumptions that underlay it. 
Loubet’s refusal to report stolen wood hints at some form of connivance with a local wood 
																																																								
1 All quotes from ADH, C1255, f.320-321, ‘Audition personnelle du Sr Boire, 26 octobre 1737’.  
2 By refering to the Greek goddess Persephone, Loubet probably alluded to her seasonal association 
with the shadowy underworld.  
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merchant, and his outburst about Madame Rouzaud reveals the leverage that an outsider 
was able to exert over officers in the course of their official duties. Most importantly, this 
brief extract encapsulates the close interlinkage between private interests and official 
circuits of power, a fundamental feature of early modern institutions. The level of verbal 
and physical violence it suggests is a reflection of the strength of the emotions generated 
by conflicting allegiances.   
 
What, fundamentally, connects these themes is the overarching issue of royal authority, “la 
pierre angulaire de la monarchie.” 3 In early modern France, respect for royal authority and 
its diffusion throughout society underpinned the success of all monarchical interventions in 
provincial affairs. The way intermediate royal institutions like the maîtrises particulières 
translated centrally-emitted measures into practice - the main theme of this thesis - is a 
revealing indicator of the nature of the relationship between the political centre and the 
provinces. Royal authority and centre-periphery relations were critical issues in the 
multipolar revisionist debate, which in the last decades of the twentieth century challenged 
the long-established orthodoxies of ‘absolutism’, a concept that is still contentious today. 
Fanny Cosandey and Robert Descimon for example underscored the importance of 
incorporating theoretical underpinnings into historical interpretations. As a theory of 
legislative power derived from Roman law, they argued, the concept of absolutism was 
relayed during the Renaissance by jurists like Jean Bodin, who used theology as the 
“matrice de la pensée politique.” 4 Here, the monarch by divine right was deemed the 
legitimate source of all positive law. In the course of the seventeenth century, a secularised 
form of this concept developed the notion of “raison d’Etat”, partly detached from its 
religious anchorage. The state apparatus that emerged was based on practices of ‘absolute’ 
royal power, but its consolidation depended on increasing levels of administrative 
rationality.     
 
Moving away from the concept of a centralising, modernising monarchy intruding 
authoritatively into provincial power structures, other strands of thought developed. They 
were based on empirical approaches, and the study of the day-to-day reality of the relations 
between monarchical institutions and groups wielding alternative forms of power in the 
provinces, such as the Parlements, the Etats, the nobility, or the municipalities. They 
underscored notions of “compromise, negotiation and sharing of resources in a manner 
																																																								
3 Michel Antoine, Louis XV (Paris, 1989), 180. 
4 Fanny Cosandey, Robert Descimon, L'Absolutisme en France (Paris, 2002), 48. 
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which maintained and supported hierarchical differences.” 5 In the introduction to his study 
of the Burgundian Estates, Julian Swann provided a helpful discussion of this powerful 
challenge to classic absolutist theses. 6 By focusing on the human complexities of Ancien 
Régime societies, cultural approaches within this movement have especially enriched 
classic views on absolutism. Peter Campbell even argued that Parlementaire studies were 
moving towards a “nouvelle histoire totale des magistrats, qui est à la fois sociale, 
économique, culturelle, anthropologique, linguistique et politique.“ 7 In its wide diversity, 
this new paradigm completely redefined the conceptual framework of power relations in 
early modern societies.  
 
A number of themes central to this revisionist scholarship have also shaped the main lines 
of our research. The pivotal issue of venality was especially relevant for the financial 
status, local prestige and promotion facilities associated with the forestry office. 8 Officier-
moyen studies have guided our analysis of the networks and patronage patterns, in 
particular those connecting mid-ranking royal foresters to the local urban elites. Finally, 
our examination of the officers’ professional practices and the responses they elicited from 
the government drew on the insights of cultural historians interested in practices such as 
patronage and gift-giving, and on the emerging research on corruption as a historical 
concept. Before developing more fully the way these various historiographical debates 
have influenced this research, I will first introduce the general context and broad 







5 William Beik, ‘The Absolutism of Louis XIV as Social Collaboration’, Past & Present, 188 
(2005), pp. 195-225, 195.  
6 Julian Swann, Provincial Power and Absolute Monarchy. The Estates General of Burgundy 1661-
1790 (Cambridge, 2003), pp. 2-18. Other helpful guides to the absolutist debate also in Peter 
Campbell, Power and Politics in Old Regime France, 1720-1745 (London, New York, 1996), 10-
35 ; Joël Cornette, ‘L'histoire au travail, le nouveau “siècle de Louis XIV”: un bilan 
historiographique depuis vingt ans (1980-2000)’, Histoire, Economie & Société, 19 (2000), pp. 
561-605; 607-620; Michael Breen, Law, City, and King: Legal culture, municipal politics and State 
formation in early modern Dijon (Rochester, New York, 2007), pp. 17-25.  
7 Peter Campbell, ‘Crises « politiques » et parlements : pour une micro-histoire des crises 
parlementaires au XVIIIe siècle,’ Histoire, économie & société, 1 (2012), pp. 69-91, 73.  
8 Especially Roland Mousnier, La vénalité des offices sous Henri IV et  Louis XIII (Paris, 1971); 
William Doyle, Venality: the sale of offices in eighteenth-century France (Oxford, 1996); Jean 
Nagle, Un orgueil français. La vénalité des offices sous l’Ancien Régime (Paris, 2008). 
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The kingdom’s forests and its foresters 
 
In the pre-industrial ‘wooden age,’ 9 forests and wood represented a crucial material 
resource for the kingdom. They were central to the development of a wood-based 
economy. They furnished the navy and military with construction material, 10 and provided 
fuel material for manufactures like metal works, glass works or salt works. They were also 
a factor of social peace and economic development, by warranting the sustainable and 
affordable provision of fuel and construction material for fast growing metropoles, towns 
and villages. For many rural communities, they represented important resources in the 
form of firewood-collecting and forest-grazing grounds for their flocks. Forestry politics 
was all about foresight and prevention of what historians described as a ‘wood crisis’, 
understood as a critical depletion of ligneous resources – perceived or real - and a 
corresponding rise of wood prices. In France, after three decades of conflict and 
administrative problems, reports of a looming supply crisis due to the degradation in many 
forests and acute administrative malfunction caused Colbert in 1661 to initiate a series of 
sweeping forestry reforms in every province of the realm.  
 
After initial successes, the hoped-for improvement was not sustained over the long term. 
At the dawn of the new century, cautious comments by royal engineer Vauban, followed 
by more vocal criticisms from natural scientists like Réaumur, Buffon, and especially 
Duhamel du Monceau (who was also inspecteur général de la Marine), brought the debate 
into the public domain. 11 In Languedoc, the situation was especially critical because of the 
unfavourable convergence of climatic, geographical, demographic and economic factors. 
Thirty years after Colbert’s initiative, intendant Lamoignon de Basville’s brief descriptions 
of the Sault forests in the Pyrenean Alet diocèse suggested at best a mitigated outcome. 
While they were sufficiently furnished with firs “pour servir à l’Etat quand la nécessité le 
demandera,” the forests which had been earmarked for the building of long galley oars for 
																																																								
9 A term coined by economic historian Werner Sombart, Der Moderne Kapitalismus (Leipzig, 
1902). 
10 According to P.W. Bamford, Forests and French sea power, 1660 - 1789 (Toronto, 1956), 9, in 
the eighteenth century, the building of just one first-rate ship of the line required more than 4,000 
oaks and a considerable quantity of other woods.   
11 Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban, ‘Traité de la culture des forêts’ in: Les oisivetés de monsieur de 
Vauban (Seyssel, 2007) first edition 1701; René-Antoine Ferchault de Réaumur, Réflexions sur 
l’état des bois du Royaume, Mémoires de l’Académie des Sciences, (Paris,1721); G.L. Leclerc de 
Buffon, Mémoire sur la conservation et le rétablissement des forêts (Paris, 1739); on Henri-Louis 
Duhamel du Monceau, see Jérôme Buridant, ‘Duhamel du Monceau et la crise forestière du 
XVIIIe siècle’, in: Jérôme Buridant, Duhamel du Monceau, un Européen du siècle des Lumières 
(Orléans, 2001) pp. 41-54.  
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the Mediterranean arsenals had all been “détruites & épuisées.” 12 In 1725, the supply 
situation of the regional capital Toulouse was worrying enough to be discussed at the 
Etats. This sparked a series of ordinances and arrêts du Parlement, which remained 
however without much effect.13 By the last decades of the century, mounting agricultural 
malaise, industrial stagnation, and commercial disasters resulted in fast rising wood prices 
in the region. In 1788, intendant Ballainvilliers warned: “Il y a une disette effrayante. Le 
dépérissement des bois se fait sentir depuis près d’un siècle. [...] On est réduit à acheter le 
bois à un prix exorbitant [...] dans les villes; les paysans n’ont de ressource que dans 
l’émondage des arbres, le bois mort, les sarments et les arbustes qu’ils arrachent dans la 
garrigue.” 14 The exceptional rise of the price of wood has been amply demonstrated, even 
if historians disagreed on the accuracy of the figures. According to Ernest Labrousse, the 
average price of firewood between 1771 and 1789 was 63 % higher than the reference 
period of 1726-1741, and 91 % for 1785 – 1789 years alone. 15 
 
In other provinces, similarly bleak assessments emerged. The “Grande enquête sur les 
bois” instigated by the ministry in 1771 exposed the disorders of main-morte woods. 16 In 
1776, navy commissioner Sr. Flamenq deplored that in Bourgogne, “[l]es forêts 
appartenantes au Roy, celles des eclésiastiques, gens de mainmorte, communautés, 
habitans de Parroisses et des particuliers touchent à leur destruction presque totale; non 
seulement par rapport aux bois propres à la construction de vaisseaux du Roy [...] mais 
encore à l’usage des bâtimens civils et pour le chauffage.” 17 In the 1780s, a series of 
reports by the influential grand-maître of Champagne, Antoine Telles d’Acosta, raised 
alarm about the disastrous situation of urban and industrial wood provisioning. Most 
																																																								
12 Nicolas Lamoignon de Basville, Mémoires pour servir à l’Histoire de Languedoc (Amsterdam, 
1736), 22. This publication is based on Basville’s compilation of 1697. 
13 Etats session of 6 February 1725. See Léon Dutil, L'état économique du Languedoc à la fin de 
l'ancien régime (Paris, 1911), esp. chapitre V, ‘Les Bois’, pp. 213-217. 
14 Charles Bernard, baron de Ballainvilliers, Mémoires sur le Languedoc ; (suivis du) Traité sur le 
commerce en Languedoc (Montpellier, 1989), first publ.1788, quoted in: Dutil, L'état économique, 
214.  
15 Ernest Labrousse, Esquisse du mouvement des prix et des revenus en France au XVIIIe siècle, 2 
vols (Paris, 1984), first publ. 1933. See especially vol.1, 343-348. For a critique of Labrousse’s 
results, see for example Jerôme Buridant, ‘Croissance industrielle et demande énergétique. Le cas 
du bois (XVIIIe-XIXe sècles) in: François Duceppe-Lamarre and Jens Ivo Engels (eds), Umwelt 
und Herrschaft in der Geschichte (Walter de Gruyer, 2008), pp. 92-105. 
16 Gille Bertrand, Les sources statistiques de l’histoire de France (Genève, 1980). 
17 AN, G3, 13, f.61r., Mémoire et Observations sur l’Etat actuel des forêts... (12 décembre 1776). 
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alarmingly, after the harsh winter of 1783-84, acute wood shortage threatened an already 
restless capital. 18   
 
For Michel Devèze, the spiralling needs of a fast developing population and economy were 
primary causes for crippling shortages and rocketing wood prices. For this forestry 
historian, they combined with the other “crises” of the last decades of the century to 
become “collectivement responsables de la Révolution.” 19 In Languedoc, Edward Allen 
reached a similar conclusion. In that fragile physical environment, the acceleration of 
deforestation after the 1760s not only destroyed in many places what little forest was left, 
but it might even have “formed an important factor in the development of revolutionary 
emotions in the winter of 1788-1789.” 20 On the other hand, the conflation of wood-supply 
problems into one single undifferentiated crisis has been challenged. More precise analyses 
of wood consumption figures led economic historians to distinguish between regions, or 
between the various end consumers, the manufactures, the navy, or the populations of the 
cities or the country. 21  Even the detailed description of individual forests in 
Ballainvilliers’ annexe mitigates the alarmist message in his main text, as they still 
appeared to be relatively abundant in some mountainous diocèses of Languedoc. At a more 
conceptual level, the idea that socio-economic factors (like catastrophic wood shortage) 
could trigger the fall of the ‘absolute monarchy’ is, however, a matter of debate for 
historians who prefer to stress the role of the political culture of leading elites marked by 
strife and factionalism. 22   
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Still, in the course of century, as observations of natural scientists increasingly seeped into 
the public domain, the idea of a crise du bois appeared increasingly as an established 
notion.  After the Seven-years war, among literate observers, criticisms also changed 
nature, acquiring a clearer political edge. New ideas about forest management emerged. 
Reformers of the 1760s and 1770s repeatedly attempted to suppress the regulative drive 
enshrined in Eaux-et-Forêts legislation, and transfer the management and control of the 
forests altogether to state contractors, or even private owners. 23 The need for a thorough 
refoundation of official forestry was discussed during the first Assemblée des Notables of 
1787, but it ended without reaching a concrete outcome on that matter. Finally, with his 
edict of May 1788, justice minister Lamoignon hit at the heart of the forestry institution 
when he suppressed all those “tribunaux d’exceptions [qui] gênent, embarrassent et 
ralentissent la marche de la justice.” 24 This re-assigned the judicial competencies of the 
forestry institution to the présidiaux and bailliage courts. A loud call for reform also 
resonated throughout the cahiers de doléances of 1789, where maîtrises particulières were 
perceived as a source of abuse, unnecessary expense, and oppression. For the authors of 
the cahiers of Ardiège (Saint-Gaudens), the “vexations inouïes que les maîtrises des eaux 
et forêts et leurs suppôts exercent contre les communautés” had become intolerable. 25 
 
France’s woes were not unique. Similar problems plagued all rulers of seventeenth and 
eighteenth-century Europe, albeit with varying degrees of severity. 26 In a revealing 
symmetry, the first edition of John Evelyn’s “Sylva” in 1664 coincided with the start of 
Colbert’s Grandes Réformations Forestières, a substantial, nation-wide series of 
operations that completely overhauled France’s forestry in the 1660s and 1670s. In 
counterpart to the catchphrase attributed to Colbert “la France périra faute de bois”, the 
earl of Carnarvon quipped that wood was “an excrescence of the earth provided by God for 
the payment of debts.” 27 Whether for the survival of a whole nation or for individual 
profit, questions of wood supplies and forest management were universal concerns of early 
modern European states. In France, all these criticisms, in their diverse manifestations, 
targeted fundamentally one core feature of the royal administration: the monopoly of the 
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monarchical state over the management and control of a crucial and increasingly scarce 
material resource, wood.     
 
This monopoly was rooted in a centuries-old process. Given its strategic and economic 
importance, it is not surprising that at all times princes and rulers sought to exercise and 
expand jurisdictional and administrative control over this resource. In France, the Eaux-et-
Forêts institution (in its eighteenth-century guise) was established by Henri III in 1575. He 
covered the territory with a grid of clearly delineated forestry districts, operated by a 
hierarchically organised, fast-growing body of office-holders. Subsequently, there were 
several attempts at reducing the number of these offices, notably by Henri IV and Jean-
Baptiste Colbert. 28 All failed, mainly because of the lack of funds to reimburse their 
holders. 29 
 
After a second major reconfiguration in 1689, the official forestry map remained broadly 
unchanged until the Revolution. 30  It comprised eighteen regional grandes maîtrises 
headed by a grand-maître, further subdivided in approximately 120 maîtrises particulières 
and smaller units, the grueries. 31  Maîtrises particulières were at once lower courts and 
administrative centres for a given geographical district. In that district, the king’s forests 
were patrolled by fluctuating numbers of salaried gardes directly answerable to the grand-
maître. 32 Colbert reduced the core personnel of each maîtrise to a skeleton staff, which 
comprised the head of the maîtrise (maître particulier), one lieutenant, one procureur du 
Roy, one garde-marteau and one or two clerks (greffiers). These mid-ranking officials 
operated at the juncture between the upper echelons of the forestry hierarchy - the Contrôle 
Général, Table de Marbre, and regional grand-maître - and the subjects who owned, or 
used, the forests situated in the maîtrise.   
 
This group of officers was an essential component of the crown’s administrative and 
judicial forestry apparatus, and it is remarkable they have not attracted more 
																																																								
28 See William Doyle, ‘Colbert et les offices’, Histoire, Économie & Société, 4 (2000), pp. 469-
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30 See Map 8 below, p.99.  
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32 An edict of November 1689 erected gardes posts as offices, but there is some confusion about 
their status after 1719, when they should have officially returned to salaried status. See Roger 
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historiographical attention. It will be seen that reasons for this lacuna are linked to the 
persistence of hardened views of a forestry scholarship narrowly focused on the Colbertian 
legacy. The forestry regime he established fits particularly neatly within the mould of 
classic representations of ‘absolutism’. Especially in French historiography, this acted as a 
bulwark against revisionist ideas, which from late twentieth century were upturning 
orthodoxies of a Paris-based, modernising administrative apparatus, whose predatory 
interventionism triumphed over the diminished vitality of representative institutions or 
leading professional groups in the provinces.  
 
Forestry and ‘absolutism’ 
 
Following critical analyses of historians like Roger Mettam or Peter Campbell, 33 the 
revisionist paradigm developed out of the fundamental belief that power in the past was 
better understood from the point of view of its actual functioning than from its structures. 
For Campbell, the state apparatus was not simply the materialisation of royal will. Instead, 
“it benefited from a great deal of consensus and co-operation from society, particularly in 
the realm of justice as arbitration.” 34 Studies based on pays d’états like Languedoc, 
Burgundy or Brittany did much to buttress these views. 35 Instead of the confrontational 
stance opposing a dominant Parisian power base to disintegrating provincial institutions, 
Swann’s research, for example, depicted a sophisticated balancing act performed by the 
Etats, reconciling demands of the crown and those of the people who placed their faith in 
them. A similar emphasis on negotiation, convergence of interests and ‘social 
collaboration’ was also at the core of William Beik’s influential study of seventeenth-
century Languedoc elites. While these works were concerned with elites and large 
institutions, other historians also focused on the middle rungs of society and institutions, 
highlighting the agency of intermediate ‘power brokers’ in the context of their immediate 
social, cultural and political environment. 36  
																																																								
33 Roger Mettam, Power and faction in Louis XIV’s France (Oxford, 1988); Campbell, Power and 
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Scholarship of early modern French forestry, especially in its Colbertian phase, was 
written from a very different perspective. As the following section will outline, forestry 
literature remained long attached to classic narratives highlighting the efficacy and impact 
of Réformations Forestières. These high-profile events were presented as the hallmarks of 
monarchical centralisation and harbingers of a modernising forestry technocracy. By 
drawing mostly on state-led processes, discourses, and institutional or legal structures, 
accounts of early modern forestry administration ignored the transformative or disruptive 
potential of provincial operators. They disregarded the fact that the successful 
implementation of central policy was contingent on the loyal and effective cooperation of 
its agents in the provinces. Searching for explanations for the failure of the Eaux-et-Forêts 
to tackle the eighteenth-century wood crisis that emerged in spite of Colbert’s promising 
reforms, forestry historians uncritically absorbed contemporary views about its officers. 
They were subsumed in general evaluations based on their venality, privileged status and 
propensity to negligent practice and corruption. Reasons for the staying power of these 
classic interpretations can be found in the perceived pecular connection between the 
nation’s forests and the monarchical state, which also legitimised their role as protector of 
this precious resource. 
 
As the eye-catching representation of the état de justice in Charles de Figon’s “Arbre de 
justice” suggests, 37 the notion of a centralised forestry department as a substantive part of 
the official state apparatus was already well established in sixteenth-century discourse. 
Wood resources constituted an important political, strategic and economic asset, and the 
nature and extent of the control exercised over them enhanced the glory and authority of 
the monarch. For Antoine Pecquet, grand-maître of Rouen under Louis XV, it was self-
evident that “[L]a conservation des forêts devenait nécessairement liée avec l’intérêt de sa 
gloire et de celle de son état.” 38 After the Revolution, this bond was further strengthened 
by nationalistic sentiment. Under the Troisième République, after decades of a potent 
combination of professionalisation, bureaucratisation and politicisation of national 
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forestry, a well-structured, assertive corps forestier emerged, more closely tied to the 
political centre than ever. After the defeat of 1871, the forestry personnel of the 
République became incorporated into the military system, for which they paid a high price 
in the First World War. The ideological character, which these developments imparted to 
the field, resonated in forestry narratives throughout the rest of the twentieth century.   
 
What underpinned the evolution of forestry writing across the revolutionary divide was a 
continuing, explicit or implicit, reference to the Colbertian regime. In that sense, forestry is 
a good illustration of Fanny Cosandey and Robert Descimon’s assertion that “la France a 
cette particularité rare d’avoir produit deux paradigmes majeurs d’identification politique: 
la monarchie absolue et la république, deux modèles antagonistes et successifs et donc liés 
intellectuellement.” 39 In forestry literature, the Colbertian reference acted as a powerful 
political metaphor. France’s forests had to be harnessed for the state’s purposes, which 
consolidated the compelling notion that the long history of the forests, framed by a solid 
body of law, was “fortement couplée au centralisme d’Etat, véritable spécificité française.” 
40 It was not until the last decades of the twentieth century that this approach started to be 
questioned, and that alternative interpretations were proposed. The following section will 
outline why the enduring fascination exercised by the Colbertian legacy in forestry matters 
so long prevented new approaches in forestry scholarship from emerging.  
 
Colbert’s legacy in forestry historiography 
 
The early years of the nineteenth century saw relatively little scholarly interest in ancien 
régime forestry. Etienne-François Dralet and Jacques-Joseph Baudrillart followed the 
tradition of compiling and commenting legal texts, 41 and one century later Edouard Decq 
explored pre-Renaissance forestry, mostly along the lines of classic institutional history. 42 
What particularly influenced the nineteenth-century approach to pre-revolutionary forestry 
was the fact that since the opening of France’s first national forestry school in Nancy in 
1824, forestry scholars were also trained practitioners. This technical slant coloured their 
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views of the performance of their predecessors. Leading this particular genre was Gustave 
Huffel, an influential high official of the Eaux-et-Forêts of the Troisième République. 
Huffel particularly deplored the longterm damage to the forests caused by the ill-advised 
sylvicultural and organisational principles of his predecessors. Following the established 
tradition, he also duly denounced the negligence and corruption of the venal officers 
entrusted with their conservation. 43  
 
In the ‘great-man-great-deed’ genre, Réformation commissioner and grand-maître Louis 
de Froidour was given centre stage. From relatively modest beginnings as a lieutenant 
général civil et criminel au bailliage et maîtrise des eaux et forets du comté de Marle et la 
Fère (Picardie), Froidour soon became a créature of Colbert, and one of his star reformers. 
In 1666, he was sent to Languedoc to mastermind the forestry reforms in the south-west of 
the kingdom. After the end of the operation in 1673, he was rewarded with the post of 
grand-maître of Toulouse, which he retained until his death in 1685. 44 The rich hoard of 
administrative documents, ethnographical observations and epistolary works this elite 
forester left behind was rediscovered by regional historians of the Troisième République, 
and they continue to fascinate historians today. 45 For Froidour biographer and forestry 
historian Michel Bartoli, not only were his works on technical matters of considerable 
importance and influence, but he was also a keen and astute observer of rural practices and 
customs of the Pyrenean communities.46 The narrow historiographical focus on this 
forestry personality, helped by accessible and well-structured archives, elevated Froidour 
to the rank of a cult figure. On the other hand, it obscured the reform work, political 
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influence and literary output of other elite foresters, such as Henri Clausse de Fleury, 
Antoine Pecquet or Dominique-Antoine Telles d’Acosta. 47  
 
After a lull corresponding to the two World Wars, Michel Devèze pioneered a revival of 
interest in forestry history and inspired a wave of research in the domain. 48 The 1960s 
decade also saw the creation of organisations dedicated to the study of the history of 
French forestry, such as the Groupe d’Histoire des Forêts Françaises, founded in 1982. 
National institutions like the CNRS or the Ecole des Chartes further fostered research in 
French forestry history, supported by the rise of the ecological sciences in the 1970s based 
on interdisciplinary work, an approach particularly well-suited to a topic such as forestry.  
 
The literature emerging from that period remained broadly in the line of classic narratives, 
focusing on forestry structures and momentous reform events, such as those of François 
1er, Henri IV, or Louis XIV. Devèze’s meticulous studies of sixteenth century forestry and 
Colbert’s Grandes Réformations were a powerful influence in this new trend, although the 
latter work was criticised for its over-reliance on Parisian sources. Together, these 
accounts depict the consolidation of a normative legal and administrative framework that 
gradually increased state tutelage over the forests owned by the Church, municipalities, or 
individuals. Most importantly, Colbert’s Réformations emerged as the climax in this long 
evolution of monarchical control of forestry matters in the provinces. For Michel Antoine, 
“[l]’histoire de la législation des eaux et forêts avant 1791 se divise tout naturellement en 
deux périodes: avant et après 1669.” 49 The Ordonnance of August 1669, 50 which was 
imposed by the king in a lit de justice, embodied the authoritarian regulation by the centre 
legitimised by its belief that following rational principles of management and control of the 
forests would guarantee their long-term preservation. After that watershed, the few works 
focused on eighteenth-century forestry suggest a century-long, gradual decline, leading to 
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the demise of the institution in the revolutionary upheaval. 51 The historiographical lacuna 
of the period between the end of Louis XIV’s reign and the Revolution rests on the fact 
that the administrative structures established in 1715 remained largely unchanged 
thereafter. However, this broad trajectory of emergence, climax and fall over such a long 
period appears overly simplistic. An empirical approach, such as is proposed in this thesis, 
from the perspective of the ‘actors’ – the officers in the maîtrises and the forestry officials 
– can provide new insights into the multilayered societal and political processes, which 
during these seven decades underpinned the evolution of the relationships between the 
political centre and the periphery.   
 
What particularly crystallised these traditional interpretations of ancien régime forestry 
into immutable tropes were the financial successes and symbolic prestige associated with 
Colbert’s forestry reforms, and the principle of ‘state rationality’ that underpinned them. 
Historians and forestry practitioners were dazzled by the unprecedented scale and apparent 
efficacy of the Grandes Réformations Forestières, implemented in every province of the 
kingdom within just twenty years. This was a relatively short time given the technical and 
logistical limitations of the period. For Michel Antoine, Colbert’s reforms represented a 
worthy contribution to the rise of what he termed the monarchie administrative, 
characterised by bureaucratic ‘functionarisation’. Re-edited more than fifty times between 
1669 and 1789, 52 the Ordonnance provided a coherent, homogenous national framework 
that remained formally valid until the new Code Forestier of 1827. Based on previous 
forestry codes, this legal ‘monument’ incorporated lessons from the vast amount of 
information  gathered from the different provinces during the Réformation process. For 
Antoine, the Ordonnance of August 1669 represented a “magnifique synthèse des 
ordonnances précédentes et des principes modernes d’administration.” 53 With their solid 
legislative basis and bureaucratic component, Colbert’s reforms could prefigure the 
impersonal functionarisation of modern bureaucracies.  
 
In thirty-two titles and over five hundred articles, the new code addressed many aspects of 
French forestry and waterways. It outlined professional guidelines for each category of 
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officers, prescribed the annual drawing up of exploitation plans adapted to each forest, 
strengthened technical and bureaucratic control procedures especially regarding wood 
sales. Auctioneering was confirmed as the only authorised sales method for royal forests. It 
regulated customary use-rights of forest grazing and wood-collecting more strictly. 
Crucially, in the technical domain it erected a small number of operational principles as 
central dogmata of forestry management: the quart-de-réserve imposed on all forests 
owned by crown, Church or communities, rotational harvesting (tire-et-aire), and a fixed 
ratio of standards (baliveaux) to be reserved after each cut for the regeneration of harvested 
plots. 54 For Andrée Corvol, the clockwork mechanics of the tire-et-aire method embodied 
the Cartesian outlook of a government guided by a spirit of science and rationalism. In the 
words of Pierre Chaunu who prefaced Corvol’s work, “l’Ordonnance de 1669, c’est la 
nature écrite en langage géométrique.” 55  
 
The historiographical impact of Colbert’s legacy in forestry as the harbinger of the 
‘modern’ state was founded not only on the ambitious scope of his programme, but also on 
its immediately visible outcome. In the three problem areas that had initially driven the 
intervention, "la crise du trésor, l'appréhension du manque de bois, et […] les besoins de la 
marine," 56 Colbert had good results to show. Despite their enormous cost (estimated at 
1,300,000 livres) the overall financial balance of the Réformations was positive. The 
aggregate returns from fines alone represented 2,000,000 livres. 57 The revenue from royal 
forests rose six-fold between 1661 and 1683, not least due to the re-incorporation of 
abusively alienated forests. The longterm preservation of these productive forests was 
secured by a stricter control of harmful practices by rural communities, such as forest-
grazing or illegal clearing of the forest margins to obtain land for cultivation. Furthermore, 
within a short time domestic production of naval timber dramatically increased. Longterm 
supplies seemed secured by imposing a small number of prescriptive management 
measures, most importantly the quart-de-réserve rule (applicable to all forests regardless 
of owner), or the compulsory declaration before harvesting a naval-grade tree with pre-
emptive buying rights reserved for the Marine department. In the short term, Colbert’s 
reforms could be considered a success, and his forestry regime an ‘ideal-type’ of state 
modernisation. As an effective system of rationally managed forestry, it increased the 
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coercive powers of the state, which legitimised the use of constraining measures by 
claiming a “superior set of administrative solutions,” apt at tackling the country’s forestry 
problems. 58 
 
Some historians have pushed the rationality argument to extremes. In the context of the 
growing environmental concerns of the last decades of the twentieth century, political 
ecologists in the wake of James Scott’s Seeing like a State used historical examples like 
these to launch a sweeping polemical attack on authoritarian methods of states and 
corporations. 59 They denounced the use of heuristic methods by powerful actors which 
allowed them to seize, and have control over, limited material resources, often in blunt 
disregard of social or environmental considerations. To put his point across, Scott used the 
example of eighteenth-century Prussian ‘scientific forestry’ – with an indirect reference to 
Colbert - forcing natural tree growth into a “reliable format for taxation.” 60  
 
‘State rationality’ has also been used by scholars interested in the actual technical and 
bureaucratic tools developed by the state to manage and regulate the forests, seen as 
instruments for gaining ever more sophisticated enforcement capabilities. 61 For Sébastien 
Poublanc, a specialist on the career of Froidour and an advocate of ‘digital history’, 
Colbert’s reforms were a remarkable analytical tool to explore the production of early 
modern ‘utilitarian knowledge’ serving the objectives of the state. Viewed from this 
perspective, Froidour was a judicious choice as, ironically, his bureaucratic profligacy 
overwhelmed even the legendary information-processing skills of his master. “Vous avez 
employé trop de papiers aux volumes de la réformation des Eaux et Forêts de la grande 
maîtrise de Toulouse, pour peu d'écritures. Ces volumes monstrueux m'empêcheront de les 
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mettre dans ma bibliothèque.” 62 Poublanc argued that, conceptually, the large body of 
forest surveys, sylvicultural information and compendia of bureaucratic techniques 
produced by Froidour represented a novel and powerful instrument of territorial control for 
the monarch. 63 The ‘databank’ he generated embodied the advent of a “nouveau cadre de 
contrôle du territoire tout autant qu’un instrument de mainmise sur une ressource 
stratégique – la forêt et ses produits.” 64 Forestry ‘data’, and the constantly refined 
techniques used to obtain them, represented effective tools of territorial consolidation and 
administrative efficiency. They were valuable “vehicles of authority or objectivity.” 65 
After the stabilisation of the Pyrenean border with Spain in 1659 and the inclusion of new 
territories in the following decades, these epistemological approaches appear especially 
pertinent, as a better knowledge of the territory would have significantly empowered the 
many maîtrises which, like Quillan, managed the forests along France’s long and heavily-
forested southern, eastern and northern borders.  
 
On the other hand, epistemological approaches have been criticised for their 
undifferentiated assumptions of the centralising, rationalising state power that underpinned 
them. In his study of forestry administration of Renaissance Venice - a smaller political 
unit than France but with an equally centralised power structure - Karl Appuhn alerted us 
to the risks of an overly narrow interpretation of state rationality. 66  Despite vast 
differences in scale between the Italian city-state and the French territory, the two forestry 
regimes showed arresting similarities in terms of their main guiding principles. They were 
both rigidly fixated on production goals driven by state needs, and to achieve these goals 
both used increasingly coercive forestry legislation. This legislative effort was contingent 
on the concomitant development of a technical and bureaucratic framework, based on a 
rational, measurable control of space and time the forests, in the form of maps, surveys and 
catalogues, or the control of timings of timber exploitation.  
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Appuhn argued that the application of state rationality could lead to ambiguous 
interpretations for both contemporary politicians and historians. His argument was based 
on the comparison of timber yields in state-controlled forests and community forests of the 
Venetian upland, between 1569 and 1636. In state forests, stricter controls had apparently 
produced disappointing results. The numbers of high-quality timber trees were decreasing. 
Figures were better in communal forests despite local residents frequently disregarding 
regulations. Paradoxically, their pilfering in the undergrowth had over time created better 
conditions for timber growth by clearing spaces for growth around the most promising 
young ‘poles’. Appuhn concluded that the “lumber crews” of the Venetian upland 
“understood the consequences of state policies in ways that the senators in Venice did not.“ 
67 This resonates with the recent emphasis of forestry scholars of various European 
traditions on the adequacy, in environmental terms, of local knowledge of the bio-physical 
characteristics of the forest ecosystem, which contrasted with the damaging effects of 
state-produced regulations. 68  Crucially, in the Venetian case such knowledge also 
extended to the subaltern officials on the ground, who, in their own right, displayed “an 
unexpectedly high level of technical sophistication.” 69   
 
This last point is important. It hints at the contrasting rationales guiding the decision-
makers in the centre and the officials in touch with local realities. Central forestry 
authorities, mindful of preserving their authority, were constrained by a narrowly-legalist 
purview, while their administrators on the ground had a good grasp of the natural and 
social environment that framed their role as enforcers of forest law. We can therefore argue 
that perspectives assuming a drivebelt-style mechanism that ignores the regulative effect of 
local resistance or the autonomy of intermediary officials are reductive. As will be shown 
in chapter four, recovering some of the operational uncertainties and complexities 
pertaining to the human reality that underpinned the practice of forestry greatly mitigates 





67 Ibid., 888. 
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New approaches in institutional history 
 
Classic institutional history is one domain of historical research, which has been deeply 
affected by the recent trend to move away from traditional structure-based approaches and 
recover the ‘human element’ in institutional history. Social histories of institutions have 
shed new light on the workings of early modern institutions in many areas of public life. 
From the 1970s, they explored the social and cultural dimensions of institutional processes, 
providing insights in to the “practices and sociology of the corporate bodies that formed 
the state.” 70 With the help of the prosopographical method, this scholarship offered more 
nuanced representations of the multiple ways in which the state used its normative 
administrative and jurisdictional powers to assert its authority. In Joël Cornette’s effective 
formulation, “[L]oin d'une histoire figée des institutions qui décrirait en somme un État 
abstrait en ne s'attachant qu'à la lettre des ordonnances et des édits ou à l'écriture normative 
et rigide des juristes, de nombreuses études centrent à présent l'analyse sur le 
fonctionnement et les pratiques de la machine administrative et les rapports «réels» 
institués entre gouvernants et gouvernés, entre roi et sujets, entre Paris et provinces, entre 
capitale et périphéries, entre centralisation et décentralisation.” 71  
  
At intermediate levels of society and the institutional hierarchy, the new social and cultural 
history of institutions especially highlighted the negotiated, adaptive role of office-holders 
as brokers of princely authority in the provinces. By the 1660s, the 40,000 or so second-
rank notables who had invested in a non-ennobling, intermediary office as a source of 
modest gages, privileges, dynastic stability and local respectability, represented a sizeable 
body whose interests and ambitions the state could not ignore. In their own right and by 
their own agency, historians of France’s officiers moyens concluded, they were “élément(s) 
moteur(s) dans la construction de l’Etat.” 72 Far from representing an anonymous cogwheel 
in the state apparatus, these brokers of royal authority were “intermédiaires souples,” 
moved by interests that could be markedly distinct from those of their service. 73 
 
Within this broad historiographical movement, the mid-ranking officers of the ancien 
régime forestry institution received only scant attention. Historians seeking explanations 
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for the Eaux-et-Forêts’ apparent failings to tackle the mounting wood crisis of the 
eighteenth century just blamed ‘en-bloc’ their venal status. They looked first and foremost 
for exogenous causes, outside the institution. Economic historians interested in questions 
of the production, distribution and consumption of wood products described the rise of 
industrial and household consumption, or the technical contingencies regarding the 
production and distribution of wood. 74 A vast and continuing debate sparked by John Nef 
in 1936 discussed the link between industrialisation and the shortage of wood as an energy 
resource in early modern Europe. 75 Others described the ravages caused by military 
operations, or the daily degradations committed by marauding village populations. 76  
 
Scholars interested in systemic causes focused mostly on the technical, sylvicultural 
principles that underpinned forestry law. Armed with the benefit of hindsight, they 
criticised the longterm consequences of a wide and unyielding application of misguided 
technical tenets. Andrée Corvol was a particularly vocal critic of the system’s rigid 
“bureaucratisme dérivé de l’institution colbertienne,” which prioritised legalist arguments 
over empirical ones based on observation. As an untouchable dogma, the superior status of 
the high forest oak over other species, she deplored, burdened eighteenth and nineteenth-
century governments with large stands of over-mature oak with little commercial value, 
whilst impeding the adequate provision of firewood (predominantly based on other 
broadleaves) for the country’s growing population and industry. 77 
 
While each of these causes might have contributed to the worsening of the situation 
towards the end of the eighteenth century, there was little interest in internal causes linked 
to the forestry system, its hierarchy, and the role played by the forestry personnel. At 
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higher levels of the hierarchy, the prosopographical survey of France’s grand-maîtres from 
1689 to 1789 by Jean-Claude Waquet, a student of Michel Antoine, is to date the only 
study dedicated to this group. Waquet depicts a relatively homogenous body of robe 
officers of recent nobility, often rooted in finance or in the judiciary. Waquet however 
restricted his study to prosopographical details of these elite foresters and financial aspects 
of their office. There is still much scope to expand on Waquet’s pioneering work, for 
example through regional approaches or specific case studies.   
 
A prosopographical study of the middle ranks of the Eaux-et-Forêts institution based on 
‘real actors’ who, in the words of John Brewer (an advocate of the micro-historical 
approach) had “agency, motives, feeling and consciousness,” 78  is still unwritten. 
Contemporary observers and historians commonly bundled intermediate forestry officials 
into an anonymous group of provincial operators, whose sole visible agency seemed to 
consist in acts of corruption or other forms of professional misconduct. Contemporary 
observers readily linked the professional malpractice, which bedeviled the workings of 
many maîtrises to the venal status of their officers. For Froidour, “à même temps qu’un 
homme en était pourvu, il pouvait se dire propriétaire de la forêt dont il était l’officier, 
avec cette seule différence qu’au lieu que le propriétaire en aurait pris quelque soin, celui-
ci ne faisait aucune diligence pour la conserver, de manière que pas un de ces sortes 
d’officiers n’ont pu nous représenter le moindre exploits de leurs visites.” 79 
 
Views such as these have been relayed by historians who uncritically included them in the 
catalogue of causes for the institution’s long-term decline. For Gustave Huffel, “[c]ette 
déchéance tient sans doute à la vénalité des offices qui introduisit dans le service, et surtout 
dans les grades les plus élevés, à partir du milieu du xvie siècle, des oisifs, étrangers à 
toute notion de sylviculture et à toute tradition.” 80 For Huffel, the reason was simple. 
These foresters were “oisifs” who had bought their office “comme on achète une terre ou 
un titre de rente, et ne songeaient qu’à en tirer le plus de profit avec le moins de tracas 
possible.” 81 Making short-shrift of analysing the problems (and achievements) of the 
institution from the point of view of its operators, these general views led to the sweeping 
statement that forestry was “symptomatic of France’s whole political and administrative 
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system in the late eighteenth century: slow, corrupt, remote and dysfunctional.” 82 From 
this perspective, the Eaux et Forêts were doomed to fail.  
 
As this thesis will show, mid-ranking forestry officers were not a passive and corrupt 
transmission device of an authoritarian decision-making centre. They operated in powerful 
social and cultural local and regional contexts. At local level, their close personal and 
professional association with dominant local groups confered upon them both 
respectability and personal ‘credit’, and it provided a solid basis for their career and their 
families. By the same token, these local ties had also the potential of coaxing them into 
participating in a culture of fraud, abuse of power, and corruption. As shown by the 
example cited in the first chapter, this could also lead to internal divisions to the point of 
verbal and physical violence. Analysing from their own perspective the field of tensions in 
which these officers operated will shed some light on their perception of service, and on 
the foundations and limits of their administrative authority. It will demonstrate that a 
centralised, well-structured institution such as forestry, organised along rational principles 
of administration, could be derailed, or at least destabilised, by processes occurring at the 
lower rungs of the hierarchy. Without an established body of research on mid-ranking 
foresters to lean on, our study has been particularly inspired by recent scholarship in three 
main domains, officier-moyen research, the study of towns and their network dynamics, 




Recent research on the vast and somewhat ill defined group of France’s officiers moyens 
was particularly inspirational. 83 Historians like Jean Nagle, Michel Cassan or Vincent 
Meyzie have used the prosopographical method to establish collective profiles of 
seigneurial judges or officers manning the présidiaux, bureaux des finances or élections. 
For Meyzie, the latter even represented an ideal-type of these “compagnies secondes.” 84 
Jean Nagle, whose research on the marc d’or had pioneered interest for this group, went on 
to explore the moral foundations underlying the venal office as a specifically French 
“passion”. In his Un orgueil français, he examined the connection between the 
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administrative authority associated with the office, and the distinct concepts of dignité and 
honneur. 85  
 
Studies of the présidiaux were particularly useful because of the similarities between 
présidial magistrates and the officers of the maîtrises. Both were mid-ranking, legally-
trained office-holders, residing in small towns with limited promotion opportunities, and 
both were on the lookout for strategies to maintain their position within a competitive local 
power arena. Both institutions were from the outset caught in a continuing struggle to 
impose their jurisdiction. In Cornette’s analysis, the introduction of présidial courts in 
1551 had been a game-changer in many towns. “Cette vague de création de nouveaux 
officiers a provoqué une recomposition de la hiérarchie urbaine du royaume et, à l'intérieur 
de chaque ville, une redistribution des pouvoirs [...] des coutumes et des honneurs.” 86 A 
recent body of research based on individual case studies has launched a debate on the 
widely assumed decline of the présidial group in the second half of the eighteenth century. 
87 Reasons for the ‘crisis’ were linked to rising levels of debts of presidial families for an 
office increasingly ill-adapted to the needs of the time, and overshadowed by more 
powerful categories of officers or the growing non-venal ‘caste’ of engineers and other 
professional groups, perceived as more immediately useful for the common good. 88 Public 
visibility and service usefulness, a common theme in pre-revolutionary criticism against 
‘privileged’ office-holders, is an important aspect to be considered in our analysis of 
Quillan’s foresters.  
 
More questionable are Cassan’s interpretations regarding the normative role of state 
bureaucratisation, and the part it played in the decline of présidial authority. His view of an 
“irresistible gonflement de l’Etat par la voie de l’office” advancing towards a modern 
bureaucratic regime is redolent of Michel Antoine’s monarchie administrative. With its 
“mécanique administrative bien rodée, secrétant ses normes, sa prose, ses tableaux et 
formulaires prêts à remplir et versant dans la routinisation,“ the bureaucratic state, Cassan 
argued, signalled that “[l]a monarchie administrative est une réalité, en quête d’efficacité.” 
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89 A forestry-related example can illustrate our doubts. We have ample evidence that 
Froidour sought to improve the mechanics of bureaucratic practice, but how did his 
intentions translate into practice? Title VIII of the 1669 Ordonnance required the greffier 
to keep, on an annual basis, eight separate categories of registers, and one can surmise that 
over the years the enormous physical volume this represented would have quickly 
outgrown the walls of the chamber where they were housed. It is tempting to assume that, 
over time, the rule was ‘adapted’ to more realistic proportions. The numerous gaps in the 
surviving records of the forestry series might be attributed to accidents of archival 
conservation. On the other hand, one of the cases described in this study proves that this 
constraining rule was less than strictly followed. In Burgundy, during an inspection visit at 
the maîtrise of Avallon in 1718 the grand-maître of Paris was appalled to find only 
“quelques feuilles de papier unies les unes aux autres” instead of the three statutory 
registers. 90 In matters of bureaucratic rationality too there was a big gap between theory 
and practice. 
  
Officers between crown and town 
 
Cassan’s observations regarding the relationship between crown and town raise another 
important question. Following Tocqueville’s assumptions about the centralising state and 
corresponding weakening of municipal powers, Cassan suggested that in many pre-modern 
small towns the alleged predominance of the state might have destroyed the old “’triple 
alliance’ entre les officiers royaux, les bons marchands et les gens de justice, garantissant 
l’harmonie citadine.” 91 This question of the resilience of ancestral structures against 
interventions of the crown, and the political attitudes and loyalties of intermediary officers 
in this struggle, touches at the heart of the centre-periphery debate. Historians have asked 
how far loyalties were determined by a “solidarité éprouvée avec la ville et les intérêts 
citadins,” or instead by “des aspirations sociales faconnées par le tropisme nobiliaire,” 92 
the latter alluding to nobility-centred networks operating as ‘natural’ conduits towards the 
upper spheres of power closest to the king.  
 
The integration of the state into urban structures has given rise to a growing number of 
studies. On a whole, they tend to mitigate classic notions of a victorious advance of the 
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administrative monarchy into the corps urbains of secondary towns and cities, such as 
Cassan assumed. 93 For Dijon for example, Michael Breen highlighted the crucial role of 
legal professionals before 1661 defending the rights of the town against repeated 
interventions by state agents, but he also described the municipality’s progressive 
submission thereafter to the governor and intendant who exploited strife and factionalism 
among Dijon’s local elites. 94 At the same time the political agency of the town’s avocats 
increased through their intellectual contributions to general jurisprudence. As “skilled 
hommes politiques, [they] could manipulate law, institutions, and patronage to successfully 
defend municipal interests, even in adverse circumstances.” 95 They played an important 
part in the formation of a ‘legal public sphere’ that “engendered and sustained a culture of 
political appraisal which was transformed during the eighteenth century into a broader and 
ultimately more influential public critique.” 96 This example alerts us to the need to closely 
examine the influence of municipal, regional and royal agents, and the role played by the 
royal foresters in a micro-battleground for power, which appears far more complex and 
fluid than a simple dichotomic choice between allegiance to the town or loyalty to the 
crown.  
 
Following such an approach, it is important to situate the town within the perceived 
hierarchy of the country’s urban system. As William Beik vividly described for 
Languedoc, 97 the official status of a town or city had a profound impact on the choices and 
opportunities it offered its residents, including royal officers. One recent approach 
suggested the existence in early modern Europe of a system of cities, which evolved 
according to economic factors linked to a proto-industrialisation located in rural settings. 
For Jan de Vries, this suggests a regional, rather than national, framework for these 
dynamic processes. “An assessment of the place of urban settlements in the economy and 
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society of early modern Europe requires an examination urban-rural interactions in a 
regional framework.” 98  In this particular approach, the regional hierarchy of towns 
depended on competitive relations between trading centres in a region, or between regional 
centres and their hinterlands. Crucially, “the urban functions of controlling production and 
providing for the circulation of goods and services were not carried out primarily to fulfil 
the needs of a command structure ‘at the top’.” 99  
 
This economically oriented perspective complements the classic use of population size and 
institutional infrastructure as the main parameters for establishing a hierarchy of early 
modern towns. The position of a town within this hierarchy had a direct influence on the 
personal ‘credit’ of its residents, but also on the value of the offices, and on tariffs such as 
marc d’or and the capitation. Conversely, residency in a particular town determined 
individuals’ chances of accessing useful networks that could open up pathways for 
professional and social advancement. If the town did not provide these opportunities, 
officers might be trapped inside narrow clientage networks converging towards local or 
regional sources of power.  
 
The importance of the exchange of power and influence through networks, patronage and 
clientèles in early modern life has been amply demonstrated in recent scholarship, notably 
in the works of Sharon Kettering. 100 She showed that the monarchical state was reliant on 
the complex web of relationships that linked court society and influential patrons of the 
upper spheres of the polity to the members of the sanior pars of France’s towns. Under 
Louis XIV, webs of dependency connected wealthy provincial lenders, many of them 
nobles, directly to the king’s inner circle. 101 A good example of such royal clientelism is 
the part played by clientage and patronage in facilitating negotiations at the Etats, as 
described by Stéphane Durand et al. 102 While major studies focused on provincial elites, at 
municipal level, clientage webs were the conduits for conflicts and strategies around 
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financial dealings, matrimonial alliances, family politics, and other forms of social 
bondage. 103 These social network dynamics were further entangled with the power tussles 
that opposed urban oligarchies, corps de villes and royal agents. Foresters in the service of 
the king, clearly, did not operate in a void. Their professional activity was framed by the 
specific social, economic and cultural characteristics of their urban environment.  In order 
to define more precisely the identity and agency of mid-ranking foresters, it is therefore 
necessary to get a better understanding of this specific urban power arena that surrounded 
them.  
 
In this respect, the town of Quillan, fifty kilometres south of Carcassonne, is a pertinent 
example. With approximately 1.200 inhabitants, 104 it was a small, walled town and river 
port on the Aude, whose forest-rich upper basin was a key area in the search for naval 
timber and the provision of manufacturing and household wood. Because the river 
upstream was suitable for the floating of timber, the town developed early into a thriving 
centre of raft-building and wood commerce. As will be further developed in chapter two, 
until the arrival of commissioner Froidour, in terms of royal control the Quillan district had 
been notoriously under-administered for centuries. In 1671, the situation changed abruptly 
when it was chosen as the seat of the royal forestry institution. This makes Quillan an ideal 
gauge to evaluate the process of implantation of royal authority in a distant border 
province such as Languedoc. The establishment of the maîtrise particulière by Froidour in 
November 1671, and the subsequent construction of the Maison Royale in the very centre 
of the town, created a sudden disturbance in the lives and routines of its bourgeois and 
merchant elites. Being at once a conspicuous centre of royal authority and a local lieu de 
sociabilité, the new structure sparked a reconfiguration of the municipal power scene. It 
opened new opportunities for individuals and their families, creating rival, or 
complementary, conduits of power.  
 
On the other hand, the new opportunities introduced by the royal institution were 
counterbalanced by tighter controls and more constraining measures. In Quillan, 
Froidour’s first step as Réformation commissioner had been to remove the town’s use-
rights to royal forests. 105 While for centuries it had been “loisible à touttes personnes d’y 
aller coupper,” 106 he replaced the centuries-old free access to wood from royal forests in 
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that district with a strictly regulated sales process, under the sole responsibility of the 
grand-maître and the maîtrise officers. It would, however, be overhasty to conclude that 
these events constituted a ‘victorious’ advance of the crown into a defenseless community. 
Some important questions must be explored. How did the tension between opportunity and 
constraint manifest itself, and how did it evolve?  Was the change driven by negotiation or 
conflict? And, crucially, what was the role of the officers in this evolution?  
 
For the post-1661 decades, Poublanc’s analysis of the multipolar opposition sparked by 
Froidour’s establishment of eleven new-style maîtrises underscored the role of rival 
institutions in the region, mostly the Parlement and the Etats, but also the pressure exerted 
by influential individuals such as the archbishop of Narbonne or local forest-owning 
nobles. 107 The impact of forest-centred vested interests must also be considered at the 
level of the town. Here, the research of Christian Fruhauf was a useful pointer. In his fine-
grained study of forestry in the Pyrenean Sault plateau (an important potential site for 
shipmast timber), this scholar documented the transition from a traditional local wood 
economy based on customary rights, to a regime dominated, especially after Louis XIV’s 
reign, by the financial interests of a local wood merchant elite. 108 Fruhauf was one of the 
few to appreciate the impact of commercial aspects of wood production. His insights 
inspired us to expand our prosopographical analysis of forestry officers to the wood 
merchants who were their close professional counterparts, and with whom they were 
personally interlinked. With this broader perspective in mind, chapter three will therefore 
critically analyse the dynamics that shaped these  networks, the existence of asymmetries 
between dominant and dependent partners, and above all, the way these allegiances 
influenced the professional practice – or malpractice - of the officers. 
 
Corruption as a historical concept 
 
The ‘corruption’ of mid-ranking forestry officers is the third main theme addressed in this 
study. While the elusive definition of this term in a historical context will be discussed 
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more amply, it must be said at the start that the word itself covers an enormous spectrum of 
practices through time and space. It is taken as a “social and political construction that can 
change over time as well as from one society or from one state to another.” 109 The use of 
inverted commas indicates that, while some common characteristics can be found between 
the early modern phenomenon and the practices of the modern world, there can be no 
question here of using it in the sense of abuse of power and betrayal of trust by elected 
politicians, large corporate organisations, or other elites of globalised economies.   
 
In the early modern context, official discourse was laced with references linking 
‘corruption’ and venality. Holding an office of judicature or finance was from the outset 
used as a metaphor for professional negligence and abuse of power for personal gain. In 
1588, the cahier de doléances of Paris noted that “la négligence des ministres de la Justice 
peu soigneux de leurs charges quand il n’y a aucun profit, partie de leur avarice et 
insatiable cupidité, étant corrompus les uns par faveur, les autres par dons et présents 
portant des âmes basses sordides et vénales et qu’au leu de servir au public et d’exercer de 
bonnes et vertueuses fonctions, s’asservissent comme esclaves de robe longue sous la 
turpitude d’un gain deshonnête qui leur ôte la hauteur de courage et la généreuse liberté qui 
doit accompagner le magistrat.” 110 Refering to examples from Antiquity, Jean Bodin 
famously stigmatised the notion of long-term office ownership as essentially contradicting 
“la vertu”, a basic principle underpinning his République. For Bodin, office-ownership 
encouraged the thirst for profit, and a large number of “officiers perpétuels” covering each 
other was synonymous with the ‘corruption’ of the whole state as this practice allowed 
“toutes les méchancetés, faussetés & concussions du plus injuste Magistrat qu’on pourroit 
imaginer” to go unpunished. 111 As office creations proliferated in the first decades of the 
seventeenth century, mounting evidence of malfunctioning in the different segments of the 
monarchical administrative system appeared to confirm Bodin’s view that uncontrolled 
swelling of the body of venal officers had the potential to thwart good governance. In 
official discourse and in public perception, the venal nature of the officers had a negative 
impact of on the quality of their service. The financial liabilities incurred by the acquisition 
of the office and its progressive devalorisation pushed them to prioritise financial motives 
over service loyalty and professional zeal. By the time of Montesquieu and Voltaire, the 
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notion of the venal office as the source of bad management, lack of commitment, and 
outright corruption had crystallised into a lasting trope. 112  
 
As a historical phenomenon, corruption has also been studied from the perspective of the 
wide semantic field associated with it. Maryvonne Géneaux and Jean-Claude Waquet have 
examined contemporary dictionaries to explore the meanings of words that can be linked to 
any form of abuse of power by agents of public service. 113 Their findings show that the 
phenomenon could have many names, of which the word itself was the least common one. 
In the texts they studied, terms were chosen in a case-by-case approach, in order to 
describe as accurately as possible the nature of the act. A similar result emerges from our 
own count of ‘corruption’ in the voluminous first volume of Antoine Pecquet’s Loix 
forestières 114 : the word corruption (and derived forms) appeared only once. The most 
commonly used words (abus, délit) are of a general nature while others denote precisely 
the nature of the action (concussion, négligence, vol), (Fig. 1). 
 
The choice of words in these legal texts betrays a predominantly legalist approach, driven 
by the need to apply an adequate judicial response to each individual case. This is 
especially important for the vocabulary of the Eaux-et-Forêts as a forestry tribunal. The 
author of the preamble in the lettres patentes which formally initiated Quillan’s second 
Réformation in 1736 avoids the generic term corruption altogether, speaking instead of 
“abus considérables... [qui] paroissent provenir de la négligence des officiers et gardes et 
de leurs intelligences avec les adjudicataires, cautions et certificateurs des ventes.” 115 In 
forestry, as elsewhere, in contrast to texts of a moral or religious nature (where 
‘corruption’ refers to the corrosion of social mores), ‘corruption’ was primarily perceived 
as an individual offense, a judicial problem to be tackled by the courts.  
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Fig. 1     Number of occurrences of a selection of words 






This legal focus points to the important issue of the governments’ responses to professional 
malpractice and fraud. In a public sphere increasingly alive with literate and critical 
observers, remedies to problems affecting everyone were expected. In forestry, 
governments traditionally responded with the habitual panoply of repressive measures, 
stricter controls and case-by-case prosecution in ordinary courts. In more extreme cases - 
or when it was politically opportune - heavy-handed interventions like Chambres de 
Justice or Réformations Forestières were launched, bringing about a new spate of coercive 
legislation. 116 For présidial magistrates, departures from theoretical norms defining the 
“perfect Christian magistrate” ranged from minor ‘adjustments’ to the strict application of 
procedures, to chronic absenteism, all the way to major acts of “délinquance” calling for a 
treatment by a special court like the Grands Jours d’Auvergne. 117  On the other hand, this 
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narrow legalist scope raises the question of the apparent failure of these legal remedies to 
contain the phenomenon.  
 
In forestry, a common and convenient explanation was to lay the blame at the door of 
disinterested officers who saw their office as a purely financial investment. In 1664, Jean-
Baptiste Colbert sent his brother Charles Colbert de Croissy to inspect and reform the 
forestry district of Touraine. He reported back indignantly. “[L]es officiers de la Table de 
Marbre du Palais à Paris [...] demeurent dans un assoupissement bien blâmable pendant 
que les officiers des provinces, sur lesquels lesdits de la Table de Marbre [...] devraient  
veiller comme sur les plus grands ennemis des forêts, les dégradent et les ruinent, la 
plupart n’ayant traité de leur charge que pour cette fin.”  118  Two and a half centuries later, 
Huffel relayed this criticism near-verbatim, pointing to ancien régime officers “qui se 
laissèrent aller à d’innombrables et odieux abus.” 119 More recently, François Bluche used 
similar prose of “gaspillage, usurpations, défrichements inconsidérés, vols, défaut 
d’entretien” for a general characterisation of ancien régime venal forestry officers. With 
their “friponneries”, “brigandages” and “insuffisances” they had allegedly encouraged 
‘abusive’ wood sales and alienation of domain forests, and precipitated the depletion of the 
precious high forests intended for the navy.  120   
 
While it cannot be denied that cutting corners in bureaucratic or technical practice or 
committing fraud were part and parcel of early modern forestry practice, a better 
understanding of the reasons for the obduracy of these behaviours can be gained by using 
an approach which considers the social and cultural reality in which they occurred. Such 
empirical, contextualised approach has been particularly advocated by scholars interested 
in the phenomenon of corruption as a historical concept. In recent decades, a growing 
number of scholars sought to explore the foundations, methods and consequences of 
administrative and political corruption in regimes of the past. Initially, a number of 
analytical models based on macro-economic factors or abstract theorisations were 
proposed, notably by Jacob van Klaveren who reduced ‘corruption’ to a set of financial 
transactions by civil servants from the perspective of free-market laws. 121  In this 
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perspective, the embezzlement of public funds was a business transaction to be analysed in 
relation to broader aspects of the political economy such as fiscalism and mercantilism. 
Later studies turned to a contextualised, empirical approach, aiming to analyse ‘from 
within’ the perception and role of corruption in past societies, and the changing discourses 
that accompanied it.  
 
The main problem encountered by historians of corruption as an historical concept is that 
of its elusive definition. For Joël Félix and Anne Dubet, it can be variously defined in 
relation to specific legal norms, or according to concepts of justice and fairness held in 
Christian morals, or again through precepts enshrined in canon law and natural law. 122 
Carefully avoiding a general, universal definition, they warned against “assessing the 
action of early-modern agents on the basis of a modern definition of corruption.” 123 
Collections of case studies spanning wide geographical and chronological frames 
portrayed very diverse manifestations of the phenomenon, examining meanings and 
practices mindful of the time, place and political regime in which they occurred. 124 Taken 
together, these various approaches helped to define more accurately the dividing line 
between acceptable and non-acceptable behaviour of agents in the service of a prince or 
state. The common themes and characteristics that they mapped out will also guide our 
own analysis of the material generated by the judicial treatement of fraud and malpractice 




Searching for causes of the seemingly irrepressible nature of corruption in the past is an 
obvious question confronting historians. Functionalist interpretations were a popular and 
convenient way of explaining its universal occurrence and permanence through space and 
time: corruption endured because it had a manifest, or latent, usefulness. Whether in the 
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guise of noisy scandals or quietly festering practices, it was seen as a form of 
compensation for a perceived injustice or ill treatment. Given the unequal societies of the 
early modern context, corruption could be conceptualised as a useful social and political 
stabiliser, a corrective process that all but legitimised it. Contemporaries already used this 
kind of rationale as a political argument. In 1670, the avocat général argued against the 
part-removal of the épices of the procureurs du roi by invoking the fact that these rights 
allowed them to “subsister avec honneur: autrement, il est impossible qu’ils ne tombent 
dans la négligence et la prévarication [...] qu’ils ne cherchent à s’indemniser par des voies 
secrètes et honteuses et ne commettent des concussions dans lesquelles ils ne garderont 
aucune mesure.”  125 In the same vein, Jean Meyer asserted in his survey of French public 
service that inadequate income of the venal office amply justified their behaviour: in a 
system based on venality, corruption, he contended, represented a “contribution quasi 
légitime au débours initial.” 126  
 
After his initial focus on the social history of France’s forestry grands-maîtres in 1978, 
Jean-Claude Waquet turned to corruption as a general phenomenon, whereby it is more 
than anecdotal to observe this historian’s concomitant interest in forestry and corruption. 
127  In this monograph, he analysed a series of high-profile cases of fraud and 
embezzlement in the administration of seventeenth and eighteenth-century Florence. For 
Waquet too, these practices represented a factor of social stability that allowed modest 
robe magistrates and administrators of intermediate spheres of Italian urban society to top 
up their financial resources, live according to their social aspirations, and create lasting 
familial dynasties. The leading administrative figures and princes followed a different, 
more political, rationale. They justified the permissiveness or severity of their responses to 
corruption by circuitous reasonings akin to to casuistry. This strategy allowed them to 
“évacuer la dimension politique des abus, [...] laisser une certaine liberté aux employés, en 
particulier s’ils étaient issus de milieux distingués, et enfin [...] préserver, au moins 
officiellement, la dignité du prince.” Princes and political leaders were integral part of a 
vast “système moral de la corruption” that encompassed the whole polity, i.e. common 
fraudsters, officials, and the prince. 128 
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This whole-system view is an appealing approach for attempting to better grasp the 
phenomenon. Applied to forestry, one could thus assume a concatenation of fraudulent 
practices, reaching from the mendacious minister using his powers to consolidate his own 
position to the officer colluding with the local wood merchant because he was a close 
relative. Testing this assumption requires us to use a wide-ranging approach. The 
prosopographical profiling of the officers will therefore include the merchants, further 
complemented by examining the attitudes of the official envoys of the central 
administration, who were dispatched to Quillan to prosecute their offenses. Including the 
socio-psychological dimension will enrich the bare data of the prosopographical analysis. 
In his exploration of the concept of political disgrace, Julian Swann argued that “[T]o 
achieve a more balanced interpretation of political culture [than one based on discourse or 
structures] we are obliged to engage directly with ideas, events, and above all the hopes 
and fears of those who participated in them.” 129 Swann’s study underscores the political 
impact of notions such as public dishonour embedded in the value system of early modern 
societies. In this perspective, the dismissal from office of Quillan’s maître particulier in 
1732 for grave “prévarications” was much more than a standard disciplinary measure 
leading to a formal change in the staffing of the maîtrise. As will be shown in chapter four, 
the social disgrace he and his family incurred triggered an expensive state-led operation, 
which affected the whole region. Considering the effect of symbolic values such as public 
trust, honor and shame adds an important dimension to our understanding of the 
mutilayered connection between venality, clientage, and corruption. This insight can in 
turn shed light on the limitations that constrained the scope of the monarchy’s 
interventions in provincial affairs.  
 
Another important aspect on the same theme came from cultural historians who have 
approached interpretations of historical corruption from the angle of gift exchange, office-
buying or patronage. 130 Their research underscored the breadth of interpretations linked to 
this phenomenon. Just like patronage and clientelism, gift-giving was not objectionable in 
itself. In France and other European countries alike, gifts were essential and necessary 
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contributions to the good functioning of early modern states. On the international scene, 
they oiled the communication processes of diplomacy. Inside, they rippled through the 
whole polity from individual subjects in the provinces to members of the court and 
ministry. In 1684, an official request from the Secrétaire des ordres du roi Phélypeaux de 
Chateauneuf asked Languedocian aristocrats for a gracious ‘gift’ of partridges to replenish 
the king’s depleted hunting grounds in Chambord, in return for which “les noms des 
donateurs seraient communiqués au souverain.” 131 Analysis of the gifting concept was 
further refined by the aspect of intentionality. In her chapter on financier fraud in the 
Spanish monarchy, Anne Dubet spoke of the “casuistry of corruption,” playing on the 
uncertainties around the intention with which gifts were made. 132 In forestry, the question 
of intentionality was straightforward. As the examples provided in chapter four will 
demonstrate, the main principle guiding the judges’ take on gift-exchanges, which had 
been denounced as dubious, was their role in enhancing the interests of the crown, 
financial or other.   
 
Corruption and ‘modernisation’ 
 
Whilst remaining wary of teleological interpretations, historians were particularly 
preoccupied by the relationship between corruption and the process of ‘modernisation’ of 
the royal administration, and, closely related to it, the increasing separation between 
private interests and the public sphere. How far, they asked, did corruption signal a broader 
shift in norms, opposing a ‘pre-modern’, ‘face-to-face’ model driven by loyalty, trust, 
friendship (and its corrolaries, nepotism, gift-giving and clientelism), and a bureaucratic 
system operating as an impersonal, rational-legal form of administration? In the context of 
the ‘fiscal state’ bent on securing financial resources for wars, Félix and Dubet suggested 
an evolution built upon ever more precise definitions of corruption. 133 In his analysis of 
the connection between historical corruption and political regimes, Kerkhoff observed a 
dramatic “shift in debates on and perceptions of corruption [that] occurred somewhere 
during the «long nineteenth century» as a result of modernisation processes.” In Kerkhoff’s 
view, broad conceptual changes led from “the early modern plurality of values to clashing 
political ideologies in modern times.” 134 Beyond their diversity, these approaches all 
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converge on the idea that, firstly, the change from personal influence to impersonal rules of 
procedure was anything but a linear trajectory between two well-defined poles, and that, 
secondly, the separation between the two spheres never fully occurred. Based on the 
premise that in early modern administrative regimes, seeking to increase private profit was 
perfectly compatible with exercising a public function, the two paradigms were connected 
through a complex and fluid zone, where both happily overlapped.  
 
These assumptions raise the critical question of pinpointing the moment, and the trigger, of 
the paradigmatic change. Félix and Dubet sought to detect “when and why social actors 
started considering the ethos of service and the rewards of gifts as the intolerable 
expression of elite domination and exclusive access to money and honour.” 135 They also 
enquired “how and why the common culture about corruption and its repression came to be 
contested and considered as the ideology of an archaic and aristocratic ethos detrimental to 
both the interests of the ruler and the nation.” 136 In this vein, William Doyle addressed the 
question of the trigger for momentous changes in social and political culture by comparing 
venality of ancien régime France and ‘Old Corruption’ in England. 137 After centuries of 
being accepted as unavoidable necessities and well-established practices integral to the 
French and English political systems, Doyle asked whether the revolutionary process, or 
Edmund Burke’s ‘Economical Reforms’, sufficed to explain why these long-established 
practices could abruptly be conceptualised as ‘corrupt’ and rejected as unacceptable. He 
argued that the decade-long spectacle of diminishing effectiveness before the eyes of an 
ever more vigilant and perceptive public opinion (especially in the military spheres) had in 
fact long eroded the basis of their acceptability. Far from being the actual triggers of the 
shift, England’s ‘Economical Reforms’ and the French Revolution had only been part of a 
longer process which made it possible to conceive that even “the most glaring abuses or 
anomalies, including venality” could be removed. 138 
 
The trigger for change need not be as dramatic as a Revolution or a bundle of radical 
reforms. For the fiscal sector, Félix and Dubet saw crises and conflicts in general as 
creative processes with an inherent potential to depart from long-established norms and 
practices. “Tensions, at different levels of analysis,” they argued, “paved the way for new 
																																																								
135 Id., 4. 
136 Id., 9-10. 
137 William Doyle, ‘Changing notions of public corruption, c.1770-c.1850’, in: Kreike and Jordan, 
Corrupt Histories, pp. 83-95. 
138 Id., 90. 
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perspectives on governance of finance, and a willingness to engage with the costs of 
corruption.” 139 This notion of ‘creative crisis’ invites us to ask how far eighteenth-century 
Réformations Forestières contributed to a paradigmatic change in the service discipline of 
the officers. Were they effective anti-corruption measures? Our concluding chapter will 
discuss how far the Réformation of the 1730s in Quillan signalled a watershed between a 
‘pre-modern’ notion (which left much room for political pragmatism and a flexible 
approach to corrupt practices), and a depersonalised system of control that was better 




A basic assumption underlies this thesis: Colbert’s reforms represented a promising 
window of opportunity to achieve a fundamental and durable system change in forestry, 
but in practice, its impact was short-lived. In a first approximation, his intervention in 
provincial forestry matters appeared as a conspicuous assertion of royal authority over the 
owners and users of the forests. The purge and streamlining of forestry personnel, and the 
tighter mechanisms to control their activity, appeared to set forestry practice on to a 
rational and more efficient footing. How can we evaluate the long-term success of these 
broad policy objectives? 
 
A centre-led audit operation (Réformation) applied sixty years after Colbert’s reforms to 
the Pyrenean forestry district of Quillan will serve as a test case to assess their impact on 
the professional ethos and the practices of provincial forestry officers at middle levels of 
the hierarchy. This analysis will be articulated around two main, interlinked 
methodological pillars: firstly, a prosopographical examination of Quillan’s forestry 
officers, with a particular focus on their social and professional status, their work practices, 
and their relationships with their hierarchical superiors and with their immediate social 
environment; secondly, an analysis of their professional misdemeanours, through a close 
reading of the judicial material produced in the Réformation process. The results of these 
explorations will serve as a basis to assess the long-term consequences of Colbert’s 
reforms, and to detect the strategies used by subsequent governments to uphold his 
promises. While no simple and conclusive answers can be expected, it is hoped that this 
discussion opens the way for further research in eighteenth-century forestry politics, as an 
																																																								
139 Félix and Dubet, The war within, 7. 
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analytical tool to better understand the complex issue of royal authority in the context of 




Prosopography has become a well-established and much-used means of elaborating the 
collective profile of a specific group of individuals linked by common characteristics. 140 
Michel Cassan’s research sets a clear methodological standard for the prosopographical 
method: to identify common characteristics of the group, the factors situating it relative to 
the state, and to the town, and to detect signs, if any, of an “identité de groupe.” 141 To help 
evaluate the social position of a corpus based on contemporary standards, Cassan 
advocated the use of marc d’or and capitation tariffs. These analytical tools could help to 
get a better ‘feel’ for the group’s social status, because they were indexed on a mix of 
financial and symbolic parameters associated with each office, profession or social group. 
Our study largely rests on a combination of the classic prosopographical method aimed at a 
collective profiling of the group, and individual biographies. This mixed approach allows 
us to identify common characteristics without losing sight of personal factors, especially 
those linked to competing social networks or the unregulated and emotional battleground 
of local urban politics. This approach however comes with its particular challenges.  
 
As a statistical method, prosopography requires, ideally, a large corpus, a long time span, 
and a degree of homogeneity, all pre-conditions that constitute a priori a methodological 
challenge for this project. With twenty-eight individuals, our core corpus is comparatively 
small. 142 For comparison, Caroline Le Mao’s corpus of Bordeaux parlementaires included 
316 entries (between 1643 and 1723), 143 and Meyzie studied 433 présidial magistrates 
(between 1665 and 1810). 144 A larger corpus of forestry officers covering a selection of 
																																																								
140 Françoise Autrand, ‘Prosopographie et Histoire de l’Etat’, in: Gerhard Ritter and Rudolf 
Vierhaus, eds., Aspects de la recherche historique en France et en Allemagne, tendances et 
méthodes (Göttingen, 1981), pp. 43-53. Other works on prosopography include: Christophe Charle, 
Jean Nagle e.a., Prosopographie des élites françaises 16e-20e siècles, Guide de Recherche (Paris, 
1980); Neithard Bulst, ‘Objets et méthodes de la prosopographie’, in: Jean-Philippe Genêt, Günther 
Lottes, L'Etat moderne et les élites, XIIIe-XVIIIe siècles, apports et limites de la méthode 
prosopographique (Paris, 1996), pp. 469-484.  
141 Cassan, ‘Pour une enquête’, 109. 
142 See corpus overview in Annexe 3 for names and details. 
143 Caroline Le Mao, Parlement et Parlementaires: Bordeaux au Grand Siècle (Seyssel, 2007), 
290.  
144 Meyzie, Les illusions perdues, introduction.  
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maîtrises particulières would satisfy the numbers’ requirement for a meaningful statistical 
treatment, but this would vastly exceed the scope of this thesis. 
 
The combination of a statistical and a nominative approach, however, can turn the small 
size of our sample into a methodological asset. For Neithard Bulst, the inclusion of 
biographical details enriches general results apprehended through statistical computation 
alone. 145 Patrice Poujade’s study of the Pyrenean tradesmen greatly benefitted from this 
dual approach. “La prosopographie et la micro-histoire biographique sont, malgré leurs 
différences, deux voies complémentaires qui peuvent se nourrir en permanence et 
permettent de jongler avec les différences d’échelles, d’aller du groupe à l’individu et vice-
versa, d’articuler le singulier (d’une expérience) et le collectif.” 146 The inclusion of 
qualitative information allows us to follow individual careers in their entirety, and glimpse 
into the social foundations and the limitations of the professional choices available to 
them. It can lead to a more differentiated representation of the group’s collective identity, 
which for Michel Cassan is intrinsically multilayered. In the case of small-town 
magistrates, a collective identity could be determined by “des voies professionnelles dans 
le cadre de l’auditoire, intellectuelles avec la production de textes, et culturelles par une 
participation active à la sociabilité savante et érudite des petites villes.” 147 Bulst especially 
underlined the insights this approach can provide on social interactions inside and outside 
the actual corpus. It can highlight “leurs oppositions, leurs divergences, leurs conflits et 
leurs compromis,” 148 and reveal the causes of fractures which, as in the example above, 
could split the group’s cohesiveness and impede the smooth functioning of the unit. To 
include such elements of dissonance into the prosopographical ‘questionnaire’ can reveal 
the social, cultural and emotional realities that underpinned dynamic processes observable 
at the level of the whole group. 
 
Another hurdle for using the prosopographical method in this study is the heterogeneous 
character of a maîtrise in terms of personnel. Contrary to well-defined, coherent 
institutional or professional bodies united by common characteristics (such as the Chambre 
																																																								
145 Neithard Bulst, ‘L’histoire des assemblées d’Etats en France et la recherche prosopographique 
XIVe - milieu XVIIe siècle’, in: Autrand, Prosopographie et genèse, pp. 171-184.  
146  Patrice Poujade, Une société marchande; le commerce et ses acteurs dans les Pyrénées 
modernes (Toulouse, 2008). 
147 Cassan, ‘Pour une enquête’, 105. 
148 Neithard Bulst, ‘L'histoire des assemblées’, 177. 
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de l’Edit studied by Stéphane Capot), 149 each post in a maîtrise particulière carried its 
own distinctive professional characteristics. There is no evidence that maîtres particuliers, 
lieutenants, procureurs du roi, garde-marteaux or greffiers, ever formed a formal 
compagnie along the model of their hierarchical superiors, the grands-maîtres. 150 
Attempting to define the collective identity of officers who demonstrated little esprit de 
corps, and who left little evidence of active correspondence with each other, appears at 
first glance contrived and artificial. Furthermore, in our case the composition of the group 
changed mid-way through our period, with the creation in 1701 of the office of receveur 
particulier. At first glance, then, our target group presented a composite character, which 
caused some researchers to doubt the suitability of maîtrise personnel as a research object. 
“L’ambiguité de la notion de personnel forestier, jointe à la faible homogénéité du 
personnel forestier royal, constitue [...] un obstacle pour la définition d’une problématique 
originale.” 151  
 
I argue however that this outward heterogeneity does not preclude the search for defining a 
collective identity for royal foresters, provided one considers differences in professional 
characteristics as subordinate to the common, overarching specificities and challenges that 
united all of its members. Le Mao’s diverse categories of parlementaires were united by 
their common membership of a prestigious court, and a similar involvement with vast and 
risky financial operations connected Françoise Bayard’s disparate body of financiers. 152 
What bonded France’s forestiers moyens were the material specificity of their object 
(forests, wood, waterways) and the separate, unique nature of the jurisdiction that framed 
their activity. Moreover, in the eyes of their contemporaries, maîtrise officers presented 
themselves as a cohesive whole. In official correspondence - and contrary to the 
personalised references concerning grands-maîtres – the administrative prose often refered 
to them as an operational entity. When commissioner Louis de Froidour addressed the 
officers of the newly-established maîtrise of Saint-Gaudens, he reminded them that they 
were “tous solidairement responsables des intérêts du roi [et] ils doivent être parfaitement 
unis dans les fonctions de leurs charges et doivent suppléer les uns aux autres en telle sorte 
																																																								
149 Stéphane Capot, ‘Les magistrats de la Chambre de l’Edit de Languedoc (1579-1679)’, Annales 
du midi, 208, 213 (1996), pp. 63-88. 
150 BNF, Nouvelles Acquisitions Françaises, ms 5833, ‘Registre des délibérations de Mrs les grands 
maîtres des Eaues et Forestz de France’, (2 janvier 1727-19 décembre 1771). 
151 Jean Boissière, Anne-Marie Cocula, e.a., Histoire des forêts françaises. Guide de recherches 
(Editions CNRS, groupe d'histoire des forêts françaises, s.d.), 162. 
152 Francoise Bayard, Le monde des financiers au XVIIe siècle (Paris, 1988). 
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que le service se fasse.” 153 One century later, the complaints of the cahiers de doléances 
of 1789 rarely singled out a specific category, aiming instead en-bloc at “les officiers.” 
Beyond its diverse professional specificities, our sample derives its homogeneity from its 
common object, and from its perception as a unit endowed with a clear and coherent 




To paraphrase Natalie Davis, archival sources represent stories told by people, rather than 
being an objective reflection of the past. 154 In this sense, researching French forestry 
institutions of the past confronts us with a familiar problem. There is an abundance of 
forestry material of a very diverse nature spread between the Archives Nationales and 
ninety or so Archives Départementales, but this rich material is overwhelmingly one-sided, 
reflecting official concerns. The personal nature of some of Froidour’s legacy is a notable 
exception, which partly explains why he has been such a popular topic of investigation for 
historians. The G7 series of the Archives Nationales are a good example of this official 
bias: official correspondence between the intendant des finances with Eaux-et-Forêts in his 
remit with various provincial interlocutors, petitions, complaints and mémoires from 
maîtrise staff mostly concerned with modalities of their office, Arrêts and Ordonnances, 
requests for cutting authorisation from various forest users, sylvicultural and technical 
reports, wood sales, forestry court records, or again problems in the forests linked to 
military activity, and much more. 155 The forestry archives found in Paris and those of the 
three Archives Départementales covering this thesis have clearly been preserved because 
of their relevance for the contemporary concerns of the state and its administrative 
apparatus.  
 
In addition to the lack of personal documents, the gaps in series of sales records or notarial 
registers impaired the accuracy of statistical evaluations. Furthermore, numeric data such 
as sales volumes or gages could be defined in different ways (if defined at all), and values 
had at times to be infered or reconstructed. These source-related flaws can be somewhat 
corrected by applying a measure of intuitive interpretation. This is particularly important 
																																																								
153 Quoted in Bartoli, Louis de Froidour, 73. 
154 Natalie Zemon Davis, Fiction in the Archives: Pardon Tales and Their Tellers in Sixteenth- 
Century France (Stanford, 1995). 
155 Suzanne Clémencet has provided a useful index of the G7 series in AN, ‘Fonds du Contrôle 




when attempting to infer broader meanings, or creating over-riding categories from the 
formulaic style of legal texts, such as case instruction, witness auditions, supporting 
documents, sentences and appeals. 
 
The nature of our sources were threefold, online, Parisian, and provincial. Particularly 
helpful was the online availability of parish registers. For Quillan, the registers were nearly 
complete for the period from February 1665 to November 1742, with only minor gaps 
(from 1689 to 1692). 156 Genealogical details have been obtained from commercial sources 
such as Geneanet, but whenever possible they have been crosschecked with information 
from archive-based sources.  
 
The overwhelming majority of our paper-based sources were spread between Paris and the 
south. In Paris, the Bibliothèque Nationale (especially the manuscripts section and the 
Cinq-Cents-Colbert collection) holds papers and legal texts relative to Colbert’s Grandes 
Réformations, and some of his correspondence with Froidour. Because of our focus on the 
later part of the period under study, they have only been partially used. At the Archives 
Nationales, apart from the sections AD and E dedicated to official forestry acts, the G 
series were particularly prolific, especially the motley collection of papers, letters and 
requêtes found in G7. Also useful were the V1 series for office provisions, Q for the royal 
domain, P for the all-important financial aspects of the office, as well as some items in the 
Marine series.  
 
The nature of this project required us however to prioritise provincial sources. Our choice 
of Quillan was covered by three Archives Départementales located in Toulouse, 
Montpellier, and Carcassonne. With their different contents, levels of digitisation and 
accessibility, they complemented each other very effectively.  
 
The particularly rich hoard of forestry material deposited in Toulouse is heavily biassed 
towards the earlier period of our time frame. 157 Spread between the Archives 
																																																								
156 Registres paroissiaux, paroisse Notre-Dame, Quillan, Décès & Mariages & Naissances. ADAD, 
100NUM/AC304/1E1, Quillan, (1654-1699); 100NUM/AC304/1E2, Quillan. (1700-1731); 
100NUM/AC304/1E3, Quillan, (1731-1746); 100NUM/AC304/1E4, Quillan, (1748-1756); 
100NUM/AC304/1E6, Quillan, (1756-1775); 100NUM/5E304/3, Quillan, (1760-1769); 
100NUM/5E165/3,  Ginoles, (1770-1792). 
157 Though dated and requiring a key to read older references, (Table de concordance des cotes), 
Henri de Coincy’s Les Archives Toulousaines de la Réformation Générale des Eaux et Forêts 
(Besançon, 1922-3) is still a useful guide, including all the published work of Louis de Froidour. 
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Départementales and the Bibliothèque d’Etude du Patrimoine, the Fonds Froidour is a rich 
and thematically and geographically coherent resource. It holds a remarkably complete 
documentation of Froidour’s Réformation operations in Languedoc. The registers 8B 001 
to 8B 034, and 1A 10 to 1A 17 contain summaries and syntheses of the whole process, 
including the establishment of the Quillan maîtrise. 158 Crammed inside approximately 
2,500 individual dossiers, this documentation provides a step-by-step coverage of 
Froidour’s reform activity for the whole Grande Maîtrise from 1666 to 1673, but also 
includes precise descriptions of the forests, complete with maps, charts and other figurative 
illustrations.  
 
Montpellier’s role as a former seat of the Chambre des Aides et Comptes explains the 
predominantly financial nature of the documents held at the Archives Départementales de 
l’Hérault. Their 1BP series keeps some documentation on forestry accounts, service 
certificates, or officers’ remuneration. Interspersed with these financial papers was judicial 
material preserved from the second Quillan Réformation. A comparison with the Toulouse 
series shows that a number of duplicates found their way to the Montpellier Cour des 
Comptes, while others were unique copies.  
 
The Archives Départementales de l’Aude in Carcassonne are home to an invaluable and 
little-explored cache of forestry material, mostly related to the Réformation of Quillan in 
the 1730s and 1740s. Its rich 63C collection holds numerous forestry-related documents, 
records of statutory inspection visits or reports of forest gardes. Much data could be 
extracted from the wood sales accounts (63C 31 to 63C 37), nearly complete between 1678 
and 1733, except for the period 1691 to 1704.  The bulk of our information on officer’s 
professional practice is based on the legal papers, notes and supportive documents 
produced in the course of the Quillan’s Réformation trials (63C 63 to 63C 65, 63C 73 to 
78). The notarial records of Carcassonne’s 3E series were particularly informative. The 
registers left by three notaries of Quillan covering our period were Bertrand Siau, Michel 
Roillet and M. Laran, with a handful of minor gaps, and a longer silence between 1713 and 
1719.  
 
In terms of communal archives on the other hand, Quillan yielded only sparse information, 
due to the fires that destroyed its town hall in 1715, and again in 1791. The compoix of 
1713 and 1731 would have been an important complementary source of information for 
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wealth and property data. They were erroneously catalogued as located at the Archives 
Départementales in Carcassonne, but they are still housed in the current Mairie of Quillan. 
As they could unfortunately not be viewed, 159 I relied on listings and observations 




This thesis is divided into four main chapters. Firstly, the preceding literature survey has 
clarified why a dominant narrative based on the legacy of Colbert’s interventions in 
forestry has long impeded a review of hardened orthodoxies on early modern forestry. 
Chapter two will present the general geographical, socio-political and institutional 
framework of seventeenth and eighteenth-century forestry administration, with special 
reference to Languedoc and the forestry district of Quillan. The next two chapters 
constitute the core of my research work. Chapter three will analyse the career profiles, 
geographical and socio-economic origins, networks and patronage links of Quillan’s 
foresters, alongside the strategies they developed to maintain their position among the 
urban elites. Chapter four is dedicated to specific aspects of their professional practice, as 
well as the governmental responses to complaints of professional negligence and collusion 
with fraudulent wood merchants. In my concluding section, I will reflect on the political 
meanings that might be infered from these findings.  
 
The prosopographical part of this study comprises all officers who worked in the Quillan 
maîtrise at any one time between 1673 (when Colbert’s new forestry regime in the 
Languedoc started) and 1745 (when final sentence on Quillan’s officers was pronounced), 
and for whom sufficient information could be found. The judicial examination of officer 
misdemeanour in chapter four, covers a more restricted time frame, from 1721 to 1736, but 
for comparative purposes, some data from outside this narrow chronological and spatial 




159 This was due to the travel restrictions imposed by the 2020 Covid-pandemic.  
160 André Marcel, Quillan, capitale de la haute-vallée de l'Aude, et du piémont pyrénéen audois 
(Quillan, 2012). For details of municipal governance, Marcel relied on a manuscript by Louis 
Amiel, the nineteenth-century descendant of a prominent wood merchant family of Quillan and a 
local historian. (ADAD, 2J84). Another useful source for the local history of Quillan is Paul 
Chabrol, ‘Histoire de la maîtrise de Quillan du 16e au 18e siècle’, Revue Forestière Française, 1 






FRAMEWORKS OF ANCIEN REGIME FORESTRY POLITICS 
 
A land of opportunities? 
 
With its two généralités of Toulouse and Montpellier, Languedoc was France’s largest 
province (41,150 km2), but because of its important highland component, it was relatively 
sparsely populated. Languedoc’s 1,700,000 inhabitants, distributed throughout 2,864 
communautés d’habitants, represented approximately 6.5 % of France’s total population. 
161 The region’s economy, mostly based on textile and agricultural production (including 
wood), contributed 6 to 9 % of the nation’s total revenue. 162 The Grande Maîtrise des 
Eaux-et-Forêts of Toulouse was only one of many royal and provincial institutions with 
which the region was equipped. At the start of Colbert’s forestry reforms of the 1660s, the 
area formally within the remit of the Grande Maîtrise was enormous, approximately twice 
as large as that of Languedoc, but only its central part was actively managed by that royal 
institution. The Alpine zone east of the Rhône, and the western flatlands of Guyenne, had 
only a nominal forestry infrastructure, and Roussillon, which had just been annexed after 
the paix des Pyrénées of 1659, was exempted from its jurisdiction. After the 
reconfiguration of the forestry map in 1689, the reduced portion remaining under the 
administration of the Toulouse Grande Maîtrise broadly overlapped with the contours of 
Languedoc’s two généralités.  
 
In geographical terms, the province was characterised by its heterogeneity, and above all 
its dependency on wood resources located in the higher grounds. (Map 1) 163 Deforestation, 
evidenced since neolithic times, transformed large chunks of the primary forest into low-
growing shrubland, and as populations and their needs for cultivated lands increased, the 
forests progressively retreated to the foothills and higher zones of the Pyrénées and Massif 
																																																								
161 Figures of 1785. See Elie Pélaquier, Atlas historique de la province du Languedoc (Montpellier, 
2009), 9. According to intendant Basville, Mémoires, 39, the province counted 1,566,038 ‘souls’.  
162 Beik, Absolutism, 34.  
163 Much information about geographical aspects of early modern Languedoc can be gleaned 
throughout the monumental work of Ernest Roschach, archivist and historian of Toulouse. His ten-
volume Histoire générale de Languedoc (Toulouse, 1872-92) was based on and complemented the 
works of dom Claude Devic et Dom J. Vaissette. See especially vol.XIV (1643-1789). 
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Central. By the sixteenth century, what remained of them had turned into hotly disputed 
economic and political assets.   
 
 






The wider region to which the Toulouse Grande Maîtrise belonged comprises four distinct 
natural zones: two highland systems - the Pyrénées and the southern outcrops of the Massif 
Central - and two lowland areas. The flat open country and low hills of Haut-Languedoc, 
west of Toulouse, overlap roughly with the Atlantic-bound hydrographic system left of the 
Garonne. In these sedimentary, largely deforested plains, a thriving cereal-based economy 
developed thanks to fertile, well-irrigated soils, and a relatively mild oceanic climate. To 
the east, the Bas-Languedoc was similarly deforested, but of a distinctly Mediterranean 
character. It formed a broad corridor along the coast, particularly propitious for migratory 
flows and long-distance trade. Its agrarian economy was based on wine-growing and olive 
plantations, both well adapted to poorer soils and a semi-arid climate characterised by rare 
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but violent precipitations. Main towns like Montpellier, Béziers or Narbonne were 
important centres of textile production, reliant on agricultural resources from the southern 
Massif Central, notably the terrace-cultivated mulberry trees for the manufacturing of silk. 
Wood supplies from the east Pyrenean plateaus arrived by the river Aude, and from the 
1680s also the “Canal Royal de la jonction des mers,” a spectacular engineering project 
carried out by Pierre-Paul Riquet . 164  
 
In the mémoires he compiled in 1697, intendant Basville described the two flatland areas 
as opposing each other “par la qualité des Terres qu’ils portent, par le génie & par le 
naturel même de leurs Habitans.” 165  In Basville’s view, the natural fertility of the 
Toulousian plains had ‘produced’ a people who were “grossiers, peu laborieux, & ont fait 
peu d’industrie.” By contrast, in the more challenging terrain of Bas-Languedoc, he saw 
people “pleins d’esprit, d’activité, d’industrie [...] propres au Commerce, aux Arts & aux 
Manufactures,” but whose preference for financially profitable activities prevented from 
engaging in “Lettres & Sciences.” 166 While Basville’s views were based on questionable 
pre-conceptions and generalisations, his description of the region’s natural resources rests 
on verifiable facts. Through a combination of climatic, geographical, economic and 
political factors, by the end of the eighteenth century, Languedoc as a whole was 
characterised by the paucity and fragile nature of its forests and wood resources.  
 
Even more credible are the observations of commissioner Louis de Froidour recorded in 
his numerous reports and letters. When Colbert sent him to Toulouse to oversee the 
forestry reforms in the kingdom’s southwest, he scoured the upper valleys of the Garonne 
and its tributaries all the way to the Spanish border, guided by local maîtrise officers and 
experienced wood merchants. With this particular mission, Colbert had the central 
Pyrenean heartland firmly in his sights, hoping to find abundant supplies for his ambitious 
naval programme. Froidour’s previous experience managing Mazarin’s estate and as 
procureur de Réformation for the forests of the Parisian basin was limited to broadleaf 
systems of the northern plains and hills. The mountain forests of the Pyrénées were as 
unknown to him as to Colbert or the other decision-makers in the capital. From the 
																																																								
164 In 1671, Colbert sent Louis de Froidour to check on the progress of the works on the Canal. He 
compiled his observations in his “Lettre à Mr. Barrillon d’Amoncourt contenant la relation et 
description des travaux qui se font en Languedoc pour la communication des deux mers”, 
(Toulouse, 1672). This work can be found in manuscrit 663 of the Bibliothèque Municipale of 
Toulouse.  
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foothills south of Toulouse to the summits near the Spanish border, Froidour encountered a 
typical vertical zoning of species, resulting from a combination of climatic and bio-
physical influences and century-long human activity. On lower grounds, beech and oak 
stands were mixed with hazel, lime, and elm, followed by mixed stands of beech and silver 
fir, sometimes interspersed with pine. Higher up, in the subalpine zone above 2,000 m, firs 
became the dominant species, but their exploitation was often impeded by access 
difficulties and lack of overland routes suitable for bulk transport. The hêtraies-sapinières 
of the middle zone were of a particular economic importance. 167 They provided building 
material and firewood for many local communities as well as charcoal for forges and 
glassworks, whereby the relative proportions of fir and beech varied according to the 
intended purpose. 168 Many of the royal forests were located in this intermediate beech-fir 
zone. In the district of Quillan, productive forests were concentrated in the Sault plateau, 
Donnezan and Fenouillèdes, all within thirty kilometres from the seat. (Map 2) As these 
forests were now also coveted by the naval authorities as a source of naval-grade timber, 
the promotion of fir at the expense of beech was one of Froidour’s priorities.  
 
At higher levels, the forest had to make space for pastoral activity, which over time created 
and maintained flat highland meadows inserted between snowy surrounding peaks and 
deeply incised upper valleys of Garonne, Ariège, Aude, and their tributaries. 169 They 
served as summer pastures for “quantitté de bestiaux de toutte sorte” which, as Froidour 
recognised, constituted “toutte la richesse de ce pays.” 170 Most Pyrenean communities 
combined the rearing of sheep, goats, mules and sometimes cattle, with some grain 
cultivation in the narrow valleys. After the spring thaw, French and Catalan transhumant 
herdsmen drove enormous communal flocks along ancient routes to graze on these high 
grassy estives, and across the border on the corresponding ‘plàs’ of the Spanish side. This 
transborder activity was regulated by elaborate rules and codes of practice involving a high 
degree of consultation and collaboration between the pastoral communities. What Froidour 
also realised to his dismay was that this essential component of the mountain economy also 
																																																								
167 On forests and metal production, see for example Jérôme Bonhôte, Forges et forêts dans les 
Pyrénées ariégeoises: pour une histoire de l’environnement (Aspet, 1998); Catherine Verna, 
L’industrie au village: essai de micro-histoire (Arles-sur-Tech, XIVe et XVe siècles) (Paris, 2017).  
168 Broadly speaking, beech was favoured as ordinary firewood and for making charcoal, used 
especially in metalworks. Fir was best suited for building needs and naval constructions. (See 
Fruhauf, Forêt et Société, 63-64). 
169 Out of many: Didier Galop, La forêt, l'homme et le troupeau dans les Pyrénées, 6000 ans 
d'histoire de l'environnement entre Garonne et Méditerranée, contribution palynologique 
(Toulouse, 1998).    
170 Castéran, Les Pyrénées Centrales, 37. 
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included forest-grazing, the scourge of any “officier des forests qui en ayme la 
conservation.” 171  
 






The forests of the Quillan district are a particularly good example of the integrated, wood-
based economy of the Pyrenean communities. They provided the region with oak and 
beech timber for constructions, lower-quality beech to make charcoal for the local forges, 
and various woods for fencing, farming tools or household utensils. The top ends of firs 
were used for making devices to carry goods on horse or mule back. Boxwood served to 
manufacture combs, a small but thriving local product that sustained a number of Quillan 
artisans. On his first visit to the Quillan district in 1668, Froidour identified some of its 
forests as a promising source for the navy. The royal forest of Caudiès, he reported, well 
furnished in arsenal-grade, straight-growing firs of two to three hundred years of age, was 
well suited for building masts for larger ships, and in neighbouring Comminges (controlled 
																																																								


























by the maîtrise of Saint-Gaudens), he predicted that the forests were “suffisantes pour 
fournir des bois à toute les flottes du roi, lorsquelles seront rétablies et bien ménagées.” 172  
 
A key aspect of the wood-based economy of the province was its hydrographic system. 
Some of its rivers represented vital carrier belts for timber and stone from the upper valleys 
to the plains (Map 3). Floatable rivers like the Aude or Garonne, well equipped with port 
infrastructures suitable for the construction of timber rafts, were significant contributors to 
the regional economy. 173 Based on a longstanding technique, timber rafting was a perilous 
operation demanding skilled workers (radeliers). 174 This activity provided sheep-farmers 
with additional, seasonal work as fluvial mariners, woodcutters or raft-builders. The 
Garonne and its tributaries, which could thus transport timber and other woods from the 
high country of Comminges and Val d’Aran, were a crucial factor for the prosperity of 
Toulouse. Further east, the Aude, floatable from Escouloubre (thirty-five kilometres 
upstream of Quillan) have supplied the Mediterranean towns and production centres at 
least since the thirteenth century. Flowing between Garonne and Aude, the Ariège was 
unsuited for this kind of timber transport, but the presence of metal ore and abundant 
forests in its basin led to the multiplication of forges and furnaces. This provided 
employment in mining, metal production, charcoal-making, sawmills, or the transport of 
metal products. An essential feature of Pyrenean economy, the metalworks were 
concentrated in specific valleys, like those of Vicdessos. There, charcoal making, mining 
and metalworks exacted a particularly high toll on the surrounding forests. In one way or 
another, the forests played a central role for the entire mountain economy – as well as for 
the fiscal solvency of its numerous communities.  
 
Froidour recognised the vast potential of the mountain forests he had been commissioned 
to manage, and he deplored the state of degradation in which he had found them. “Ces 
forêts sont toutes en très mauvais état : un quart absolument dénaturé, défriché et réduit en 
culture [...]; un quart réduit en misérables broussailles par les excessifs délits que l'on y a 
faits et par les abroutissements des bestiaux, [...] et la moitié restante est en bois, mais 
																																																								
172 ADHG, B, Quillan, dossier A2, ‘Procès-verbal de réformation, Quillan, 8 mai 1670’. 
173 River transportation of heavy materials (timber, stone) was a crucial aspect for the provisioning 
of Paris from the rivers Yonne and Seine. See Jérôme Buridant, ‘Flottage des bois et gestion 
forestière: l’exemple du Bassin parisien, du XVIe au XIXe siècle’, Revue Forestière Française, 
LVIII, 4 (2006), pp. 389-398. 
174 Jean-Michel Minovez, ‘Grandeur et décadence de la navigation fluviale: l'exemple du bassin 
supérieur de la Garonne du milieu du xviie au milieu du xixe siècle’, Histoire, Économie & Société, 
18, 3 (1999).  
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dégradé à tel excès qu'il faut chercher à l'extrémité des forêts pour trouver un hêtre propre 
à faire quelque ouvrage que ce soit.” 175 The lack of royal control, he claimed, had 
encouraged mismanagement and abus on an enormous scale, which in his eyes amply 
justified the incisive government-led intervention he had been charged with conducting.  
 






With their combined resources, ligneous, hydrographic or other, the central and eastern 
Pyrénées might have appeared as a land of plenty to Froidour, but as he and his successors 
knew all too well, these opportunities were commensurate with the difficulties rooted in 
the peculiar characteristics of their natural and human environments. Late snows, floods, or 
dry spells reducing the suitability of rivers for timber transportation could thwart the best 
laid out tree-harvesting plans. Villagers who had enjoyed vital customary rights for 
centuries could resist their curtailment by passive resistance or direct acts of violence. 
Owners of forested estates, resentful of the increasing constraints on their exploitation 
rights, could use their personal influence and legal means to challenge official decisions. 
To be successful, a forestry reform had to take into account the sensitivities and vested 
																																																								


























interests of a large number of stakeholders, all competing for the region’s diverse but 
limited forestry resources.  
 
Languedoc’s defiant communities 
 
Languedoc’s populations presented Languedoc’s maîtrises with particular challenges, 
which reflected their specific interests in the forests. The judgments pronounced as a result 
of the two Réformations that covered the district of Quillan, in the 1660s and 1730s, can 
provide an idea of the nature of these challenges. 176 In 1670, the rural communities 
furnished with 66 % the majority of all cases, while the rest was divided between 
landowners, 30 % of them noble, and just 4 % members of the Church. Most of the charges 
brought by Froidour to the ‘consuls et habitants’ of rural communities concerned abuse of 
customary use-rights or missing entitlements for using the forests (unauthorised charcoal-
making, forest-grazing or wood theft). The charges were often accompanied by accusations 
of deliberate damage (dégradation). In six cases, the villagers were accused of illicit 
clearances in order to turn the land into cultivation or build a métairie. By contrast, noble 
and Church cases were overwhelmingly about missing deeds confirming their ownership 
of, and rights over, the forests.  
 
For the operation of 1736, Réformation judgments were found spread between five 
registers covering a lengthy period, from 1736 to 1749. They show a similar distribution 
between the different categories of offenders, with the significant difference that wood 
merchants appeared as a new group in the judgment listings (8 %). They were accused 
with overcutting beyond their contract or building sawmills without authorisation. 177 
Landowners (noble and non-noble, Church or hospitals) represented 27 % of all cases, and 
65 % concerned communities. Contestations with landowners were still about title deeds, 
shared ownership with the king (paréage), as well as non-compliance with the obligation 
to demarcate their property (bornage). The charges levelled at the communities were 
described in detail in the judgment texts. Next to the numerous cases of ‘wood theft’, they 
refered to building on unauthorised clearances and forest grazing in unallowed zones or 
seasons (whereby confiscated animals were sometimes forcefully recovered by their 
																																																								
176 For the first Réformation: ADAD, 63C73, 1 and 63C73, 2, f.263-440, ‘Jugements en 
Réformation, Quillan, Pays de Sault (1670)’. Only the Sault region has been considered here, and I 
have excluded cases of officers, which will be treated separately in chapter four. For the second 
Réformation: ADAD, 63C63-4, 63C75-7, ‘Quillan: Réformation; Jugements et procédures (1736-
1749). 
177 Fraud among wood merchants will be treated in detail in chapter four.  
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owners). Several mentions of “rébellions” indicate either passive resistance (not showing 
up at summons), or acts of verbal or physical violence against members of the maîtrises. In 
1738, a garde was murdered while on patrol. Half a century after Froidour’s intervention 
in Languedoc, opposition to maîtrise rule, especially regarding the curtailment of their 
customary rights, was unabated.  
 
The authorities were well aware that the main problem for ‘forest crime’ was deficient 
policing. Costly, heavy-handed involvement of the maréchaussée was rarely available, and 
the forest gardes charged with reporting offenses had only limited enforcement 
capabilities. Private forests were patrolled by seigneurial gardes recruited by the owner, 
but accredited by the maîtrises. In the royal forests, control on the ground or collecting 
forestry fines relied on few, badly remunerated collector-gardes recruited from the villages 
bordering the forests, whose service loyalties often proved to be questionable. The problem 
was particularly acute in the moutains, where harsh natural and human conditions limited 
the scope and effectiveness of maîtrise interventions. Because of their relevance for our 
case study, the rural communities of the Pyrénées will be described in some more detail. 
 
The mentality of the Pyrenean communities appeared to have been shaped by violence and 
conflict. For Christian Bourret and Peter Sahlins, 178  their identity was primarily 
determined by their border situation at the southern margins of the kingdom, together with 
its corollary, conflict. Historians influenced by anthropological approaches have described 
a peculiar mentality of “montagne–frontière” characterised by arcane, honour-bound rules 
of allegiance and ties of obligations, persistent feuding between local warlords, 
bandolerism, 179 clanism, rogue-baron racket, all aggravated by international conflict. 180 
Just one decade after the paix des Pyrénées, the collective memory was still scarred by the 
horrors of the recent wars, and when in 1667 conflict with Spain flared up again, deeply 
ingrained fears of the miquelets 181 who still roamed the backcountry quickly resurfaced. 
The massing of troops, winter-quartering, and intense fortification works in Collioure, 
Perpignan or Mont-Louis presented poor communities with the additional worry of seeing 
																																																								
178 Christian Bourret, Les Pyrénées centrales du IXe au XIXe siècle: la formation progressive d'une 
frontière (Soueich, 1995); Peter Sahlins, Boundaries: the making of France and Spain in the 
Pyrenees (Berkeley, 1989). 
179 Bandolers were organised bands of mercenaries recruited by local seigneurs and towns (Bourret, 
Les Pyrénées, 95).  
180 Apart from Bourret or Sahlins, see also Paul Chabrol, ‘De l'influence du relief dans l'étude des 
questions pastorales pyrénéennes’, Revue des Forêts Françaises, 12, (1954), pp. 745-754, 749. 
181 Miquelets were light mountain units used by the Catalans, a model later copied by the Maréchal 
de Noailles for the French army.  
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what little was left of their communal woods ravaged by special requisitions for these 
military constructions. 
 
Exposed to unforgiving physical conditions, crippling scarcity of resources, and hazardous 
border conditions, mountain communities developed survival strategies centred on 
transborder trade with the Catalans, with whom they shared a common language. Since 
ancient times, deeply cut-in valleys and ‘ports’ had encouraged the two-way transit of 
people and merchandise. Communities on either side made regular arrangements for the 
transhumance of flocks, or the trading of horses, metals, and agricultural and animal 
products. These commercial exchanges, vital for their livelihoods, were protected by 
ancient border-crossing treaties, the lies et passeries, concluded with the blessing of the 
French and Spanish monarchs. Over time, these transborder activities created a fiercely 
autonomous spirit, which could easily tip into outright rébellion, 182 as Froidour recounted 
during his voyage of discovery of 1667. “Les gentilshommes et le peuple [...] avoient été 
fort difficiles à gouverner, [...] ils n’avoient reconnu ny l’authorité de la justice et du 
Parlement, ny celle des intendants ny celle des gouverneurs de la province, et [...] celle du 
roy y avoit esté la plus méprisée.” 183 Half a century later, this belligerent spirit seemed 
unabated. On their inspection of the distant forests of Campagna (Donnezan region) in 
October 1728, the officers of Quillan reported that unauthorised clearings and illegal 
charcoal-making could not be prosecuted there, because “pas un garde ne vouloit aller faire 
ses fonctions dans ce pays a cause de l’esprit de révolte qui y reigne.” 184 Surveyors, 
gardes or fine-collectors venturing near some of these mountain villages risked being 
threatened, attacked, or even killed. The land seemed ungovernable.  
 
Dealing with restive rural populations, however, only represented one facet of maîtrise 
business. For the most part, the interlocutors of the royal officers were town-dwelling 
owners and users of the forests. Whether wood-based artisans, wood traders, or influential 
landlords, the relationships of this urban cohort with forestry officers were governed by a 
common participation in municipal governance, further complexified by multiple kinship 
links and other forms of social bondage. These processes can be best understood from the 
point of view of the specific political, economic, social and cultural fabric of the towns to 
which they all belonged.  
																																																								
182 In contemporary language, the term ‘rébellion’ described any act of passive or active resistance 
to official measures. This also included not attending a summons. 
183 Castéran, Les Pyrénées Centrales, 31. 





In the 1700s, the vast majority of Languedoc’s population lived in places below 400 m 
altitude. They were particularly concentrated along the lower Garonne south of Toulouse, 
on the southern fringes of the Massif Central, and in the coastal plains of Bas-Languedoc 
between Montpellier and Narbonne. For the purpose of this section, I have selected 
fourteen diocèses civils of the province bearing a special geographical or topical relevance 
for this study. 185 It returned 188 places, described as villes in the Dénombrement of Claude 
Saugrain. 186 Their distribution by population size shows a clear predominance of towns 
below 2,300 inhabitants (87 %). As elsewhere, Languedoc was characterised by the 
contrast between a widely dispersed small-town and village population, and few large and 
densely populated metropoles. Two cities reached the 30,000 mark: Toulouse (37,762 
residents), and Montpellier (36,552). Far behind came Nîmes (20,560), Béziers (10,993), 
Narbonne (9,586), Albi (8,845) and Castres (8,539). (Map 4) 
 
Map 4      Selected towns in Languedoc, with special consideration of maîtrise and 




185 Albi, Toulouse, Castres, Carcassonne, Limoux, Aleth, Mirepoix, Rieux, Lavaur, Saint-Papoul, 
part of Montauban, Part of Comminges, Narbonne and Saint-Pons. 
186 Claude Saugrain, Dénombrement du royaume par généralités, élections, paroisses et feux... 




























Unsurprisingly, Table 1 shows that Languedoc’s seven most populous towns were also 
equipped with a wide range of institutions, and, apart from Castres, they all belonged to the 
wealthiest diocèses with the highest taille allocation (Fig. 2). 187 Among the welter of 
institutions hosted by the généralité’s two capital cities, Toulouse and Montpellier, the 
Parlement and the Cour des Comptes et Aides embodied the judicial and financial 
orientation of these cities. They defined their identity and determined the specific socio-
professional structure of their populations. With its Table de Marbre and its university 
(where most maîtrise officers received their legal education), Toulouse is particularly 
relevant for our study. Since the establishment of the Parlement in 1420, and “by virtue of 
its vast jurisdiction, its continuity of tradition, and the aggregate social prestige of its 
members,” 188 this institution developed into an imposing legal apparatus. Under the 
presidency of Gaspard de Fieubet in 1673, it occupied over one hundred magistrates and 
other officers, with office values at the high end of the regional scale. 189 Together they 
formed a robe notability that set the tone in the leading circles of the city. The Toulouse 
Parlement was an imposing regional centre of political control, well capable of 
undermining the authority of the Eaux-et-Forêts.  
 
Outside these prominent cities, much of Languedoc’s population lived in towns of more 
modest proportions. From their diverse perspectives, historians of early modern towns  
concurred that a ‘ville’ must be studied from the point of view of contemporary standards. 
For his definition of a ville, Saugrain probably used a traditional definition based on 
ancient privileges and external characteristics such as a market or a defensive wall. 190 
While the accuracy of Saugrain’s listings has been questioned by George Frêche (mainly 
because he amalgamated paroisses and communautés), a comparison based on a small 






187 Basville, Mémoires, 166.  
188 Beik, Absolutism, 77. 
189 The office of first president of the Toulouse Parlement for example had a market value in the 
region of 150,000 livres (Beik, Absolutism, 52).   
190 Saugrain, Dénombrement du royaume. 
191 Georges Frêche, ‘Dénombrement de feux et d'habitants de 2 973 communautés de la région 
toulousaine (1536-1790)’, Annales de démographie historique, 1 (1968), pp. 389-421, and 2 
(1969), pp. 393-471. 
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Table 1       Major institutions in Languedoc’s seven largest cities 





Fig.2      Languedoc’s diocèses ranked by their taille allocation (livres) 












































































































































As historians like William Beik or Jean-Pierre Poussou have convincingly demonstrated, 
population size was not the only defining feature of the early modern town, and often not 
even the most important one. 192 In the eyes of contemporaries, the ranking of a town also 
depended on the density and quality of their institutional infrastructure, and/or their 
economic buoyancy. In pays d’Etats, a particular factor of prestige was also the town’s 
role in the yearly Etats assemblies. In Languedoc, towns situated in diocèses at the poorer 
end of the taille spread combined smaller populations and limited institutional 
infrastructures. These discrepancies are clearly visible in our sample of 188 towns, where 
only 26 % of them had more than one institution. In most cases this included a non-
resident juge royal, perched on the lower rungs of the legal hierarchy (Table 2). Crucially, 
to this group of towns also belonged Colbert’s new permanent maîtrise seats. In eight out 
of ten cases, Froidour chose, or confirmed, their location in small Languedocian market 
towns, with populations well below 5,000 inhabitants. The maîtrise of Montpellier, located 
in Languedoc’s eastern metropole, was an exception. As the area it controlled had very few 
royal forests, it became dedicated instead to overseeing the coastal fisheries and sea salt 
resources.  
 
These observations however offer only a partial picture of the urban reality of the province. 
True to the period, the focus of Saugrain as an official demographer was on institutions 
connected with the royal administration. By considering the province from the perspective 
of the people who lived and worked in it, a different picture emerges, dominated by the 
towns’ role in the Etats. 193 As René Souriac concluded in his study of sixteenth-century 
towns in the Ariège valley, “le premier critère de définition de la ville aux yeux des 
contemporains c’était son appartenance à l’assemblée des Etats.” 194 Next to the Etats of 
Languedoc, the region also hosted a number of small but combative assemblies, 
representing the interests of the Pyrenean communities. The Etats of Nébouzan, Bigorre, 
Quatre-Vallées and Foix, which survived Louis XIII’s intervention of 1629, kept their 
vitality as effective mouthpieces of popular grievances. Through the Etats, Languedoc’s 
smaller towns were connected to higher levels of decision-making, especially regarding the 
																																																								
192 Beik, Absolutism, especially pp. 59-76; Poussou, Les Petites Villes; Meyer et Poussou, Etudes 
sur les villes françaises. 
193 For a comprehensive overview of the Etats of Languedoc, see S. Durand e.al., Des Etats dans 
l'Etat.  
194 René Souriac, ‘Les villes du Comminges au XVIe siècle’, in: Poussou, Les petites villes du 
Moyen-Age, pp. 65-77, 66. 
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all-important distribution of the taille between the different diocèses. The role played by 
smaller towns in Etats assemblies also contributed to their self-perception. Town delegates 
were members of the small but powerful urban notability of legal professionals, successful 
merchants and, in the towns hosting maîtrises particulières, forestry officers. For these 
provincial “notables de deuxième rang,” this role confered them a measure of symbolic 
prestige as they – however modestly - partook in a negotiation process with the crown. 
Conversely, their role at the Etats contributed to their local respectability, thus 
consolidating further their local anchorage. For Jean-François Dubost, this small urban 
oligarchy enjoyed “la réaffirmation par la monarchie des principes d’autorité et de 
hiérarchie, principes qu’eux-mêmes incarnent et aident à imposer à l’ensemble de la 
population.” 195 
 
Table 2 Towns housing the eleven maîtrises particulières of the Grande Maîtrise of 
Toulouse, by institutions, population (inh.), and royal forests (ha) 






195 Dubost, Absolutisme, 386. 
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Local power structures of meridional towns, well anchored in the collective psyche, had 
overseen the administration and well being of their residents for centuries. For the families 
who had been associated with them for generations, this local bond was a crucial factor 
shaping their self-perception and identity. For royal officers, a role in municipal 
governance provided opportunities for prestige, recognition and political influence that 




A long tradition of municipal governance, based on a corps de ville endowed with specific 
structures and responsibilities, was the hallmark of the early modern meridional town. 196 
A system of elective consuls and a coopted conseil led to the emergence of a small local 
‘bourgeoisie’ whose members were perceived as the natural leaders of the urban 
community. Family members were sometimes involved, as in Quillan, where the daughter 
of garde-marteau Etienne Loubet acted regularly as godmother to the town’s foundlings. 
Four red-robed dignitaries, the premier consul and three auxiliaries, presided over 
municipal affairs, assisted by a conseil of notables comprised of notaries, merchants, 
medical men, and ‘bourgeois’. 197 Further members of the corps de ville included notaries, 
treasurers, petty magistrates of seigneurial courts, 198 as well as marguilliers who, as 
churchwardens, also oversaw charitable activities. In municipal assemblies, decisions were 
taken by a simple majority of votes. Among a wide range of responsibilities, the most 
important ones consisted in organising tax collections, supervising the town’s finances and 
managing public works. The premier consul participated in Etats assemblies in an 
honorific capacity.  
 
For all the prestige and authority these public functions confered, they also carried a highly 
ambivalent status and certain personal risks. A task considered most abhorrent was that of 
collecting community debts or royal dues, as it could easily lead to resentment and 
hostility. In 1719, Quillan’s consuls decided to take on the task of collecting the royal tax, 
“car ils estimaient la chose odieuse et susceptible d’entraîner la ruine de plusieurs 
																																																								
196 Maurice Bordes, L'administration provinciale et municipale en France au 18e siècle (Paris, 
1972), especially pp. 185-187. 
197 These categories will be analysed further in chapter three. ‘Bourgeois’ is taken here in its 
meaning as individuals living from their rents.    
198 A contribution to the debate on the continuing strength of non-royal jurisdictions in: François 
Brizay, Antoine Follain et Véronique Sarrazin (dirs.), Les justices de village. Administration et 
justice locales de la fin du Moyen Âge à la Révolution (Rennes, 2002).  
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familles.”  199 Consuls who were routinely coopted to ensure that forestry regulations were 
being implemented, were liable to being prosecuted and fined ‘in their own, private name’ 
if they failed.  
 
Notwithstanding the legacy of municipal governance that endowed these towns with a 
strong sense of traditional privilege and autonomy, the influence of the crown could be felt 
at several levels. The archbishop of Narbonne, at once overlord of Quillan, président-né of 
the Etats, and closely associated with the king’s inner circle, embodied in his person the 
alliance between the town, the province, and the crown. From the fourteenth century, 
monarchical governments were repeatedly called upon as arbiters in local revolts, which 
eventually led them to introduce reforms of administrative procedures or a revision of the 
representation system. 200 After 1687, in the elections for the capitouls of Toulouse, the 
choice of eight names out of the list of twenty-four candidates was entirely left to the 
intendant. Steps like these reflected the increase of royal influence in municipal 
governance. 
 
In this closely interconnected town-crown system, the year 1693 was a further milestone, 
when the king, “spéculant sur la vanité bourgeoise,” 201  created offices of maires 
perpétuels and lieutenants de maire in every town, endowed with attractive privileges. 202 
This measure encroached seriously on entrenched traditions of elective municipal 
administration. The new venal maires were exempt from increases of taille and gabelle, 
from forced loans, and from bothersome services to the military. Gages were at 5% of their 
‘finance’. In some towns, these offices could even lead to nobility. This first move was 
followed in 1723 by the creation of the offices of conseiller maire ancien et alternatif mi-
triennal, and of conseiller maire ancien mi-triennal. After being rescinded in 1724, 
mayorships were reintroduced in many places by the edict of November 1733, again with 
attractive privileges. Together with ownership of legal offices like those of présidiaux or 
maîtrises, mayoral offices represented yet another layer of royal intrusion in local affairs. 
More generally, the juxtaposition of royal and non-royal sources of empowerment is an 
important theme in this study. The following analysis of the power arena in the small town 
																																																								
199 Marcel, Quillan, 173. 
200 Beik, Absolutism, 66. 
201 Pierre Goubert, Familles marchandes sous l'Ancien Régime : les Danse et les Motte de Beauvais 
(Paris, 1959), 130. 
202 Edicts of March 1693 and lettres patentes of June 1694. See for example Maurice Bordes, ‘Le 




of Quillan provides an excellent example of the ways in which they overlapped, interacted, 
or clashed, whereby the outcome cannot be determined in simple win-lose terms.  
 
The example of Quillan 
 
The small town and river port of Quillan on the Aude (291 m average elevation) 203 is 
located in a natural cul-de-sac at the juncture between the fertile plains south of 
Carcassonne and Limoux, and the first elevations above 1,000 m of the Sault plateau. In 
Saugrain’s estimation, it had 366 feux in 1709, representing approximately 1,700 
inhabitants. In a sample of eighty-one maîtrises in the whole of France for which 
population information could be found (excluding the maîtrises near Paris), over half, 
including Quillan, were established in towns of less than 1,000 “feux”, representing 
approximately 4,500 inhabitants.  (Fig. 3) 204  
 
Fig.3     France: Distribution of eighty-one maîtrises particulières  
by population (feux) 




203 The town is said to have derived its name from three cone-shaped mounts (quilles) to the south. 
204 For the conversion between feux and inhabitants, I used the ratio of 4.569/feu suggested by 




Fig. 2    Distribution of France’s maîtrises by population (feux) 
(source: Saugrain, 1709)  
 
 
Graph 2     Distribution of France’s maîtrises by population (“feux”)  
















































































































































































































In terms of governance, Quillan was the principal town of the diocèse of Alet, one of 
Languedoc’s twenty-four diocèses, which became separated from that of Limoux in 1660. 
For ordinary jurisdiction, Quillan belonged to the sénéchaussée and présidial of Limoux, 
but as a baronnie, it was under direct the seigneurial rule of the archbishopric of Narbonne, 
which comprised all three justice levels. As Languedoc’s oldest and richest ecclesiastical 
diocèse, its holder was the président-né of the Languedoc Etats. He topped Beik’s list of 
‘truly influential powers’ in the province. 205 In Quillan, where he perceived municipal 
rights as the town’s overlord, the archbishop owned the castle, a flourmill on the Aude, and 
a number of forests in the Sault region, well stocked with high-forests in the precious fir-
beech zone. Entering his service as châtelain, lieutenant or procureur to represent his 
financial and legal interests endowed the bearer of the post with prestige and protection.  
 
With its municipal governance structure shared between the seigneur (here the archbishop 
of Narbonne) and the elected consuls, Quillan was typical of many meridional towns. The 
moral and religious well being of the residents on a day-to-day basis was in the hands of 
the parish priest, overseen by the bishop of Alet who visited the town episodically. The 
town’s four consuls were elected annually from a list provided by the archbishop - who 
also received their oath in person. In 1694, Jean-Pierre Pinet, a scion of a successful local 
family of wood merchants boasting several consuls, bought the new royal office of maire, 
which remained within the wider family remit of the Pinets until the Revolution. As ville 
de tour, Quillan’s first consul (or maire) was invited to the Etats sessions every third year, 
but he participated on an annual basis in the deliberations of the assiette diocésaine for the 
allocation of the royal tax.  
 
The main features of the town as it might have appeared around 1700 could be 
reconstructed (Map 5). By the 1730s, the old town walls on the left bank of the river had 
been largely dismantled. On a promontory on its right bank stood the remains of the 
archbishop’s castle. Inside the town, Quillan’s most prominent features included the 
church, the town hall (destroyed by fire in 1715), a monastery, a hospital, and the rafting 
port. The houses of the most prominent families lined the grand-rue. Some of them – 
including that of garde-marteau Etienne Loubet – had a public oven in their precincts to be 
used by other residents. Quillan was also home to a small number of nobles who left their 
mountain seigneuries to spend the cold winter months in the milder climes of the town.   
 
																																																								




Map 5 The town of Quillan around 1700 




In the early 1670s, the Maison Royale, seat of the new maîtrise, was being conspicuously 
built on the central square, within close range of both the church and the town hall. Its 
appellation as Maison Royale sent a clear message. It drove home the concept of a source 
of authority distinct from that of municipal structures. As an “ouvrage public qui doi[t] 
demeurer jusques à la fin des siècles”, the royal building had to follow the highest 
architectural standards. 206 It was a multi-purpose building. The council chamber housed 
the registers and the special casket containing the royal tagging hammer, the court room 
was used for the weekly hearings, while offenders were locked inside the prison cell on the 
ground floor. Until 1744, it also served as private residence for the maître particulier and 
his family, and hosted the grand-maître and other officials on their visits to the town. Each 
autumn, auctions for the sale of wood from the royal forests were held in its main chamber. 
																																																								
206 ADAD, 63C5, f.33, ‘Procès-verbal sur financement de la Maison Royale, 3 janvier 1678’. 
Map 4       Quillan around 1700 


























These public, colourful events attracted many bidders from outside town, including 
Carcassonne, within a radius of fifty kilometres. 207  
 
Like many other meridional towns, Quillan perfectly illustrates the remarks of Filippo de 
Vivo concluding his analysis of communication processes in early modern Venice. What 
made social status, personal ties and individual authority politically significant, he stated, 
was “the potential for social mixing” facilitated by lieux, but also moments, de sociabilité. 
208 The preceding description of the town’s main features underscores the key role of these 
places for social exchange, where events were discussed, business settled, and rumours 
passed on. Forestry material is replete with statements such as “il fut murmuré 
publiquement dans cette ville que ...,” 209 or “[I]ls virent la dame de rouzaud qui estoit sur 
le seuil de la porte de la maison royale ou elle habitoit et qui dit a haute voix en les 
regardant...,” 210 or again “... et led. sr rouzaud passant devant la porte dud.laprade pour 
aller au port, il les pria de vouloir entrer dans son bureau...” 211  Physically and 
conceptually, royal officers were at the heart of the “rumeur publique” and social control, 
which were driving urban politics in these small forestry seats. One of the aims of this 
study is to determine how far they also influenced their professional behaviour and service 
loyalties.  
 
Quillan, a stable socio-professional structure 
 
The economic structure of Quillan reproduced that of the whole province. It was mainly 
based on the production of wool cloth, leather works, and agricultural products, which 
increasingly included winemaking from local vineyards. As a river port well equipped with 
raft-making facilities, Quillan also developed a thriving wood-based artisanry and 
commercial activity. Based on our survey of parish records of 1666 and on the compoix 
listings of 1731 recorded by André Marcel, 212 we can get a picture of the socio-
professional structure of the town, but no claim can be made for the figures obtained from 
these sources to represent the whole working population. For our purpose, the forty-six 
professional categories or social groups identified in the sources have been re-grouped into 
eleven main categories. (Table 3) 
																																																								
207 ADAD, 63C32, ‘Ventes de bois, Quillan, (1679)’. 
208 de Vivo, Information and communication. 
209 ADH, C1257, f.175, ‘Audition Jean Roillet, 5 aout 1737’. 
210 ADH, C1255, pièce 321, f.3r., ‘Audition personnelle André Boire, 26 octobre 1737’. 
211 ADH, C1257, pièce 210, page 4, ‘Interrogatoire Jean-Antoine Loubet, 18 septembre 1741’. 





Table 3 Quillan: Socio-Professional Categories in 1666 and 1731 






One can observe that by 1731 the number of textile artisans soared, reflecting what was 
happening in the rest of the province. The hospitability sector flourished, and the number 
of wood traders doubled. The other categories showed little change. To further clarify the 
picture, the professional groups refered to in Quillan’s compoix have been amalgamated 
into just four over-arching categories: notables (non-merchant), merchants (wood and non-







213 They are the same categories as those used by Abbé Jean-Joseph Expilly in his Dictionnaire 
géographique, historique et politique des Gaules et de la France, 6 vols (Avignon, Amsterdam, 
1758-1768), Article  ‘Languedoc’, vol. 4, 58.  
















Fig.4 Quillan: Socio-professional structure, simplified categorisation (%) 




Numerically, the town was clearly dominated by artisans (67 %) who supplied local 
markets. Only 15.5 % were labourers (brassiers), many of them working in the 
surrounding vineyards and in local winemaking. The urban oligarchy comprised non-
merchant notables with a legal or medical education (23 %), and the maîtrise officers and 
their families as representatives of the only royal institution of the town. While merchants 
(14 %) were in smaller numbers, some of them, and especially those who can be qualified 
as forestry entrepreneurs, must be included in the elite category, not only by virtue of their 
economic strength and local influence, but also by their pivotal role as intermediaries for 
the exploitation of the kingdom’s forests, royal and other. Wood as a commodity was a 
crucial factor that shaped the relationship of merchants and royal officers, two forestry 
professionals who, residing alongside each other in the cramped confines of the town, were 
also duty-bound to interact and collaborate.  
 
Wood as a commodity 
 
One of the principal characteristics of wood commerce in the early modern period is its 
regional scope. This also delimited the markets available to Quillan’s wood merchants. By 
its very nature, trading bulk material such as wood was limited to the regional or local 
spheres because of the price of transportation, unless long-distance fluvial routes, such as 
the Yonne or the Garonne, could be used. In the case of naval wood, river and/or maritime 











transport routes were essential. For this type of wood, Bamford estimated that “the cost of 
overland transport alone could easily exceed the value of the standing trees.” 214  
 
In Languedoc, the contribution of wood trade to the province’s overall commercial activity 
can be evaluated thanks to the detailed listings of goods produced in the province compiled 
by intendant Basville at the end of the seventeenth century. 215 In that province, textile 
products (wool, cotton and silk) clearly dominated, with 47.3 % of the total commercial 
volume, followed by agricultural and animal-based products, with 42 %. His estimate of 
360,000 livres/year for wood trade and wood-related products represented just 1.3 % of the 
province’s total commercial volume. (Fig. 5)  
 
Fig.5 Languedoc commerce: distribution  
according to main production areas (livres/year) 






In other provinces, the volume of wood trade naturally varied, depending on the abundance 
and nature of the forests, transport infrastructures, the presence of larger towns, or specific 
economic and manufacturing demands. In general, it can be surmised that wood would 
have similarly represented a more modest contribution than essential goods such as grain 
or wine.  
																																																								
214 Bamford, Forests and French sea power, 50. 














At national scale, returns from royal forests alone were similarly modest, compared with 
other forms of revenue. In the compendium of the kingdom’s various sources of revenue 
published by Arthur de Boislisle for the years 1683 to 1697, 216 wood from crown forests 
represented only a small fraction, especially in relation to particularly weighty income 
sources, such as tax farming (fermes) or ‘recettes générales’.  (Fig. 6) 217  
 
Fig.6 Main sources of national revenue net of expenses (1683) 





In purely economic terms, wood was therefore not a major commercial object that would 
have captured much governmental attention. Its relevance was of a different nature. It was 
political. The exploitation, sale and distribution of wood, and the mechanisms that 
regulated and controlled the access to the forests, formed distinctive regional forestry 
systems, whose internal dynamics were driven by stake-holders - including the state - 
motivated by divergent and rival interests. Central to those systems was the personal and 
professional interaction between maîtrise officers charged with implementing long-term 
royal designs, and wood merchants and land owners motivated by short-term profit. While 
																																																								
216  Arthur de Boislisle, ed., Correspondance des contrôleurs généraux des finances avec les 
intendants des provinces (Paris, 1874-1883), vol.1, 583. 
217 For the period from 1698 to 1703, grand-maître Telles d’Acosta estimated the annual revenue 
from royal forests at 2,200,000 livres. It rose incrementally throughout the century, reaching a 











the merchants were empowered by trading with all categories of forest owners (including 
the crown), the authority of the officers and the success of their interventions in non-royal 
forests could be seriously limited. Dealing with private, clerical, and even with communal 
forests, demanded diplomacy, negotiation and compromise. In terms of forestry, the legal 
status of forest ownership was the lynchpin of the relationships between the king and his 
subjects.  
 




For a private owner, a member of the Church, or a village community, a forest was more 
than a source of income or a reserve for urgent needs. It could turn into a powerful 
bargaining chip in negotiations and litigation, influence broad policy orientations, and limit 
the degree of control that maîtrises could apply on non-royal forests. Forest ownership by 
the Church, communities or private subjects had from the outset been an integral factor of 
forestry policy, but Colbert’s special concern with domestic naval supplies gave it a 
sharper political edge. On their own, the forests of the royal demesne were vastly 
insufficient to cover the surge of demand for these special, relatively uncommon wood 
types. This placed non-royal owners, collectively, in a position of leverage.  
 
Before engaging further with issues of forest ownership, it will be helpful to define the 
concepts of ‘forest’, and ‘ownership’. Today, a ‘forest’ can be defined from different 
viewpoints, environmental, legal, institutional, or cultural, but in the eyes of seventeenth-
century owners, users or officials, a forest was first and foremost a legal entity, defined by 
regulations and rules enshrined in title deeds and contracts in written form or orally 
transmitted.  
 
The ceaseless string of paréage cases or boundary disputes between adjoining royal forests 
owned by the crown and a private family bears testimony to the acute awareness and 
importance of this legal definition. The level of detail shown in the hand-drawn maps 
reproduced in Figs. 7 and 8 demonstrates the importance attributed to achieving as precise 
a representation as possible, especially for cases involving the king’s demesne. Boundaries 
had to be determined exactly to serve for any future legal contestation. As a result, one of 
the most important tasks of maîtrise officers and surveyors was the operation of bornage, 
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whereby carefully placed ditches, fences or marking stones determined forest boundaries 
in a permanent, legally-binding way. 
 
Fig.7 Map illustrating a boundary dispute between the king and Mr. d’Axat 






Fig.8 Detail of a map used in a boundary dispute 
between the king and Melle de Thoiras 





The notion of ‘ownership’ of a forest also differed vastly from today’s understanding of 
freehold ownership of land.  While private owners could in principle enjoy the proceeds 
from the sale of wood or the lease of certain rights, their exploitation rights and 
management plans were constrained by a set of obligations and servitudes. In the first 
place, owners were restricted by measures imposed by the crown, such as the quart-de-
réserve, the baliveaux rule, or the compulsory declaration of naval-grade trees on their 
land. 218 Villagers too could have a stake. Under tightly specified conditions they could 
collect certain types of wood for domestic fuel, and for a small annual albergue send pigs 
to mast in the forests (glandée), fish in streams and ponds, or let cattle graze on the soft 
forest undergrowth. One major part of Réformation work consisted in checking entitlement 
acts to confirm, reduce or abrogate customary rights of villagers in the royal forests. In 
1675, it was thus confirmed that the “sindic consuls et habitants du lieu de Belcaire 
																																																								
218 See glossary. 
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jouiront des droits de chauffage de bois mort et sec en estant et gisant et pasturage de leurs 
bestiaux [...] en payant lesd. redevances ordinaires.” 219 Shifts and changes in customary 
laws and property rights, and their very complexity, created a ceaseless string of forestry 
cases, which also explains the continuing import of forestry courts that specialised in them.  
 
Four categories of forest owners 
 
Fundamentally, forestry law distinguished between four categories of forest owners, royal, 
clerical, communal and private. One of the most significant results of Colbert’s 
Réformations was a drastic increase of knowledge about them. Concerning royal forests, 
the surveys performed in each province by the commissioners produced a first reliable, 
national record of all crown forests in the kingdom, a summary of which, remarkably, 
survived at the British Library. 220 This manuscript is undated, but Devèze estimated its 
date at 1680. 221 By contrast, the lack of reliable data for non-royal forests, especially 
before the 1780s, does not facilitate comparative analyses. Communal forests were 
extremely fragmented throughout the region, and the clergy used arguments like the don 
gratuit to eschew requests for information. It was not before the nationalisation of the 
Church demesne in 1790 that this information could be ascertained.  
 
Based on Devèze’s study, the comparison between the four main categories of forest 
owners by 1789 reveals a striking distribution: 58,16 % of France’s forests were in private 
hands, and only 14.28 % belonged to the Church, unevenly spread between abbeys, regular 
orders and mainmorte communities. 222  Communal forests (16.17 %) were widely 
dispersed throughout the country’s approximately forty thousand towns and communautés 
d’habitants. Finally, with only 11.38 %, the crown represented the smallest share in terms 







219 ADAD, 63C3, f.86r., ‘Etat des chauffages et autres droits... (1675)’. 
220 British Library, ms 7179, ‘Harleyen register’. 
221 Devèze, La grande réformation, 288. 
222 Mainmorte refers here to communities such as congregations or hospitals which did not entail a 
mutation by death, and whose material possessions were subject to specific jurisdiction.  
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Fig.9 Distribution of France’s forests by owner (1789) (%) 





Because of the difficulties involved in reconstructing forest acreages and ownership 
patterns in a more distant past, these percentages can only provide a rough guide for the 
situation at Colbert’s time. It can however be assumed that this strikingly unbalanced 
distribution within the kingdom was already in place. Devèze provided a useful discussion 
of these methodological problems. 223 Data reliability improves at regional and local level. 
In certain provinces, the predominance of one particular owner category could be extreme. 
In Périgord, “almost all of the woodlands were in private hands,” 224 while in the northern 
Cambrésis, strong episcopal presence resulted in 80 % of the forests being in the hands of 
mainmorte communities. 225 What distinguished the Languedoc from other regions was its 
particularly high proportion of royal forests. Based on measurements recorded in the 
‘Harleyen’ register, with 21.8 % of France’s total acreage of royal forests, Languedoc 
topped the list before Champagne, Isle-de-France, Normandie and Touraine, each holding 




223 Devèze, Les forêts françaises, 242-244. 
224 Hamish Graham, ‘Policing the Forests of Pre-Industrial France’, European History Quarterly, 
33, 2 (2003),  pp. 157-182, 157. 
225 Archives Départementales du Nord, C10072, ‘Lettre du Commissaire..., (1788)’.  
226 Similar listings of forest acreages also in: AN, E3627, ‘Etat des coupes de bois... (1669-1677)’, 








Fig.10          Proportion of royal forests in each Grande Maîtrise,  
                as a percentage of France’s total acreage of royal forests (%) (1680) 




In the Grande Maîtrise of Toulouse, Poublanc’s survey of 2,200 Réformation cases treated 
in the 1660s by Froidour and his judges provides some information about the province’s 
ownership structure. 227 The summary in Table 4 shows that community forests dominated 
in terms of overall numbers, but by their nature, they were fragmented into numerous, very 
small units. With respect to their surface area, royal forests dominated. They represented 
more than twice that of Church forests, notwithstanding the presence of wealthy orders like 
the Ordre de Malte or the Chartreux. On the other hand, certain forests belonging to the 
secular clergy could be of considerable value. Those owned by the Narbonne 
archbishopric, mostly located within the Quillan maîtrise, were estimated at over 60,000 
livres annual return. 228 In 1748, the bishop of Carcassonne, Armand Bazin de Bezons, 
could contribute 40,000 livres for the construction of the episcopal palace in Carcassonne 
just from the sale of the quart-de-réserve of one of his forests in the Montagne Noire 
(Loubatière). 229 This level of capital enclosed in timber reserves points to the existence of 
powerful vested interests.  
																																																								
227 Poublanc, Compter, 116.	
228 AN, G7, 1349, pièces 183 and 184, ‘Requête de M. l’Archevêque de Narbonne à propos des 
forêts dépendant de l’Archevêché, 27 décembre 1710’. 
229 A. Mahul, ‘Eloge historique d’Armand Bazin de Bezons’, Mémoires de la Société des arts des 
sciences de Carcassonne, 2 (1856), 36.  
Fig. 10   Proportion of royal fo ests in each Grande Maît ise, as a percentage of 
France’s total acreage of royal forests (1680) 
















Table 4  Ownership status and surface area of the forests (ha) 
                    in the Grande Maîtrise of Toulouse (1660s) 




The extent of private forests (noble and non-noble) is particularly difficult to estimate, but 
qualitative information suggests a certain concentration in the fertile Toulousian region 
along the Garonne, and in the Vivarais rich in ancient baronnies. The paréage cases 
treated by the Quillan maîtrise suggest that private forests were also well represented in the 
Pyrénées, and often owned by families of old nobility. As a result, these owners were also 
frequent interlocutors of the maîtrise officers.  
 
Most important for the crown’s purposes were the Pyrenean forests, which focused 
governmental attention on the three main mountain maîtrises of Quillan, Pamiers and 
Saint-Gaudens (Fig. 11). Together, the districts they covered represented nearly 73 % of 
the total royal forest acreage of the Grande Maîtrise. The very small contribution of 
Villeneuve-de-Berg (366 ha) is due to the large number of well-forested private baronnies 
in that particular maîtrise. 230  
 
The administrative restructuring of 1689, which reduced the Grande Maîtrise of Toulouse 
to just six maîtrises 231 accentuated the predominance of Quillan even further. 232 It now 
																																																								
230  See Didier Catarina, Les justices ordinaires, inférieures et subalternes de Languedoc 
(Montpellier, 2003). 











Church	 363	 21.2	 48,667,28	
Communities	 859	 50.1	 unknown	




controlled over half of the total forested cover in the reconfigured Grande Maîtrise (51.3 
%). Its ‘high-forests’ (futaies), well stocked in firs, in Sault, Fenouillèdes, or the more 
distant Madrès Mountains, appeared especially promising for the provision of ship masts 
and their exploitation by the Compagnie des Pyrénées established in 1665 by Colbert for 
that purpose. 
 
Fig.11      Acreage of royal forests in the eleven maîtrises particulières  
        of the Grande Maîtrise of Toulouse (1671) (ha) 




Because of the specific reproductive characteristics of resinous species of trees, however, 
they could only be sold by individual tree (par pied d’arbre), instead of the standard 
whole-plot method (tire-et-aire) imposed by Colbert’s Ordonnance. This exception to the 
rule was achieved by Froidour who had convinced a reticent Colbert that Pyrenean forests 
“doivent être régies et administrées d’une manière toute différente à celle des autres forêts 
du royaume.” 233 The higher risk of fraud entailed by this single-tree method was a 
deplorable, albeit unavoidable, flaw, of which the authorities were well aware. 
Furthermore, some of the dense mountain forests were only partially harvestable, because 
																																																																																																																																																																							
232 ADHG, B1924, ‘Edit portant création de 16 grands maîtres..., février 1689’. Following an 
administrative error, this version of the Edit mentioned Rodez instead of the intended Villeneuve-
de-Berg maîtrise. The error became subsequently corrected. 
233 Bartoli, Louis de Froidour, 111. For a detailed survey of sylvicultural discussions at Froidour’s 
time, see especially pp. 95-145. 
Table 12    Acreage of royal forests (ha) 
in the eleven maîtrises particulières of the Grande Maîtrise of Toulouse (1671) 
















of steep gradients and lack of access to floatable rivers, so that improving roads to 
facilitate log transport by ox-cart was identified as another priority for the Réformation 
commissioners. 234 
 
State control in forestry, an ongoing challenge 
 
While the proportion of royal forests varied greatly from region to region, on a national 
scale Fig. 9 above showed that they represented only a minor proportion of all forests. In 
principle, the integrity of the royal demesne was protected by the fundamental dogma of 
inalienability enshrined in the Edit de Moulins of 1566. The long-term leases to engagistes, 
which provided the crown with a safe and steady income, usually contained a re-
possession clause. As a result, by 1789 half of the royal forests had been detached as 
apanages, bois engagés, or allocated to specific manufactures such as salt making. 235  The 
king sometimes invoked his “grace specialle, pleine puissance et authorité Royalle” to 
reward the subjects he wished to favour with free yearly firewood allocations or forest-
grazing rights. 236 Far more damaging to the integrity of the forested demesne was the 
déclaration of December 1652, which authorised the sale of degraded parts of the royal 
demesne such as “boqueteaux, taillis rabougris ou abroutis, terres vaines et vagues, landes, 
marais.” 237 This edict led to considerable abuse. In Normandie, healthy high-forests have 
thus been declared ‘downgraded’ to be sold off and traded for a good profit on the wood 
markets. 238 Colbert had made recovering these abusive subtractions a priority task for his 
commissioners.  
 
The vast disparity between royal forests those of other owners, or the ongoing 
encroachments on the integrity of the demesne, risk overstating the impression of weak 
control over what was considered a ‘bien public’. By the eighteenth century the state had 
acquired and consolidated its jurisdictional and arbitration powers over all four types of 
forests. This concerned especially the forests of the clergy and the municipalities, which 
together totalled 30 % of the nation’s forested surface. Claiming the role of the king as 
																																																								
234 In 1668, Froidour was charged with inspecting works on the “Chemin de la Régordane” leading 
from Montpellier to Brioude in Auvergne. His account can be found in the BMT, ms 665, pièce 
12.  
235 Devèze, Les forêts françaises à la veille de la Révolution, 242. 
236 AN, KK952, f.163, ‘Mémoire pour la Réformationdes forests du Roy, s.d’. This mémoire is 
unsigned, but Devèze attributed it to Colbert, who wrote it in 1663 for the instruction of the newly-
appointed Réformation commissioners. 
237 Devèze, Une admirable réforme, 37-38. 
238 Id., 47-48. 
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“protecteur, conservateur et défenseur” of the temporal possessions of the clergy, Colbert 
re-iterated certain obligations which by the 1660s had fallen into abeyance. He requested 
that all forests belonging to “ecclésiastiques et main-mortables” followed the same 
management principles as the royal forests. With the quart-de-futaie prescription, a quarter 
of their forests had to be ‘reserved’ to grow into high-forest. The lower wood (taillis) was 
to be harvested according to a annual rotation of contingent plots (tire-et-aire), whereby 
sixteen of the most promising young trees (baliveaux) had to be ‘reserved’ for restocking. 
Their forests also had to be surveyed and measured by an approved arpenteur. The edict of 
1715 further confirmed the grand-maître in his jurisdictional powers and inspection rights 
over these forests, and instances of wood theft and other illegal activities on their grounds 
could, under certain conditions, be treated in the royal forestry courts. 239  
 
While this appears as a drastic intervention into their affairs, the Church never fully 
submitted. The Assemblée Ordinaire du Clergé of 1670 protested vigorously against 
Colbert’s demands, invoking the preeminence of custom over law, historical precedent, or 
legal inconsistencies. In 1675, at the height of the Franco-Dutch war, the Assembly 
threatened to withdraw its annual don gratuit. In 1693, a group of five traitants was 
charged with recovering the 4,600,000 livres fine arrears accumulated by the Church for 
years of non-compliance with forest regulations. 240 In the new century, things were no 
better. Governments continued to face a string of individual legal challenges, especially 
from powerful regular orders like the Ordre de Saint Jean de Jerusalem or the Abbaye de 
Clairvaux. For the foresters on the other hand, the preeminence of the king’s jurisdiction 
over the temporal possessions of the clergy was an indisputable prerogative, legitimised by 
the forests’ general nature as a common good. According to a commentator of Gallon’s 
Conférence de l’Ordonnance, “[l]es bois des ecclésastiques ont toujours été regardez 
comme étant de droit public; c’est la raison pour laquelle nos Rois dans tous les tems ont 
veillé à laur conservation, & les ont pris sous leur protection particulière, tant parce que 
l’Eglise est toujours mineure, que pour empêcher les abus que pourroient commettre les 
Bénéficiers au préjudice de leurs successeurs.” 241  
 
																																																								
239 On legislative aspects of the control of ecclesiastical forests of the clergy, see Antoine Pecquet, 
Loix forestières de France, Commentaire historique et raisonné sur l'Ordonnance de 1669, ... 2 
vols, (Paris, 1753), vol.2, 185-262. 
240 See Waquet, Les Grands Maîtres, 270-271. 




Similar claims were made regarding the woods of the communautés d’habitants. A lighter 
level of control was applied to private forests, which did not mean that owners were 
entirely free to manage and commercialise their wood as they pleased. Because of their 
vast coverage, they were regarded as a resource of national interest, a key reserve of futaie 
timber for large constructions on land and sea. Various edicts of the 1720s reiterated the 
prohibition of clearing private forests or harvesting parts of the futaie reserves without 
authorisation from the Conseil. Private taillis woods could only be harvested after a 
minimum of ten years. The grand-maître had inspection rights, especially in forests held in 
paréage with the king, or in those adjoining royal forests. These observations mitigate the 
impression of weak state control that could arise from considering differences based on 
acreages alone. 
 
While initially the Eaux-et-Forêts had been principally established to manage, control and 
protect the crown’s own forests, by the eighteenth century the institution had become a 
crucial instance of regulation and control for a large and diverse group of owners and users 
of the forests, including the large contingent of private forests. In the eyes of the grand-
maître of Rouen, the new forestry order created by Colbert, “qui pouvait paraitre 
extrêmement gênante pour l’ordre des particuliers, et qui semblait blesser des privilèges 
abusifs dans leur principe,” had, after one century, lost none of its legitimacy. 242 
Notwithstanding Pecquet’s claim, in practice, the rules were often ignored because of 
entrenched practices based on custom or powerful vested interests. More relevant and 
potentially damaging for the king’s authority, however, was an unintended by-product of 
Colbert’s intervention. While the regime he had established had crystallised into an 
unassailable legal and organisational framework, the context of its application on the 
ground was in a constant flux. As will be developed in chapter four below, this created a 
paradox, which holds a key to the Eaux-et-Forêts’ increasing marginalisation on the 
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The Eaux-et-Forêts, an unloved institution  
 
Fragile historical foundations 
 
Throughout the five centuries of their existence, the Eaux-et-Forêts have sat uneasily 
amidst the intricate shifts and changes of the kingdom’s institutions. In the thirteenth and 
fourteenth centuries, legal competency for the crown forests had rested with the baillis. 
The institution was headed by a unique souverain-maître equipped with exclusive 
jurisdictional powers. Their main concerns were the protection of the traditional hunting 
grounds of the king and his clients mostly located near the capital, and the revenue drawn 
from his forests. Formally, Eaux-et-Forêts were part of the Maison du Roi, alongside the 
heads of the king’s household (grands maistres du Roi), and the grands écuyers, grands 
veneurs and grands fauconniers in charge of his hunting needs. 243 The first holders of the 
souveraine maîtrise des eaux et forêts had close links to the royal circles. Clausse de 
Fleury, a particularly energetic souverain-maître and reformer of the end of the sixteenth 
century, was a godson of Henri II, son of a secrétaire du roi, and grandson of François 
1er’s personal doctor. Besides its enormous prestige, this office also carried considerable 
gages and privileges. The souverain-maîtres had total control over a small cohort of 
subaltern officers, maîtres des forests and their lieutenants, capitaines forestiers and 
procureurs, all members of the provincial notability. Many seventeenth-century maîtres 
particuliers were gentilshommes. In 1677, the maître particulier of the maîtrise of Villers-
Cotterêts, Charles de Capendu, vicomte de Boursonne, was Page de la Chambre du Roi. 
244 Much less frequent was the nobility of garde-marteaux, which can derive from being 
entrusted with the fleur-de-lys-embossed marteau, the seal granting them wide powers of 
control over users and merchants in royal forests. Together, these early royal foresters 
oversaw the implementation of ordinances and organised the sales of timber. In the 
absence of a fixed official seat until the Colbertian reforms, they exercised a peripatetic 
form of forestry justice in the provinces. 
 
From the sixteenth century, the expansion of the king’s demesne demanded that the 
institution be reformed, and its jurisdiction clearly separated from that of the sénéchaux or 
baillis. The monopoly of the souverain-maître started to be eroded with the establishment, 
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in 1554, of the higher appellate court for forestry cases, the Table de Marbre, a specialist 
appeal structure that complemented, as well as rivalled, the Parlement. The final blow 
came when, in May 1575, Henri III created six new Grandes Maîtrises, each of them 
headed by a grand-maître endowed with the same powers as the former, unique, 
souverain-maître. 245 Despite the occasional proclamation of good intentions, the surge of 
venality that followed could never be permanently abolished. In 1573, the total number of 
subaltern officers of the new Grandes Maîtrises amounted to 183, with a further 448 
sergents and gardes policing the forests. 246 In the course of the next hundred years, 
numbers waxed and waned according to need and circumstances. With the proliferation of 
offices during the turbulent period from 1630 to the mid-1650s, numbers nearly tripled. 
When Colbert took over the forestry department from the hands of Chancelier Pierre 
Séguier in 1661, they had reached a total of 1,620. 247  
 
The southern half of the kingdom had not been affected by this multiplication of offices. It 
suffered on the contrary from critical under-administration. In Quillan for example, the 
control of royal forests before 1671 had largely relied on a system of local gardes overseen 
by the sénéchaux. A small forestry bureau established in 1561, operated by four royal 
officers, was hamstrung by a total lack of judicial and policing powers, whose main task 
was to collect a nominal fee from the exploitation of the forests on the upper reaches of the 
Aude. When Froidour commenced operations in 1666, one of the gardes had just been 
killed, leaving his sector of the forest totally unsupervised. 248 Other maîtrises were in a 
comparable situation, except Toulouse, where the presence of the royal administration was 
more palpable. In their first reports, Froidour and the other commissioners described at 
length the sorry state of the district’s royal forests resulting from this weak control. They 
had fallen prey to abusive practices by disenfranchised and unaccountable officials who, in 
collusion with local residents, merchants and private owners, considered that the resources 
of the royal forests were there for the taking.  
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As the new de-facto head of the Eaux-et-Forêts, in 1661 Colbert took on the colossal task 
of addressing abuses like these in every province. He started by reconfiguring the 
administrative forestry map, a highly heterogenous structure, the result of accidents of 
history and unregulated alienations, gifts, apanages, and haphazard acquisitions of 
seigneuries (Map 6). 
 
Map 6 Forestry map before Colbert’s reforms (1661) 





The map illustrates well the difference between a densely structured northern half, and a 
vastly under-administered south, stretching from the Atlantic shores to the Alpine mounts 
of Provence and Dauphiné. This measure was acccompanied by a reduction of office 
numbers, which mostly affected the northern maîtrises. By 1674, they were trimmed back 
Map 5      Forestry map before Colbert’s reforms (1661) 
































































from 1,620 to 1,333. 249 In 1667 he commuted the offices of grands-maîtres into salaried, 
commissioned posts, a status which they retained until 1689, whereby the reimbursement 
of these expensive offices was to be covered by the proceeds of wood sales. In Toulouse, it 
took the total sales income for the period from 1668 to 1672 to reimburse the former 
grand-maître, Jehan Caulet de Cadars. 250  He did not enjoy the benefits of that 
reimbursement because he was suspended and fined 8,000 livres.  
 
Map 7 Forestry map after Colbert’s reconfiguration of 1671 
(Sources: ‘Harleyen’ register; Poublanc, Compter.  




Another urgent task was to redress the north-south discrepancy of the forestry map. Within 
the enormous southern unit administered by the Toulouse Grande Maîtrise, Colbert 
created in 1671 eleven maîtrises and six smaller sub-units (grueries), each of them 
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250 AN, G7, 297, f.iii, ‘Comptes du Sr. Riquier pour les bois du Languedoc (1687)’.   
Map 6     Forestry districts after Colbert’s reconfiguration of 1675 





























































including five main officers, a variable number of gardes, and auxiliaries such as a sworn-
in suveyor, a fine collector, and a huissier (Map 7). 251 
 
Six years after Colbert’s death, in 1689, the map was changed again, and the structure it 
acquired then remained broadly constant until the fall of the institution in 1791. Venality 
returned to forestry: the territory was divided into sixteen Grandes Maîtrises, each headed 
by a grand-maître who had bought this office. 252 In the south, the oversized Grande 
Maîtrise of Toulouse was reduced to more workable proportions. Five of its maîtrises 
particulières became assigned to the new Grande Maîtrise of Guyenne, leaving Toulouse 
with only the six easternmost maîtrises. (Map 8) This reduction greatly facilitated the task 
of the grand-maître charged with overseeing them.  
 
Map 8 Forestry map after the reconfiguration of 1689 
(Sources: Devèze, Une admirable réforme, and the 
Edit de création de seize grands-maîtres, février 1689) 
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252 AN, P2390, f.37-47, ‘Edit de création de seize grandes maîtrises dans le Royaume, février 
1689’. 
Map 7   Forestry districts after the reconfiguration of 1689 

















































































The grand-maître, a pivotal role 
 
As exclusive recipients of the Conseil’s lettres patentes, the grands-maîtres were the main 
channel for the implementation of ordinary policy decisions in the provinces. During 
Réformations Forestières, they were endowed with wide discretionary powers as they 
could pronounce arrêts and ordonnances in their own name. According to the debates 
recorded in the journal of their compagnie, they entertained frequent and active relations, 
in epistolary form or in person, with the intendant des finances (who had Eaux-et-Forêts in 
his remit) or his premier commis, their main interlocutors in the capital. 253  Their 
discussions were dominated by the defense of their own interests, apart from discussions of 
some high-profile cases susceptible to serve as precedence for legislation. A good example 
of this is the journal entry of 8 February 1727, when they discussed the case of the 
Chartreux order who insisted on using their high-forests regardless of the quart-de-réserve 
rule.  
 
In their role as heads of the regional forestry district, one of their principal duties was to 
oversee the gardes and the officers of the maîtrises particulières. Much of this regulatory 
task of control, predictably, was of a bureaucratic nature, and could be undertaken from 
their residence in the regional capital with the assistance of a personal secrétaire. The 
“informations de vie et moeurs” they conducted for each new applicant of a maîtrise post 
was one of their cherished – and at times challenged - prerogatives. Grands-maîtres could 
also use their personal authority to avert undesirable recruitments. They signed the yearly 
certificats de service needed by the officers to receive their gages, and with their taxations 
they determined their chauffages and journées. They appointed all gardes of royal forests, 
and could dismiss them without further court procedure. Above all, grands-maîtres had 
disciplinary powers over maîtrise officers, to the first level. This included the power to 
fine, suspend or remove them, in which case, they could commit for their replacement. 
“C’est principalement dans les cas d’interdiction que le Grand-Maître a tout droit de 
pourvoir & de commettre, afin que le service ne manque point.” 254 This power has 
however been severely curtailed  after the posts returned to venal status, when they could 
only commit substitutes under certain conditions. 
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Appeals to decisions of the grands-maîtres pronounced outside their own seat, for example 
during their inspection visits (“en réformation”) were normally directed to the Parlement, 
the Eaux-et-Forêts’ longstanding nemesis. This represented a serious limitation to their 
jurisdictional authority, as the example of the three new maîtrises particulières established 
in 1729 in Dauphiné well illustrates. In a series of mémoires and requests addressed to the 
Conseil, the grand-maître bitterly complained about “l’opposition opiniâtre que le 
Parlement de Grenoble a fait paroître dans tous les tems contre les Règlemens en matière 
d’Eaux & Forêts, & les contradictions sans nombre que les Officiers chargés de la 
manutention de ces Règlemens ont essuyé de la part des Officiers de cette Cour.” 255 After 
a long and acrimonious procedure, the arrêt du Conseil of 13 June 1752 finally confirmed 
the grand-maitre in his exclusive right to pronounce judgment on maîtrise personnel. In 
the case of judgments proceeding from a commission by the Conseil, for example during 
an official Réformation, appeals could only be lodged with the Conseil, avoiding the 
Parlement’s obstructive rulings. As Pecquet remarked, “[L]e conseil est proprement un 
Tribunal d’administration; ainsi on peut s’y pourvoir pour ce qui regarde les parties 
d’administration & de police, l’exécution d’autres Arrêts du Conseil, le maintien de l’ordre 
que le Roi a voulu qui fût suivi.” 256 While these prerogatives might point to a high degree 
of personal and professional influence over the officers, we will see that, in practice, they 
only hesitantly intervened in internal affairs of the maîtrise.  
 
The role of the grands-maîtres was not restricted to bureaucratic activity from their seat in 
the regional capital. At least once a year, they travelled to each of the maîtrises to inspect 
the royal forests, control the registers and the general performance of the officers. The 
most important task they performed during these visits was to determine, for each district, 
the nature and volume of the wood to be offered at the next auctions, and to preside over 
those taking place in the current year.  
 
Administrative and contentious affairs concerning the merchants, owners, and users of the 
forests formed another prominent part of grand-maître activity. During their visits, they 
were entitled to pronounce sentence on ordinary cases of the public, whereby appeals were 
normally directed to the Parlements. In some sensitive cases, “pour épargner à leur 
décision la disgrâce d’être anéanties par d’autres des parlements,” grands-maîtres diverted 
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appeals away from the Parlements by requesting a commission from the Conseil, 257 in 
which case they were treated there. They also examined requests from private and clerical 
forest owners for cuts outside the regular harvesting schedule (coupes extraordinaires). 
These requests were forwarded to the intendant in Paris, with an accompanying suggestion 
on how to proceed. In most cases, their advice was confirmed. As Michel Antoine 
observed, by the 1730s, these requests had become so numerous that the Conseil - formally 
responsible for authorising each of these requests individually - only intervened in some 
rare cases whose outcome “ferait jurisprudence,” such as those touching on the integrity of 
the demesne, or raising political issues or local sensitivities. 258 In his multi-faceted role, 
the regional grand-maître represented a pivotal executive link between the centre and the 
province.  
 
Five categories of maîtrise officers 
 
Colbert’s reforms also clarified and consolidated the rights and duties of the five categories 
of officers who operated the maîtrises particulières: maître particulier, lieutenant, 
procureur du roi, garde-marteau and greffier. Collectively, their main areas of 
responsibility were four-fold. Firstly, in their judicial role they held weekly sessions 
addressing minor claims, requests or offenses reported by the gardes, they forwarded 
appeals to the regional Table de Marbre, and held assises once a year. Secondly, in a more 
executive function, their main responsibility was to manage and inspect the royal forests 
within their remit according to a schedule determined by the Ordonnance. In-between 
these visits, the forests were left to the scrutiny of the patrolling gardes, duty-bound to 
report weekly on their visits. Work on the ground also included bornage operations, the 
organisation and control of replantation schemes, and the marking of the plots (assiette) to 
be offered at the autumnal auctions. Planning and organising these events required their 
attention for the best part of the year. Their third main area of responsibility concerned the 
non-royal forests in their district. They could inspect private, clerical or communal forests 
on an ad-hoc basis, and they passed on to the grand-maître the authorisation requests for 
cuts in private high forests received on that occasion. Fourthly, they also managed and 
policed river fishing, and ensured that waterways remained in good order for the all-
important river transportation of timber. 
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The various maîtrise offices shared some common general characteristics. Applicants had 
to be at least twenty-five years old (unless granted a special derogation), be of the Catholic 
faith, and reside in the vicinity of the seat. Those with relatives in the maîtrise were in 
theory excluded. They were established (pourvus) at the Conseil after payment of the fees 
and scrutiny of their “vie et moeurs” by the grand-maître, after which they were formally 
‘received’ at the Table de Marbre. Their legal and technical suitability was confirmed by 
an examination, which for greffiers, huissiers, and gardes was limited to the relevant 
articles of the 1669 Ordonnance. They could only claim their gages upon presenting a 
certificat de service signed by the grand-maître. They were barred from taking up another 
judicial office (except the lieutenant), from engaging in trading activities, participating in 
wood auctions, or managing the estates of seigneurs or other forest owners.  
  
Beyond these common characteristics, the distinctive attributes and responsibilities of each 
post were key to understanding their work practices and, at times, misuse of office. The 
maître particulier was considered primus inter pares. According to Pecquet, as formal 
head of the maîtrise, he had a determining influence on the quality of the service of the 
whole unit. "L'état d’un maître particulier n'est point un état de repos, [...] la vigilance qu'il 
peut avoir [...] peut beaucoup contribuer à faire respecter les Loix forestieres, & par 
conséquent à assurer le bon ordre public." 259 His apparel included the ceremonial sword, a 
prerogative he shared only with the garde-marteau. A law degree was not required, but his 
judicial role was important. He presided over the weekly tribunal sessions held at the 
maîtrise,  and at the behest of the procureur du roi he could pass sentence at the first level, 
provided it was validated by the other officers. As a graduate, he could instruct cases, but 
only at the procureur’s behest. Otherwise, this task was left to the lieutenant. He ensured 
that correct procedures were being followed for the all-important yearly wood auctions and 
after-sales control of the merchants’ cuts (récollements). In addition, the maître particulier 
was required to visit all the royal forests in his district every six months. He was also 
entitled to inspect non-royal forests without previous sollicitation, and more generally 
launch inquiries into anything that could affect the royal forests.  
 
In case of incapacity or absence, the lieutenant replaced the maître particulier. It was a 
difficult post, which frequently brought its holder into conflict with the head. As an 
“officier de robe longue” the deputy head was necessarily a graduate of law, but the office 
carried only modest gages and limited rights, and symbolic prerogatives like its droit de 
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préséance were regularly challenged. The most critical role in the maîtrise fell on the 
procureur du roi. This officer, who, ideally, was to show exceptional qualities of  “probité, 
lumières, et attention,” was for Pecquet "l'âme des maîtrises." In his essentially judicial 
role, he represented the king’s interests, and warranted the assiduity and professional zeal 
of the other officers. In day-to-day forestry business, he initiated and pursued all 
administrative or contentious procedures brought to the maîtrise. 260  
 
The most intriguing office in the maitrise team was that of the garde-marteau - literally the 
‘keeper-of-the-hammer’. This officer represented the physical link between deskwork and 
control on the ground. A law degree was not required, but he needed a good grasp of 
sylvicultural and local knowledge. As garde-marteaux typically formed long dynasties, 
training was provided through familial apprenticeship. Their presence was required at all 
official sessions, where they were entitled to wear a sword and had deliberative voice, and 
could replace the maître particulier or lieutenant if they were absent. The prestige and 
authority associated with this office derived from their custodianship of the maîtrise’s 
fleur-de-lys-embossed hammer, considered the material representation of the royal seal. 
This tagging hammer, which formally authorised cuts and other interventions in the 
forests, was securely kept in a casket locked by three keys, held by the head, the procureur 
du roi, and the garde-marteau. As an additional prerogative, garde-marteaux also owned a 
personal hammer for the tagging of special types of wood. Their main responsibilities 
consisted in overseeing martelage operations in the planning phase of the auctions, and 
controlling the cuts at the end of the merchants’ exploitations. In their frequent patrol 
rounds in the forests, they also supervised the work of the gardes. This role as the 
maîtrise’s mobile instance of control was a crucial element in their functioning. According 
to Pecquet, this officer could do as much harm as good in the king’s forests depending on 
the use he made of this monopoly. 261 As this study will expose, the garde-marteau’s 
regular and close interaction with local forest users, workers and merchants, also made him 
into a particularly ‘corruptible’ element of the maîtrise team.  
 
The greffier, who was often also a local notary, was the bureaucratic arm of the maîtrise. 
Before Colbert’s reforms, clerical work in forestry had been attributed on an ad-hoc basis, 
often to local notaries. When the commissioners started inspecting the paper work of the 
maîtrises, they often found official documents “dispersez dans les maison particulières de 
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ceux qui [..] auront exercé [le greffe] et de leurs veuves et héritiers.” 262 This disorder and 
neglect sparked significant changes in the bureaucratic organisation of maîtrises 
particulières. 263 As regular, sworn-in officers, greffiers were forthwith asked to appear in 
public "en habit décent, c’est-à-dire robe de palais, et en habit court noir quand ils 
travaillent chez les juges en leurs maisons.” 264 They were required to keep eight different 
registers, each with a specific purpose, to be securely housed in armoires located in the 
forestry building. 265 This elaborate code of practice aimed at preserving for the long term 
a legally-binding record of all operations, forest inspections, sales, and tribunal work. 
Being privvy to the affairs of their colleagues and fellow residents, the greffiers whose 
office carried particularly low gages enjoyed some uncanny leverage. Durand’s study of 
Languedoc administrators between the 1670s and the 1780s demonstrates that this 
particular group was frequently involved in dubious dealings. 266 Crucially, the greffier’s 
presence at all administrative and judicial sessions made him legally co-responsible for any 
irregularities. For Jean Roillet, greffier of the Quillan maîtrise, this aspect of his work 
turned into a painful reality: as a result of Quillan’s second Réformation he was 
prosecuted, briefly jailed, fined, and suspended for one year. 267 
 
The good functioning of the forestry institution as a whole, then, depended on the quality 
of service and professional practices of these officers in their diverse, complementary and 
inter-connected roles. On the other hand, Grandes Maîtrises and maîtrises particulières 
did not operate in an institutional void. During the five centuries of its existence, the Eaux-
et-Forêts institution was also confronted with ongoing challenges to its authority and 
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A contested jurisdiction 
 
As well as an administrative body, the Eaux-et-Forêts were also a juridiction 
extraordinaire. 268 From the outset, monarchs had willed that forestry jurisdiction remain 
distinct from general jurisprudence. In the words of one avocat-général at the Paris 
Parlement, bodies such as the Bureaux des finances, Amirautés, Greniers à sel or Eaux-et-
Forêts were all concerned with “des matières singulières [...] qui devaient et pouvaient 
raisonnablement être l’objet d’un ordre particulier de jurisprudence.” 269 In forestry, this 
distinction was particularly important because of the need to protect the kingdom’s forests 
against profit-driven short-term interests and attempts to manage and exploit one’s 
property freely, unshackled by official regulations. Royal or non-royal, all forests, 
conceptually, were considered a bien public for which the state claimed tutelage, and 
which was best served by a specific legal framework.  
 
This juridictional separatedness, however, was an irritant for other institutions that 
perceived Eaux-et-Forêts’ judicial prerogatives as infringing their own. 270 Already the 
brief episode of the révolte cabochienne in 1413 271 saw a first attempt at eliminating the 
office of the souverain-maître, claiming it to be “inutile, onéreux pour le trésor et le 
peuple.” 272 In 1655, the maîtres des forêts of Rouen had to seek an évocation générale of 
forestry appeals to the Conseil “to overcome the resistance of those parlementaires who 
had a vested material interest in impeding the introduction of new forestry regulations.” 273 
Such mistrust of Parlements was not surprising given the fresh memories of their 
involvement in the Fronde, but similar challenges to the legitimacy of the institution and 
the authority of its members lingered on for the next century and a half. The final blow 
came with the edict of May 1788, which incorporated all specialist jurisdictions into 
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Parlementaire obstruction  
 
Institutional antagonism against the Eaux-et-Forêts crystallised mostly around the 
Parlements and the Etats, whereby the former were cited as the most resolute obstructors 
of forestry jurisdiction. The formal establishment of the new grandes maîtrises in 1575 
was received with suspicion by the Parlements, sparking a two centuries-long war of 
attrition against their perceived rival, motivated as much by the defense of their 
jurisdictional competencies as by private interests, as many parlementaires were also  
landowners. They had equally resented the establishment in 1554 of the Tables de Marbre, 
which introduced a further judicial layer between the maîtrises and the Parlements. In 
Toulouse, the bureaux of these new forestry appeal courts were, tellingly, relegated to a 
dark and dank corner of the Parlement’s large building complex. 274 In terms of personnel, 
they overlapped partly with the Parlements. In their ordinary weekly sessions, which were 
in theory presided by the grand-maître or his lieutenant général, these hybrid courts 
received appeals from the maîtrises particulières for matters of “fonds et propriété des 
eaux et forêts du Roi, îles, rivières, entreprises sur icelles”, and other forms of forest 
holdings. 275 Appeals to these numerous cases were directed to the Parlement for final 
sentence. In matters of “usages, abus, délits et malversations commises dans les eaux et 
forêts,” the Tables de Marbre acted as final instances. Here, the sessions were presided by 
the first president of the Parlement (or his substitute), and comprised the seven most senior 
conseillers of the Parlement’s Grand-Chambre, as well as the most senior officers of the 
Table de Marbre. This highly complex and unwieldy structure was used as the Parlements’ 
long arm in forestry affairs, a situation that was particularly conducive to a deleterious 
atmosphere generating ongoing competency squabbles with the maîtrises and the grand-
maître.  
 
Unsurprisingly, parlementaire wariness guided Colbert’s choice of commissioners for his 
Réformation Générale of the 1660s. Out of seventy-five commissioners, subdelegates and 
judges, twenty were intendants, maîtres des requêtes, or close relatives of the minister, but 
the bulk comprising thirty-two officers from présidiaux, sénéchaussées or bailliages were 
legal professionals at intermediate levels of the judiciary. Only four of Colbert’s 
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commissoners were parlementaires. 276 For his operation in Languedoc, Froidour followed 
suit. In his report to the Contrôleur Général about the establishment of the province’s new-
style maîtrises particulières, he harked back on the familiar theme of parlementaire 
obstruction to maîtrise jurisdiction. “Nous avons remarqué une troisième cause [of mis-
management] qui est l’impuissance de ces mesmes officiers dont l’authoritté légitime a 
esté opprimée par celle du parlement qui en touttes occasions a favorisé les délinquans et 
les usagers peut-estre par l’interest que les particuliers de ce corps avoient à la continuation 
des désordres.” 277 As a result, not one of Froidour’s Réformation judges or subdelegates 
was a parlementaire. As mentioned above, this mistrust caused him to move the maîtrise 
particulière away from Toulouse to the small town of Villemur, “pour tirer les maistres 
hors des sollicitations des personnes puissantes de laditte ville.” 278 After the end of the 
Réformation process in 1673, Froidour, who as grand-maître was no longer protected by 
his commissioner’s powers, became the target of parlementaire assaults. He complained 
that “non seulement le Parlement favorisait lesdites entreprises [des juges ordinaires sur la 
juridiction des forêts], mais qu’il retombait dans tous les abus du passé, favorisant en tout 
et partout les délinquants, recevant les appellations, obmisso medio, du siège de la Table 
de marbre, évoquant et recevant toutes sortes de causes au préjudice de la juridiction des 
forêts.” 279  
 
Forestry-Parlement antagonism came to a head during the institutional crisis triggered by 
the war of Spanish Succession. In February 1704, an edict removed the Tables de marbre 
and created instead in each Parlement a new chambre des Eaux-et-Forêts, to be staffed 
with a plethora of new officers. This incorporation of the former forestry appeal court with 
the Parlement’s chambre des requêtes drastically increased parlementaire leverage in 
forestry. In 1708, the maître particulier of Saint-Pons complained that a number of 
contentious forestry cases channelled directly to the chambre, thus by-passing the 
maîtrises, were never finalised “faute d’y estre poursuivies.” 280 For merchants and private 
landowners too, the new structure was a boon. In 1704, a small group of merchants lodged 
a request to remove the extra fee claimed by Quillan’s officers for their task of controlling 
the timber rafts floated on the Aude. Wood merchant Guillaume Bertrand and the marquis 
du Vivier de Lansac thus secured an arrêt du Parlement, which freed them from paying 
																																																								
276 Based on Devèze, Une admirable réforme, passim. 
277 ADHG, 1A12, t.1, f.231 v., ‘Procès-verbal d’avis, Froidour, 27 juillet 1668’.   
278 Id., f.240.  
279 ADHG 1A12, t.1, f.248. Quoted in Bartoli, ‘Louis de Froidour’, 32.   
280 AN, G7, 1349, f.160r. ‘Lettre Sr.Roiré, 10 octobre 1708’. 
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that fee. 281 For ordinary residents, it was an opportunity to reverse unpalatable rulings 
pronounced during the last Réformation. Sr Catala, seigneur de Rocquefer et la Fajolle, 
could thus re-claim possession of one of his forests that Froidour had incorporated into the 
royal domain. 282 In Montauban, where maîtrise officers had applied sentence to a house 
owner who kept wood stolen from royal forests in his cellar to be sold on the black market, 
the owner appealed to the Parlement to overturn the sentence, driving the alarmed maître 
particulier to turn to the intendant in Paris for help. In his letter, he refered, once again, to 
the “mille chicaneries auxquelles les habitants desdittes villes, acoutumés a n’acheter que 
du bois de délit pour leur chauffage, m’expozeront par voie du parlement.” 283  
 
This institutional crisis of the 1700s proved particularly damaging for the  personal 
authority of the grand-maître. In a letter of 15 April 1705, grand-maître Claude Anceau 
complained that the practice of reducing fine amounts, particularly frequent amongst the 
judges of the chambre, encouraged merchant fraud: “Ce qu’ils retireront du délit qu’ils 
auront commis sera souvent au-dessus des amendes auxquelles ils pourront estre 
condemnnez.” 284  The changes in personnel caused by the establishment of the new 
chambre also created uncertainty in established precedence rankings. Grand-maître Claude 
Anceau observed: “Dans la chambre des requêtes il y a un fauteuil dans l’angle où 
personne ne s’assoit, et à la gauche de ce fauteuil siègent les deux présidents des requêtes 
et à la droite de ce fauteuil est le Doyen de lad. chambre et puis le reste des conseillers 
selon l’ordre du tableau; si le grand-maître estoit obligé de siéger immédiatement après les 
deux présidents de la chambre, il arriveroit que le Doyen auroit une place au dessus du 
grand-maître.” 285  
 
In later decades, the status of the Tables de Marbres became confused. The controversial 
chambres were abolished in Paris, Bordeaux, Dijon, Rouen, and Metz. In Besançon, 
Toulouse and Aix, the Parlements were given a “chambre des requêtes incorporant celle 
des Eaux et Forêts,” but in the other regions, they retained total control. In Toulouse and 
Bordeaux, Henri de Coincy contended that the Parlements continued using their role as 
																																																								
281 AN, G7, 1349, p.110, ‘Arrêt de règlement du Parlement Toulouse, 15 janvier 1704’. The droits 
de passe were restored by Lettres Patentes on 2.September 1706.  
282 AN, G7, 1349, p.240, ‘Mémoire de grand-maître Claude Anceau, (février 1714)’.   
283 AN, G7,1349, f.32, ‘Lettre du Sr. Domingon,... (18 avril 1704). The arrêt du Parlement against 
him was effectively overturned on 10 June 1704.  
284 AN, G7, 1349, f.87v. ‘Lettre de grand-maître Claude Anceau, 15 avril 1705’. 
285 AN, G7, 1349, p.80, ‘Mémoire pour Mr.Desmarets, undated but probably 1705’.  
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mouthpieces of popular grievances as an effective weapon against maîtrise intervention. 286 
After the 1760s, the grand-maître became particularly exposed to parlementaire 
obstruction in his arbitration role for contentious cases of commonland partition between 
communities and seigneurs. With cases involving the Conseil, Parlements and grands-
maîtres accumulating, unabated, throughout the rest of the century, it can be assumed that, 
in fine, the Parlements never lost their grip on forestry.  
 
The Etats  
 
While France’s Parlements were commonly described as the foresters’ nemesis, the 
relationships of the Eaux-et-Forêts with the provincial Etats (where they existed) were 
more ambiguous. The Etats of Languedoc, but also those of smaller Pyrenean entities like 
Comminges, Foix and Bigorre, drew strength from a their popular basis in local villages 
and towns. In Languedoc, they used their don gratuit to force moderations of collective 
fines imposed on communities for non-compliance with forestry regulations. In 1673, a 
request by the sindic du Languedoc moved Colbert to reduce the penalties “à l’esgard des 
communautez dont les condamnations exedoient ce qu’elles portoient de taille ordinaire.” 
287  In the Comminges district covering the heavily forested higher basin of the Garonne, 
there was a long history of legal quibbles opposing the syndics des Etats and the maîtrise 
of Saint-Gaudens. Froidour needed much diplomatic skill to overcome the opposition of 
the minuscule, but pugnacious, Etats of Foix against the establishment of his maîtrise in 
Pamiers in 1671. The forests of that district, a key supply source for Toulouse, turned this 
event into a sensitive issue for all participants, merchants, owners, users, and the crown. 
The plea to retain control of their forestry affairs, lodged with the Etats de Foix by the 
sindic of Haut-Comminges, sparked a long and convoluted legal process. Their president, 
Francois-Etienne de Caulet, bishop of Pamiers, argued that the Etats were well capable of 
managing the forests themselves. On closer analysis, it appears that Etats resistance was 
also driven by the private interests of a powerful alliance of influential delegates led by the 
bishop, the marquis de Rabat and the baron de Gudanes. These forest-owning members of 
local nobility 288 were joined in their opposition by other influential local forest owners, 
engagistes or fermiers. Powerful vested interests, compounded by fuzzy jurisdictional 
																																																								
286 See Henri de Coincy, La Grande Maîtrise de Guyenne au XVIIIe siècle, Revue des Eaux et 
Forêts (1928), pp. 1-15; 69-83, 7-9. 
287 ADHG, 1A12, t.1., f.30v., ‘Procès-verbal de Réformation Générale ... Toulouse, 29 juillet 
1673,’ quoted in Poublanc, Compter, 198-199. 
288 Poublanc, Compter, 200-201. 
	
	 111	
competencies and institutional rivalry between the Parlements of Bordeaux and Toulouse, 
all combined to paralyse the work of the maîtrise for four years. 289 Even if Froidour 
finally prevailed in 1676, the determined attitude of the Etats caused the new maîtrise to 
start on a particularly precarious footing.  
 
On the other hand, the impression of an irredeemably confrontational relationship arising 
from these examples must be offset against observations drawn from some of their 
practices. Parlementaires and officers were for example well aware of the benefit to be had 
from associating in fraud. In the first decades of the seventeenth century, a number of 
Breton magistrates, including président à mortier Christophe Foucquet, committed, in 
league with local foresters, “de très grands abus et malversations” in the royal forests. Over 
the years it amounted to a considerable offense, for which the procureur de Réformation 
claimed 400,000 livres damage and interest. 290 Moreover, for royal officers there was no 
incompatibility between their maîtrise work and entering into service of prominent Etats 
members like the archbishop of Narbonne. In Quillan, maîtrise officers were sent as Etats 
delegates for the town. Furthermore, parlementaires and foresters were connected through 
multiple direct kinship links, through marriage or via the wider kinship sphere. The family 
of the garde-marteau of Toulouse, Sr Bartellemy de Gramont, included several 
parlementaires, including a président des enquêtes, and Toulouse’s demoted grand-maître, 
Jehan Caulet de Cadars, had close family links with the Parlement conseiller Jean de 
Melet. Even more convincingly, the Etats could be conduits for constructive improvement 
proposals. In 1684, Froidour  used the Etats to plead for a flexible approach on forest-
grazing rules for the Pyrenean communities, whose livelihoods depended on animal 
husbandry, leading the Conseil to consent. 291   
 
  
From the preceding analysis emerges the picture of a particularly unsettled institutional, 
social and political basis for the early modern Eaux-et-Forêts, despite the institution’s 
centuries-old existence. With its defiant rural populations, influential forest owners or 
shrewd wood merchants, the regional context in which the royal foresters operated 
represented a constant challenge to their authority and the efficacy of their service. In 
																																																								
289 The complexities of this particular crisis are described in Maurice Durand-Barthez, La Maîtrise 
particulière des Eaux et Forêts de Comminges, des origines à 1789. Thèse de l’Ecole des Chartes 
(Paris, 1937), 323-330. See also Bartoli, ‘Louis de Froidour’, 36-39.  
290 Devèze, Une admirable réforme, 27. 
291 AN, G7, 294, f.134 (art.2) et f.162 (art.6), ‘Extrait du Mémoire présenté par les députés de la 
province de Languedoc (1684)’.  
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theory, these difficulties were not insuperable. Colbert’s reforms had established a solid 
organisational framework, with well-defined professional duties and responsibilities, under 
the close guardianship of the regional grand-maître. Outwardly, a well-regulated, rational 
system of management and control warranted the smooth functioning of forestry work, and 
limited the scope for negligent practice or fraud. To better understand why this ideal was 
never fulfilled is the focus of the two next chapters. The prosopographical survey of 
Quillan’s forestry officers and the analysis of their practices will be guided by two 
fundamental and complementary questions. Did their status as mid-ranking office-holders 
contribute to enhance their social position, consolidating by the same token the authority of 
the whole institution? Or did their local anchorage provide attractive alternatives, outside 






THE MID-RANKING FORESTRY OFFICE, 
AN UNCOMFORTABLE POST 
 
 
As stated in chapter one, the prosopographical treatment of our corpus of maîtrise foresters 
combines a statistical approach with individual biographical data. This mixed approach 
sharpens the contours of this group as a cohesive entity, moved by common service to the 
king and his forestry interests. Integrating personal histories and elements of network and 
patronage sheds light on the strategies forestry families developed to uphold their place 
among the social elites of a provincial town of small size and scant institutional 
infrastructure.  
 
Central to this nexus of questions is the issue of social status. For early modern 
contemporaries, the notion of ‘social status’ could not be reduced to a single factor such as 
wealth, birth, education, or office. It reflected a complex reality. Bluche and Solnon’s 
analysis of the capitation of 1695 demonstrated that, in official perception, social 
stratification was indiscriminately based on a combination of royal office and non-venal 
	
	 113	
activities, for example in finance or commerce. 292 In such a complex and fluid society, 
recovering the social positioning of royal officers and their strategies for recognition and 
advancement forces us to draw upon a wide range of quantitative and qualitative sources, 
which can inform us on a broad palette of themes linked to the forestry office: financial 
aspects, privileges, length of residency, education, the honour and respectability with 
which it was associated, the dynastic stability it confered, but also on other major 
organising principles of local societies such as wealth distribution and networking 
opportunities. 
 
This multi-layered approach will allow us to identify the group’s characteristics from three 
complementary perspectives, their own, their contemporaries, and their hierarchical 
superiors. It can recover some of the lived reality of its members, including the normative 
influence on their service of economic and political factors located outside the reach of the 
royal administration. This study will therefore examine the strategies developed by forestry 
officers in their triple function, as heads of families aspiring to social advancement, as 
constituent members of an ambitious and distinctive small-town oligarchy, and as servants 
of the king. It will ask how they reconciled the various, and often contradicting, facets of 
these identities.  
 
This chapter will start by analysing some quantitative aspects of their office, to be followed 
by a more general survey of the qualitative characteristics of the forestry career. In the last 
part dedicated to the officers’ insertion in their urban environment, the focus will shift onto 
their relationships with local nobles and wood merchants, each animated by their own set 
of interests in the region’s forests and their ligneous resources.     
 
The forestry office, a profitable financial investment? 
 
Volatile office prices 
 
The financial value of an office is a crucial marker of the officer’s place in society. As a 
marketable good, it was also an object of intense speculation. Forestry offices were no 
exception. During our period of study, their market prices showed great variability and 
																																																								
292 François Bluche, Jean-François Solnon, La véritable hiérarchie sociale de l’ancienne France; 
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volatility in space and time. 293 Unsurprisingly, provincial seats were valued much less 
highly than their counterparts in the metropoles. In 1729, the maître particulier office of 
the district of Paris was acquired by Jean-Louis Nicolas Trinquand for 66,000 livres, 294 
while around the same time Pierre Marsol in Quillan had to mobilise three times less for 
the same office (21,000 livres). 295 The value for Quillan is in line with similar offices of 
other peripheral maîtrises, like the Alsacian Grande Maîtrise of Metz, where maître 
particulier offices averaged 21,000 livres. 296 For other categories, the Paris-province 
disparity was even greater. In the prestigious maîtrise of St Germain en Laye overseeing 
one of the king’s favourite hunting grounds, the garde-marteau office was traded in 1689 
at 12,000 livres, while in Vesoul (Franche-Comté) the same office was worth eight times 
less, selling for a mere 1,500 livres. 297  
 
To rein in this volatility, the government sporadically decreed price controls, as with 
Colbert’s intervention of 1665, aimed at containing runaway prices of judicial offices in 
the sovereign courts. Their impact, however, remained short-lived. Actual prices, which 
could at times reach a multiple of the original official evaluation, continued to react to 
personal circumstances, the economic conjuncture, the potential for profit in the long term, 
or the perceived prestige attached to certain locations or office categories. 298 These real 
values are precious indicators of the economic and social position of the buyer. For Robert 
Descimon, “l’échelle des valeurs des offices reflète les hiérarchies sociales de l’époque, 
elle en constitue même un indicateur et un révélateur.” 299  
 
When buying an office, the ‘principal’ was not the only aspect an officer had to consider. 
The bundle of fees to be paid at various stages of the process could amount to considerable 
sums. In Christophe Blanquie’s calculations, for the office of conseiller at the présidial of 
Bazas (Gironde) acquired from the parties casuelles for 800 livres in the 1750s, the 
candidate paid 2,235 livres extra fees, including 1,000 livres for the frais de réception 
																																																								
293 For a discussion on office values, see William Doyle, ‘The price of offices in Pre-Revolutionary 
France’, The Historical Journal, 27, 4 (1984), pp. 831-860. 
294 This office sold twenty years later for 86,200 livres, which represented an increase of 30%. 
(Waquet, Les Grands Maîtres, 216). 
295 ADH, C1255, f.307r., ‘Pièce de procédure, 21 sept.1737’. 
296 Waquet, Les Grands Maîtres, 217. 
297 Figure of 1698. Maurice Gresset, L'introduction de la vénalité des offices en Franche-Comté: 
1692-1704 (Paris, 1989), 127. 
298 See for example Doyle, ‘Colbert et les offices’;	id., Venality,	210-211. 
299  Robert Descimon, ‘Les notaires de Paris du XVIe au XVIIIe siècle: Office, Profession, 
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alone. 300 For offices bought on the open market, the ratio between fees and principal was 
naturally reduced. When, in 1726, the office of procureur du roi was sold for 7,200 livres, 
the fees represented 5 % of the principal. 301 For Quillan’s office of maître particulier, 
bought by Pierre Marsol in 1734 for 21,000 livres, the marc d’or, sceau and honoraires 
represented together only 2.4 % of its market price. 302  
 
In our corpus of twenty-eight individuals, office values could be ascertained in seven cases 
(Table 5). However sparse, these figures yield some important information. Firstly, and 
predictably, a comparison with the upper end of the hierarchy shows that they were in a 
completely different league as grand-maître offices. In 1695, Guillaume Dunoyer 
purchased the office of grand-maître of Toulouse from Thimoléon Legras for 
approximately 80,000 livres. 303 In 1763, Charles Louis Paul Anceau sold the same office 
for 233,800 livres. 304 According to Waquet’s calculations, on average the value of grand-
maître offices nearly tripled in one century, from 125,000 livres in 1689 to 351,000 livres 
in 1785. 305 At these upper rungs of the hierarchy, office trading remained to the end a 
profitable investment.   
 




300  Christophe Blanquie, ‘Fiscalité et vénalité des offices présidiaux’, Histoire, Économie & 
Société, 23, 4 (2004), pp. 473-487, 476. 
301 AN, V271, ‘Lettres de Provisions, (1727)’. 
302 AN, V299, ‘Lettres de Provisions, (1734)’.  
303 Henri de Coincy, ‘Quelques précisions sur les grands-maîtres des Eaux et Forêts en Languedoc’, 
Annales du Midi, 35 (1923), pp. 39-57; 184-203; 47.  
304 Waquet, Les Grands Maîtres, 63. 




































Jean	Roillet	 Greffier	 Premier	Consul	 1731	
Louis	Terrisse	 Procureur	du	Roi	 Consul	moderne	 1741	
Jean-Antoine	Loubet	 Garde-marteau	 Consul	moderne	 1741	














Maître	particulier	 1677	 3,000	 Parties	Casuelles	
Maître	particulier	 1734	 21,000	 Private	sale	
Lieutenant	 1681	 5,400	 Private	sale	
Lieutenant	 1686	 8,080	 Private	sale	
Procureur	du	Roi	 1675	 880	 Parties	Casuelles	
Procureur	du	Roi	 1721	 7,200	 Private	sale	





The data of Table 5 clearly place maîtrise offices into a totally different price bracket. In 
William Beik’s list of a sample of Languedoc’s elites ranked according to purchase price 
of office, annual revenue and wealth, the forestry offices would have been found near the 
bottom, alongside those of the présidial courts. 306 The table also points to an officially 
perceived hierarchy within the unit. In the valuations of the Parties Casuelles, the office of 
maître particulier (3,000 livres) was worth three times more than that of the greffier (1,000 
livres). Figures for offices sold on the private market also show the impact of speculation. 
When Quillan’s maître particulier office was sold in 1734, its value had increased 
sevenfold from when it was newly created in 1677, 307 the lieutenant office gained half of 
its value within just three years, while the procureur du roi office increased ten-fold in 
forty-six years.  
 
A comparison with forestry offices of other maîtrises also highlights the influence of 
geographical factors on office prices. The original valuation of the Quillan maître 
particulier office is in line with its counterpart of Saint-Gaudens, offered for sale in 1673 
at 2,000 livres. 308 Both maîtrises oversaw richly forested districts, and with a lot of 
forestry business in perspective, these posts held the promise of substantial perks. By 
contrast, the newly created office of maître particulier in Villeneuve-de-Berg was valued 
at just 1,000 livres, because of its lack of royal forests. 309 In the forest-poor Castelnaudary 
district, the applicant for lieutenant paid the parties casuelles in 1676 a mere 400 livres. 310  
 
This great variability and volatility does not preclude the existence of a stable hierarchy 
between the different offices. This internal ordering can be approached by way of the marc 
d’or, a staggered tax levied at each office transfer, which represented the combined value 
of the buyer’s expected financial status and the perceived ‘dignity’ of the office. Nagle’s 
survey of the situation in 1704 shows marc d’or rates climbing incrementally along thirty-
seven classes, ranging from a mere 42 livres to 5,000 livres. 311 For our corpus, marc d’or 
																																																								
306 Beik, Absolutism, 53 (Table 3). 
307 This steep increase is partly due to inflation and currency depreciation, at least until the 
stabilisation of  1726.  
308 Durand-Barthez, La Maîtrise particulière des Eaux et Forêts de Comminges, 141. 
309 ADHG, Table de Marbre, registre 57, f.31r. 
310 AN, G7, 1364, f.144, ‘Quittance de finance de Me Condomines, 28 déc.1676’. 
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rates reproduced the steep gradient between the grand-maître and the subaltern officers. 312 
In 1695, Guillaume Dunoyer was charged 1,296 livres, while the average fee paid by a 
sample of twenty-six maîtrises officers of all categories amounted to 208 livres. Even more 
revealing is the distribution inside the maîtrise, where the maître particulier clearly 
towered above the other categories. (Fig. 12)  
 
Fig.12    Quillan: marc d’or averages paid by maîtrise officers  
                   (1684-1734) (livres) 






Rankings based on marc d’or are also consistent with those suggested by the capitation, a 
head tax established in January 1695 on the basis of the household’s wealth and the 
‘quality’ of the social or professional category. 313 Based on a sample of the twenty-two 
classes of these capitation listings, 314 Table 6 charts the position of several forestry-related 
categories. Here too, the grands-maîtres (8th class) vastly surpassed the maîtres 
particuliers (15th class) and the other forestry officers (16th class), while forest gardes were 




312 AN, V1, 111, ‘Provisions d’Offices (1695)’. 
313 Bluche et Solnon, La véritable hiérarchie, especially 41-61. These authors warned that this 
official list must be interpreted with care because of the heterogeneous nature of the various 
classes, and the political agenda that guided their elaboration. 
314 Boislisle, Correspondance, vol.1, 565-574. 















Table 6 Capitation rates for a selection of social and professional groups 




Overall, these preliminary observations confirm that the early modern forestry apparatus 
was constructed along a stable hierarchical model, including the dominance of seats 
located near the capital: in official minds, the pyramidal structure of the Eaux-et-Forêts 
seemed immutably established. Examining them now in terms of the incomes they 
provided can further refine this general image of the forestry office. 
Table 14   Capitation rates for a selection of social and professional groups 











































A century of mediocre gages 
 
In the venal system, forestry offices belonged to the category of offices à gages. Contrary 
to purchase prices, the sources are more prolific about gages and other types of financial 
rewards attached to the forestry office. An overview can be found in the records compiled 
under Froidour by the treasurer of the Grande Maîtrise in Toulouse who oversaw the 
distribution of gages to the various categories of personnel 315 : grand-maître, officers of 
the Table de Marbre, officers of all maîtrises particulières and grueries, and gardes. 316 
The treasurer’s accounts show that the receipts from wood sales in the Grande Maîtrise 
supported these personnel costs. The year 1679 can serve as an example (Table 7). In the 
Grande Maîtrise, personnel costs represented one-third of the sales receipts, with the 
grand-maître and his secretary, predictably, receiving the lion’s share, while the gages of 
the officers amounted to comparatively modest sums. 
 
Table 7       Gages of the different personnel categories 




315 Under Colbert it was a commissioned post, which from 1687 onwards was turned into the office 
of receveur général des domaines et bois) 





























Focusing now specifically on the gages of maîtrise officers, their quantitative analysis 
reveals a number of characteristics. A comparison between six of Colbert’s reconfigured 
subdistricts in the Grande Maîtrise of Toulouse shows that they varied in accordance to the 
perceived prestige of the maîtrise and the perspective of extra earnings (Fig. 13). As the 
maîtrise that oversaw the forests supplying the regional capital Toulouse, Villemur was 
regarded as particularly prestigious, and the mountain maîtrises of Quillan and Saint-
Gaudens controlled densely forested districts.  
 
Fig.13    Gages of maîtrise officers in six districts  
of the Grande Maîtrise of Toulouse (1683) (livres) 





Regardless of these variations, the relative distribution between the five categories of 
officers was consistent, paralleling that of the marc d’or shown in Fig. 12. Maîtres 
particuliers received more than double of the average gages of the other categories. 
Lieutenants and greffiers always received the lowest incomes. Already in 1573, lieutenants 
had earned four times less than maîtres particuliers, a longstanding disparity, which 
contributed to their uneasy position within the maîtrise and their frequent conflicts with the 

















(30 livres p.a. on average). With his gages consistently higher than those of the procureur 
du roi, the garde-marteau presented an intriguing anomaly, possibly linked to the historic 
prestige associated with this function.  
 
In terms of longterm evolution, a comparison of the figures for 1683, 1759 and 1789 shows 
that gages, averaged across the Grande Maîtrise, remained broadly unchanged for during 
the whole century (Fig. 14). 317 Moreover, official accounts show that they were not always 
paid in full, and not always on time.  
 
Fig.14   Averages of the gages of maîtrise officers  
in the Grande Maîtrise of Toulouse  
(1683, 1759, 1789) (livres) 





If we consider the additional income generated by the acquisition of an ‘alternatif‘ office 
or an ‘augmentation de gages’, 318 the income data show some increase towards the end of 
the century. This trend, which is particularly prominent for the maîtres particuliers, is 
represented in Fig. 15. 
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on 6 maîtrises (Quillan, Villemur Castelnaudary, Saint Pons, Isle-Jourdain and Saint-Gaudens); for 
1789 on 3 maîtrises (Quillan, Villemur and Castelnaudary). 
















Fig.15  Maîtres Particuliers in the Grande Maîtrise of Toulouse:  
The impact of ‘augmentations de gages’ and ‘alternatif’  





Next to gages, additional incomes such as ‘alternatif’ and ‘augmentations’ were important 
elements in the financial strategies of the officers, but on which the officers had little 
leverage. As a proportion of the capital he invested in the office, the gages of the maître 
particulier office in Quillan represented 10 % in 1677. This proportion decreased steeply 
to 1.4 % in 1734, due to the inflated price of the office on the open market. Including 
alternatif and augmentations in this calculation increases the percentage for 1734 only 
slightly, to 1.81 %. These percentages are in the same order of magnitude as other 
intermediate offices, such as élus (less than 2 % in 1789) or bailliages and sénéchausséees 
officers (3 %). 319 At any rate, they were well below the official benchmark of 5 % to be 
had on the loans they might have been forced to take enter these schemes. Altogether then, 
and regardless of internal differences between the different categories, the income package 
represented by gages, alternatif and augmentations would have been insufficient to keep 
up with inflation and maintain a lifestyle suitable for members of urban elites. The picture 
changes, however, when considering another income-enhancing source, the journées et 
vacations.  
																																																								
319 Doyle, Venality, 199. 
Fig. 14  The impact of income extras (augmentations de gages and alternatif) on basic gages 






















Journées, a crucial part of the income package 
 
Forestry authorities were well aware of the need to enhance officers’ gages through other 
financial incentives, as well as more symbolic prerogatives, as a bulwark against the 
temptation of professional negligence and fraud. As Froidour argued, “pour exciter lesd. 
officiers [...] a estre plus diligens et affectionnés a fidellement servir et se bien comporter 
en leurs charges sans rien recéler pour les mettre à couvert de l’opression qui pouroit leur 
estre suscitée par ceux qu’ils auront condamnés [..] et leur donner moyen de vivre sans 
commettre aucune concussion, S.M. est très humblement suppliée de vouloir les maintenir 
dans les privilèges en la possession desquels nous avons trouvé qu’ils ont esté maintenus 
par arrest du parlement.” 320 As will be seen in chapter four, these coveted rights were also 
a frequent source of abuse, and the acrimonious suits which arose to protect them show 
that for the individual officer, their importance cannot be overestimated.  
 
The most important of these supplements were the journées et vacations. In principle, 
these payments compensated for expenses incurred in the performance of their duties, for 
example attendance at wood auctions, forest inspections, or assisting sales events for royal 
and non-royal forests. They were paid through the sol pour livre, an official 5% fee levied 
directly on the merchants during the auction. The centrally determined rate of a forestry 
journée ranged from 3 livres/day for greffiers to 6 livres/day for maîtres particuliers. 
Crucially, this extra payment could represent a substantial increase of income for the 
officers. With his journées, garde-marteau Antoine Cachulet increased his gages by 60 %. 
321   
 
The example of the maîtres particuliers in the Toulouse Grande Maîtrise (Fig. 6) 322 not 
only demonstrates how much journées could boost their income. These extras also 
represented the part of their income package on which they could have some influence. 
The multiplication of the number of journées is especially visible after mid-century. In 
1685, a maître particulier claimed an average of 9 days, at a rate of 6 livres/day (making 
just 54 livres), but in 1789 his successor requested 78 journées at a daily rate of 9 livres, 
which returned over 700 livres. It is unlikely that this thirteen-fold increase over one 
																																																								
320 ADHG, A12, t.2, f.141v., ‘Procès-Verbal de la Réformation Générale de la maîtrise de Toulouse 
(Villemur)’. 
321 ADH, 1BP32105, ‘Gages des officiers, Quillan, (1701)’. 
322 Based on averages of three maîtrises: Villemur, Castelnaudary, Quillan.  	
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hundred years was justified by an equivalent increase of the workload for the same office. 
With this maneuver, the officers compensated for what they presumably perceived as an 
inadequate reward for their work. It was conspicuous enough to be included as a key 
argument in Calonne and Lamoignon’s attempts at reforming the Eaux-et-Forêts in 1788. 
323  
 
Fig.16  Maîtres particuliers in the Grande Maîtrise of Toulouse: 
 The impact of ‘journées’ on their income (1683, 1759, 1789) 





As a river port, Quillan also provided the officers with another means of securing extra 
income. It can be assumed that many river port maîtrises would have had similar 
arrangements. Officers received a jealously guarded droit de passe for their duties of 
control of the timber rafts conveyed down the Aude. With a yearly average of 350 livres 
from this fee, the maître particulier could thus double his gages. This fee was allocated 
according to a precise set of rates, depending on the office category and the nature of the 
timber load. In Quillan, the lack of regular controls of this important aspect of personnel 
costs resulted in substantial fraud, as the procureur de Réformation discovered on his audit 
																																																								
323 See the riposte sent to the deputies of the Etats Généraux by Dufort, procureur du roi at the 
maîtrise of Guyenne, Discours du procureur du roi de la maîtrise particulière des Eaux et Forêts 
de Guienne,... (Bordeaux?, March 1789), 30-32. 
Fig.	15	Comparison of gages with augmented income (augmentations, alternatif, 
journées) for maîtres particuliers in the Grande Maîtrise of Toulouse 






















of the maîtrise’s accounts. When the legal justification to receive the droit de passe was 
challenged, is not surprising that the officers fought a desperate legal battle to keep it. 324  
 
Further to these various financial benefits, officers also received firewood allowances 
proportionally to the status of their office. They were usually provided in cash, but in 
Quillan where wood could be conveniently floated down right to the officers’ doors, they 
were delivered in kind, one pile for every one-hundred passing through the port to be 
shared among them according to a given quota. 325 Furthermore, an arrêt du Conseil of 
1708 protected the officers against taille increase. Two years later another arrêt exempted 
them from the dixième, and that of June 1715 shielded their journées and chauffages 
against the risk of being seized as security by personal creditors, treasurers or traitants. 
 
In sum, while gages alone would have been a poor financial basis for these officers, 
additional allocations such as journées, droits de passe or firewood allowances offer a less 
bleak, and more realistic, picture of the foresters’ income situation. In Quillan, the office of 
maître particulier carried 300 livres gages p.a., but, in reality, the officer could count on at 
least 700 livres p.a. in 1683, and well over 1,000 livres in 1789. The authorities had a 
prime interest in helping intermediate foresters to maintain levels of income suiting their 
status as royal officers, keep sufficient local ‘credit’, and remain fiscally sound. For all 
those benefits however, what governments gave with one hand, they took again with the 
other. The forestry office was not exempt of the taille, to which after 1695 was added the 
capitation. Furthermore, speculating on the credit that these officers could command 
locally, governments sporadically imposed different forms of forced loans. For historians 
like William Doyle who explored the relationships of venality and the fiscal-financial state, 
these requests imposed upon office holders were, especially under Louis XIV, a more 
effective and cheaper option than other forms of raising income for the treasury, such as 




With the augmentations de gages, office-holders were requested to invest a certain sum in 
order to continue receiving their gages. The rachat du prêt et annuel further allowed 
																																																								
324 ADH, C1256, pièces 117-158. This right was confirmed by the new règlement of 1754. 
325 ADAD, 63C3, f.85r., ‘Registre pour l’insinuation des édits, arrêts et règlements, maîtrise de 
Quillan (17 fév.1674)’. 
326 Doyle, Venality, 52-3. 
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officers or their successors to continue enjoying hereditary transmission and keep the 
office as part of the family patrimony. These operations required them to mobilise funds 
from trusted circles of creditors, raising their personal debt levels and making them even 
more dependent on the regular income from gages and extras. In forestry, between 1671 
and 1745 mid-ranking officers were sollicited three times in that way. Soon after the surge 
of office sales of 1689, the edict of August 1693 requested from them a first, hereditary, 
augmentation de gages, at an initial interest rate of 10 %. In five maîtrises of the Grande 
Maîtrise of Guyenne, 327 maîtres particuliers were asked for 1,127 livres, garde-marteaux 
732 livres, and procureurs du roi 415 livres. 328 In 1716, the initial rate became reduced to 
4%, then to 2% in 1720, and finally 1% in 1726.  
 
Just eight years later, the edict of December 1701 forced a substantial augmentation on all 
judicial offices. After serious parlementaire protest, 329  it was moderated by the 
Déclaration of 14 February 1702. Regarding forestry offices, a close examination of the 
negotiations around that particular intervention of 1701 shows that a compromise figure 
was reached after almost a year of haggling between central demands and requests for 
moderation, requiring sometimes the intervention of the region’s intendant. 330 With their 
foresters too, monarchical governments had to use caution, taking care not to pass the 
insolvency threshold of the individual officer. Interest on this new loan was initially fixed 
at 7.14%. Grand-maître Claude Anceau paid 16,000 livres to receive 1,142 livres 
augmentations, which represented an increase of 23 % on his regular income. For the 
maîtres particuliers of Villemur and Quillan, who paid respectively 3,080 and 2,100 livres 
into the scheme, the increase was even more substantial (31% and 50 %) - at least initially. 
331 It is unclear how long these loans remained at the more attractive initial rate, but data of 
1759 suggest that by that date it had plummeted to 0.85 %. 332   
 
In February 1745, with war costs spiralling again, the government turned again to the 
forestry officers with a particularly substantial demand. They asked for payment to keep 
their préséance rights, and their share of the statutory 14 deniers/livre paid by merchants at 
																																																								
327 Isle-Jourdain, Saint-Gaudens, Villemur, Castelnaudary, Mazamet.  
328 AN, P3924, ‘Quittances de Finances d’Offices’. The figures are averages. 
329 John Hurt, Louis XIV and the Parlements. The assertion of royal authority (Manchester, 2002), 
95-6. 
330 AN, G7, 1364, f.41v.-47r., ‘Etat des sommes à payer pour les officiers des maîtrises pour 
taxations et augmentations de gages attribués par l’édit de décembre 1701’. 
331 AN, G7, 1364, f.56, ‘Augmentations de gages payés par les officiers des maîtrises (Quillan), 
8.mai 1708’. 
332 AN, P2994, ‘Recettes et Dépenses’, Toulouse (1759).  
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each sales transaction to cover their journées. 333 Records show that nearly all officers of 
the Toulouse maîtrise obliged within two years, causing an abrupt rise of indebtedness 
amongst this category of office-holders. To cover this payment, the maître particulier of 
Villemur, François de Domingon Cambesian, had to borrow from two merchants of 
Montauban “à constitution de rente”, at the usual rate of 5%. 334 The 2,692 livres paid by 
his counterpart of Quillan, Pierre Marsol, represented nearly 13 % of the price of the office 
he had bought just one decade before, no doubt a heavy additional burden on his personal 
budget. 335  
 
For all the consideration and personal ‘credit’ it offered, the acquisition of a forestry office, 
then, also carried financial risks. This begs the question of evaluating the long-term rate of 
return on the initial investment for a mid-ranking forestry office, a calculation that all 
office-holders must have contemplated at some point.  
 
Maître particulier, an unprofitable office 
 
For the seventeenth century, historians have estimated that royal offices seldom offered 
significant long-term returns on the invested capital, especially if compared with high-
yield rents on land and buildings, and other profitable forms of economic activities. For 
that period, returns were evaluated in general at between 1 and 4.5 %. 336 By the end of the 
eighteenth century, with intensifying speculation, yields would have been fluctuating, but 
for most middling to lower judicial offices they remained under the 5 % threshold. 337 In 
his detailed analysis of the financial situation of a wealthy bourgeois of Nantes who had 
acquired in 1746 the office of maître de la chambre des comptes, Jean Meyer reached a 
similar conclusion. The overall profit on the capital he had invested over thirty years had 
been minimal. For Meyer, it had been “une opération blanche, qui ne vaut [...] qu’en 
fonction du prestige social ainsi acquis.” 338 For the prestigious office of grand-maître of 
																																																								
333 ‘Edit du roi février 1745 qui ordonne que les Grands-Maîtres des Eaux & Forêts feront tenus au 
rachat de l'annuel, & les Officiers des Eaux& Forêts à celui du prêt & de l'annuel’, in: Bonaventure 
Chailland, Dictionnaire raisonné des Eaux et Forêts (Paris, 1769), vol.1, t.2, 286. 
334 AN, P3411, ‘Taxations aux officiers des maîtrises des Eaux et Forêts, édit de février 1745. (19 
sept.1746)’. 
335 Id., (22 fév.1747). 
336 Donna Bohanan, ‘The sword as the robe in seventeenth-century Provence and Brittany’, in: 
Mack Holt, Society and institutions in early modern France (Athens, London, 1991), pp. 51-62, 53. 
337 Doyle, Venality, 200. 
338 Jean Meyer, ‘L’évolution de la vénalité des offices au XVIIIe siècle’, in: Pinet, Histoire de la 
fonction publique, vol.2, pp. 353-367. 
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Toulouse, Henri de Coincy obtained a performance of 6 % for the period 1743 to 1763. 339 
This figure, though higher than that of the maître des comptes, still hovered just one 
percent above the regular interest rate on loans of 5 %. In any case, these rates were well 
below those of office-holders in finance who, in Doyle’s words, were the “greatest 
profiteers in the venal system.” 340 
 
Data availability allows us to attempt this calculation for the maître particulier office in 
Quillan. The return on the total capital invested, over a certain period, to acquire, maintain 
and transmit this office will be offset against the accrued yearly income from that office 
over the same period. The results are summarised in Tables 9 and 10 below. The chosen 
time bracket (1677 to 1744) totals sixty-seven years. Inevitably, the variables used for this 
calculation include some estimates, and a few preliminary explanations beforehand are 
therefore necessary. 
 
In order to reflect the fact that the profitability of the office changed with each major 
financial ‘event’, I have subdivided the period into five distinct sub-periods, determined by 
the occurrence of a major change concerning the office: 1677 (first acquisition from 
parties casuelles) to 1695; 1696 (first office transfer) to 1704; 1705 (acquisition of 
alternatif) to 1726; 1727 (second office transfer) to 1733; 1734 (private sale of office) to 
1744 (just before the next major forced loan).   
 
On the ‘expenses’ side comes, firstly, the capital value of the office. It had been acquired 
in 1677 from the parties casuelles for 3,000 livres. Afterwards, it was handed down within 
the same family until it was sold on the private market in 1734 for 21,000 livres. To reflect 
the evolution of its market price in-between these extremes (which are the only two secure 
values available), I have assumed a linear progression along a gliding scale between 3,000 
and 21,000 livres. 341 Secondly, the office changed hands three times, incurring transfer 
fees (marc d’or, sceau, honoraires) in 1696, 1727 and 1734, based on indications of the 
lettres de provision. As those of the 1696 transfer were missing, I have used data of 1688 
for the maître particulier office of Saint-Gaudens, a maîtrise similar to Quillan. 342 Its fees 
amounted to 505 livres, which is also the amount paid at the office transfer in Quillan in 
																																																								
339 Coincy, ‘Quelques précisions’, vol.2, 190. 
340 Doyle, Venality, 205. 
341 Because of the fluctuations on the office markets, this is of course a simple approximation, but 
given the limited data, it is the best possible one.  
342 AN, V51, ‘Lettres de Provisions (1688)’. 
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1727. This figure is exclusive of any additional costs, pots-de-vin or gifts, for which no 
information was available. Thirdly, there are two augmentation de gages to consider. For 
the first augmentation in 1693, I have again used the figure for Saint-Gaudens, whose 
maître particulier paid 1,400 livres to receive an additional 100 livres gages, giving an 
interest of 7.14 %. The augmentation of 1702 is known for Quillan. It amounts to 3,080 
livres. Furthermore, at some point between 1702 and 1710, Quillan’s maître particulier 
also acquired the alternatif office for 1,000 livres. Finally, the annuel which secured the 
hereditary transmission of the office was taken as 1/60th of the original valuation of 3,000 
livres, adding a further payment of 50 livres p.a.  
 
On the ‘income’ side, gages levels remained at 300 livres p.a. unchanged throughout the 
whole period. Secondly, for the two augmentations of 1693 and 1702, it is known that the 
initial interest rates diminished over time. For the 1693 operation, I have used the 
progressive interest devaluation described above, from the original 7.14 % to 1 % after 
1726. Similarly, for the 1702 augmentation, the interest would not have stayed long at 7.14 
%, and I have assumed a value of 3 % after 1710, based on known interest decreases from 
later periods. Thirdly, we have seen that the number of claimed journées et vacations 
increased during the period. From the sales records of the whole period, I have assumed an 
average of 15 journées at 6 livres/day, or 90 livres/year. Finally, based on yearly figures 
for 1720 to 1740, 343 the additional payments received for the 5 deniers/livre and the droits 
de passe have been evaluated at an average of 400 livres p.a.  
 
Tables 8 and 9 provide a summary of the calculations used to obtain an estimate of the 
profitability of Quillan’s maître particulier office and its evolution over time. It has been 















Table 8 Summary of the variables used in the profit calculation for the 













Market prices (estimated) 
(1677): 3,000;   (1687): 6,000;   (1697): 
9,000;   (1707): 12,000;   (1717): 15,000;   
(1727): 18,000;   (1737): 21,000 
Fees for 2 office transfers (marc d’or, 
sceau, honoraires) 
505 each transfer 
Augmentation gages (1693) 1,400 
Augmentation gages (1702) 3,080 





Augmentations de gages (1693) 
(1696-1715):   7.14 % = 100/yr  
(1716-1719):   4 % = 56/yr 
(1720-1725):   2 % = 28/yr 
(1726-1759):   1 % = 14/yr    
Augmentations de gages (1702) (1702-1710):   7.14% = 220/yr (1710-1733):   3 % = 92/yr 
Journées et vacations 90/yr 







Table 9 Returns (%) on the accrued capital invested  

















6,000 (purchase price, 
averaged over 18 years); 
505 (transfer fees); 500 
(annuel) 
5,400 (gages) + 200 
(augm.1693) + 1,620 
(journées) + 7,200 
(droits de passe) 
 
 expenses for first period 
= 7,005 (a) 
income for period I = 





1696 – 1704 
(8 yrs) 
4,500 (added capital) + 
505 (transfer fees) + 
1,400 (augm.1693) + 
3,080 (augm.1702) + 400 
(annuel)  
2,400 (gages) + 800 
(augm.1693) + 440 
(augm. 1702) + 720 
(journées) + 3,200 
(droits passe)  
 
 accrued expenses for 
period = 16,890 
income for period II = 
7,560, makes 945/year  5.59 % 
PERIOD III 
 
1705 – 1726 
(21 yrs) 
10,500 (added capital) + 
1,000 (alternatif) + 1,050 
(annuel)  
6,300 (gages) +  1,322 
(augm.1693) + 2,572 
(augm.1702) + 1,890 
(journées) + 8,400 
(droits passe)  
 
 accrued expenses = 
29,440 
income for period III = 




1727 – 1733 
(6 yrs) 
9,000 (added capital) + 
505 (transfer fees) + 300 
(annuel)  
1,800 (gages) + 84 
(augm.1693) + 552 
(augm.1702) +  
540 (journées) + 2,400 
(droits passe)  
 
 accrued expenses = 
39,245 
income for period IV = 




1734 – 1744 
(10 yrs) 
2,500 (added capital); 505 
(transfer fees); 500 
(annuel) 
3,000 (gages) + 140 
(augm.1693) + 310 
(augm.1702 at 1%) + 
900 (journées) + 4,000 
(droits de passe) 
 
 accrued expenses = 
42,750 
income for period V = 






These calculations yield a number of results. Firstly, and predictably, for period I the return 
at 11.43 % is relatively high, because of the low initial investment and the substantial 
droits de passe. This high profitability did not last. From period II to V, the returns on the 
invested capital decreased rapidly, from 5.59 % to just 1.95 %. This is mainly due to the 
influence of the steadily rising market value of the office and the augmentations, which 
were not counterbalanced by corresponding income increases. Furthermore, if we also take 
inflation into account, and most of all, debt repayments at 5 %, it becomes clear that over 
this long period, the office would have been losing value to the point of negative equity, 
unless compensated by external, non-office related income sources. These results broadly 
correspond to the prevailing opinion that the early modern office was a “placement qui 
rapporte peu, expose son détenteur aux exactions du fisc et ne peut jamais garantir le 
recouvrement du capital.” 344 In the long run, the office of maître particulier was an 
investment ‘at a loss’. Mid-ranking forestry offices were “intended only for those who 
already had other means which the crown wished to tap.” 345  
 
The diminishing profitability of this office raises the question of why it remained in the 
same family for so long. Next to the professional stability it offered, historians have often 
advanced motives of prestige, personal ‘credit’, and respectability. In a less ‘glamorous’ 
vein, it is also likely that declining market values later in the century made them 
unsellable. The case of the mid-ranking forestry office provides another, even bleaker 
possibility. Within the wide range of judicial offices, forestry was not only unprofitable 
and unglamorous; it was also a specialism, which much reduced the prospects of moving 
upwards or sideways into other areas. On the other hand, the next section will show that, 
for all its negative characteristics, the forestry office did not preclude a level of wealth that 
allowed these families to maintain their position as part of the small-town bourgeoisie. The 
office was one component of a range of strategies, which, crucially, included the 
strengthening of bonds with the most successful local wood merchants. Analysis of the 
wealth strategies of Quillan’s officers will shed more light on these strategies, uncovering 
in the process the unexpected outcome of a reversal of the traditional hierarchical 




344 Arlette Lebigre, La justice du roi (Paris, 1988), 67. 




The wealth of forestry officers 
 
Middling wealth levels  
 
The generally comfortable, even prosperous situation of Quillan’s officers that emerges 
from examining the officers’ wealth portfolio from the 1670s to the 1740s stands in stark 
contrast to the morose image described above, which only considered their incomes from 
the office. Overall, their economic situation is comparable to that of notable local wood 
merchants such as the Alvernys, whose estate was detailed in a sales deal after one of them 
suffered personal ruin in 1699. 346 Information found in notarial and other records shows 
officers owning town houses, farms, fields, gardens, and vineyards, a lucrative production 
that was developing fast in the low hills around Quillan and Limoux. By 1789, all last 
holders of a maîtrise office, or at least one of their close relatives, tellingly, had the name 
of a seigneurie added to their title. 347 Behind this impression of relative prosperity lies the 
typical range of strategies used by the urban bourgeoisie to acquire, maintain and enhance 
their status. Forestry officers diversified their assets, engaged in financial transactions or 
real estate operations, whilst securing their situation further through judicious matrimonial 
alliances and strategic networking.  
 
By combining a variety of sources, we can first try to evaluate, in quantitative terms, the 
general wealth bracket of these provincial forestry officers. Here again, capitation rates 
can be a useful guide. In his study of small towns, F.J. Ruggiu estimated the ratio of 
capitation to the yearly income of middling officers at 0.8 to 1 %. 348 Applying this index 
to the capitation data appearing in Table 6 places the wealth bracket of Quillan’s maître 
particulier in the region of 2,400 to 4,000 livres. This figure compares well with an 
example from another forest-rich province, Burgundy, where the personal accounts of the 
procureur du roi of the maîtrise particulière of Autun, Louis-Marie Fourat, have provided 
us with a rare source of detail information. With an annual surplus fluctuating between 
1,500 et 5,000 livres, procureur Fourat was considered “un homme aisé, très au-dessus de 
																																																								
346 ADAD, 3E7749, f.31v., ‘Registre Notaire Me Siau, acte du 27 mars 1699’. 
347 Examination of notarial records for a later period could ascertain whether their seigneurie was 
acquired through marriage or direct purchase. 
348 François-Joseph Ruggiu, Les élites et les villes moyennes, 176. The figures refer to Abbeville 
and Alençon after 1766. 
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la moyenne des gens de son entourage quotidien.” 349 The proceeds from his office 
represented 27 % of his annual budget. The remainder was spread between 47% from 
vineyards, 10 % from land and building lease, and 13 % from diverse financial 
investments. While we clearly have to allow for regional differences, this example points 
to the importance of analysing in greater detail the strategies used by forestry officers to 




By including different career moves within the officer’s lifetime, and expanding the 
analysis to the wider familial sphere, the forestry office emerges as one component in an 
integrated strategy, which was largely based on what G.V. Taylor termed ‘proprietary’ 
wealth, i.e. land, venal office and annuities. 350  In the case of Quillan, the strong 
interlinkage between wood merchants and officers allowed to combine entrepreneurial 
spirit and shrewd political sense with the more careful risk management approach of 
traditional ‘proprietary wealth’ strategies. The success of this integrated approach is 
reflected in the relatively large number of seigneurie-owning descendants of both, officers 
and merchants, in the second half of the century.  
 
Quillan’s procureur du roi and lieutenant are an excellent illustration of this strategy. The 
wealth and local influence enjoyed by Quillan’s procureur du Roy Pierre Pinet was based 
on the returns from his seigneurie of Brezilhou, 351 further secured by close familial links 
with the Pinets, one of the town’s most successful wood merchant families. Acquiring the 
office of procureur, a key post in the maîtrise, was part of a wider familial strategy 
combining wood trade and forestry office. When Pierre Pinet left the maîtrise after twenty-
six years in forestry to become châtelain of Quillan for the archbishop of Narbonne, he 
managed a substantial estate comprising several houses, vineyards, fields, herms, 
meadows, gardens and woods. In 1731, together with his brother François, he invested 
6,000 livres in bonds emitted by the Etats of Languedoc, 352 evidence that his portfolio also 
included important liquidities. 
 
																																																								
349 M. Dorigny, De forêts en vignes : journal d'un notable de l'Autunois, Louis Marie Fourat, 1774-
1807 (Dijon, 1997), 23. 
350  George V. Taylor, ‘Non-capitalist wealth and the origins of the French revolution’, The 
American Historical Review, 72, 2 (1967), pp. 469-496. 
351 Brezilhou is located two kilometres north of Quillan.  
352 ADAD, 3E13294, ‘Registre Notaire M.Roillet, acte du 19 juillet 1731’. 
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The fortunes of the Jauberts, lieutenants of the maîtrise, rested on the wealth accumulated 
by their most prominent member, Guillaume Jaubert, the town’s longstanding judge. In 
1681, Guillaume Jaubert bought the office of lieutenant from the seriously endebted Jean 
Besset de Garard, who had been prosecuted and heavily fined for charges of fraud, 
embezzlement, and abuse of office. A court settlement of 1686 requested that the office be 
sold back to the Besset family, who kept it until 1724, after which it returned to the 
Jauberts until the Revolution. Guillaume Jaubert’s marriage into the Delbès family in 1685 
brought him a dowry of 4,400 livres, as well as a connection with the religious elite of 
Carcassonne, where the bride’s uncle was chanoine of the cathedral. His uncle, Jacques 
Jaubert, was a particularly active wood merchant who had married into the Négrés, an old 
noble family. Outside wood commerce, Jacques Jaubert exploited the whole gamut of 
profitable operations, including money lending, real estate operations, and the leasing of 
cattle and sheep (gazaille). When Guillaume Jaubert’s son, Jean-Louis, assumed the 
lieutenant office in 1724, he was already heir to a substantial estate in and around Quillan, 
including a flourmill, at least one town house, one métairie, and some vineyards.  
 
A crucial factor in the fortunes of officers like the Pinets or Jauberts was their close 
association with local wood merchant circles, a strategy that also applied to other officers. 
The wealth of the family of Jean Roillet, the maîtrise’s longstanding greffier, rested on a 
fruitful alliance of forestry office, notarial activity, and wood trade. In 1733, Jean Roillet 
financed a two-man wood trade company, one of whose partners was his own son, Jean-
Pierre, known for switching roles between notarial and commercial activities despite 
official prohibition. 353 The risk of collusion and fraud, which this close connection 
between legal and commercial activities entailed, was long known to the legislators. It is a 
key aspect of this study, and will be developed more fully in chapter four. Further evidence 
for the continuing connection between forestry officers and wood traders can be found in 
the lists of delegates to the Languedoc Etats. 354 Out of 102 delegates from the diocèse Alet 
et Limoux between 1661 and 1789, twenty-one (20.5 %) could be identified as belonging 
to the families of forestry officers and wood merchants of Quillan. Among the forestry 
officers (10 mentions) figured prominently the Loubets, a family of garde-marteaux. 355 
 
																																																								
353 ADAD, 3E13305, ‘Registre notaire Me Laran, acte 1er août 1742’. 
354 A list of delegates of the Languedoc Etats can be found on  http://etats-du-languedoc.univ-
montp3.fr/index.php?menu=session&page=session&sessioncode=16781117. (Some years were 





This glowing picture of economic prosperity does however not imply that all officers were 
similarly successful. Paradoxically, in Quillan the office of maître particulier provided a 
counter-example, indicating that economic strength, and official hierarchy could appear in 
reverse order. This counterintuitive observation signals the existence of a deeply rooted 
fracture within the institution, with far-reaching consequences, not only for the officers’ 
personal fate, but also for the functioning of the whole institution.   
 
Quillan’s maître particulier 
 
Between Jean Gasse de Contigny, the first purchaser in 1677 of the newly-created office, 
and Louis Rouzaud who was forced to sell it in 1734, the office of maître particulier in 
Quillan remained in the same Gasse-Rouzaud family cluster for fifty-five years. They 
descended from notables of Lavelanet, a small town thirty kilometres west of Quillan, with 
a professional profile presenting a typical mix of commercial and legal activities. After 
inheriting the office from his uncle in 1696, Jean Rouzaud went to live in Quillan, where 
he lived gratuitously in the Maison Royale with his numerous family. After his death in 
1719, the office was bequeathed to his widow, Antoinette Pepratx. During the minority of 
her eldest son Louis Rouzaud, Jean’s brother, Joseph Rouzaud Mourency, acted as interim 
maître particulier, from his Lavelanet home, until 1726, during which time Antoinette 
Pepratx was said to have lived with her nine children on “200 ou 250 livres de revenus.” 
356 Part of that income came from an investment in a government bond secured on the 
tailles, created in 1720 at a rate of 2 %. 357 From Jean Rouzaud’s testament it appears that 
the family office was the only security to cover for her children’s inheritance. 358 
 
Between 1720 and 1733, together with her son Louis Rouzaud and her brother Bernard 
Pepratx (a wood merchant of Caudiès twenty kilometres south-east of Quillan), Antoinette 
Pepratx used her office to engage in a number of dubious, forestry-related activities. 
Relying mostly on their own, out-of-town connections, the group committed various “abus 
et prévarications” in the royal forests. This course of action ultimately sealed the family’s 
fate after the Réformation commissioners picked up their case in 1737. When he reached 
his majority in 1727, Louis Rouzaud started on the family office, but he was abruptly 
dismissed after just four years, for “prévarications manifestes” committed during his time 
																																																								
356 ADH, C1255, f.274r., ‘Mémoire du Sr.Anceau (undated, ca.1736)’. 
357 ADHG, 1C3300, f.226, ‘Quittance de finance de 3,000 livres pour jouir de 60 livres de rente.., 
en faveur d’Antoinette Peprax, 25 avril 1723’. 
358 ADHG, 1C3306, ‘Testament de Me Jean Rouzaud, Me particulier des Eaux et Forêts..., 1719’. 
	
	 137	
in office. After a decade-long series of legal proceedings, the Réformation judges imposed 
additional fines on that family. This not only drastically diminished the value of the office, 
but during these ten years the family had very limited access to the proceeds from the sale 
of the office because they were being held in séquestre for security. Just before they 
pronounced their final sentence in 1744, Louis Rouzaud went into hiding, and the family 
disappeared forthwith from the forestry scene.  
 
In addition to this troubled trajectory, records suggest that despite having held onto this 
relatively respectable office for so long, in terms of economic success, the family never 
rose above a modest position. There was little evidence of economic activity against Jean 
Rouzaud’s name, like rental income from land or buildings, or other types of financial 
operations. While the three daughters of the greffier, Jean Roillet, received dowries in the 
range of 2,000 livres each, the two older Rouzaud daughters only received 500 livres each. 
The oldest, Marie Rouzaud, died ignominously, after having traded her belongings to pay 
for drugs and medical treatment during her illness. They included all her furniture, her bed, 
and sheets described as "fort usés." 359 Two of Marie’s sisters married into modest local 
merchant families. Access to a prominent position within the maîtrise was clearly no 
guarantee of personal economic success.    
 
The most likely cause for such misfortune – apart from Louis Rouzaud’s obvious personal 
unsuitability for public office - was the family’s status as town outsiders. Both Jean Gasse 
de Contigny and his nephew, Jean Rouzaud, originated from Lavelanet, and Antoinette 
Pepratx descended from a merchant family of Couiza, ten kilometres downstream from 
Quillan. Crucially, during their residence in Quillan the family remained loyal to their own 
networks outside town. Before his death in 1719, Jean Rouzaud had entrusted the legal 
inventary of his possessions to his brother in Lavelanet and his brother-in-law in Couiza, 
Louis Pepratx. Furthermore, among the twenty godparents of their ten children (all of 
whom were born in Quillan), only three were Quillan residents. In the opinion of grand-
maître Claude Anceau, Jean Rouzaud might well have been a good servant of the king who 
had worked “avec exactitude et probité,” 360 but as an outsider he had been unable to 
penetrate the networks which could have opened the doors to more profitable activities.  
 
																																																								
359 ADAD, 3E13305, ‘Registre Notaire Me Laran, 1er décembre 1743’. 
360 ADH, C1255, f.19r., ‘Lettre Claude Anceau (5 déc.1718)’. 
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While we cannot draw general conclusions from this one example, the Rouzaud case alerts 
us to the existence of a fault line within the maîtrise separating maîtres particuliers from 
the other officers. In the case of the Rouzauds, their status as town outsiders was a 
powerful obstacle to their integration, which also prevented a cohesive, collaborative 
maîtrise unit from developing. Examples from other maîtrises show that internal rifts could 
also have different causes. As we shall see next, the separateness of the head of a unit 
could be exacerbated through noble status, especially for the earlier part of our period. 
Whether through non-residency or social distinction, the relationship between the maître 
particulier and the rest of the officers was a crucial factor in determining the effectiveness 
and authority of the provincial maîtrises, which could readily turn into a vulnerable spot in 
Colbert’s well-structured, rational forestry system. 
 
The end of old forestry nobility 
 
As we saw in chapter two above, the prestige of the sixteenth-century forestry institution 
was linked to the noble status of its most distinguished members. This allowed the 
souverains-maîtres and some of their subaltern officers to command the necessary moral 
authority to deal with members of the higher orders. Many of them had forests included in 
their fiefs, and when they adjoined royal forests, they did not hesitate to take advantage of 
fuzzy or absent material demarcations to encroach on them in relative impunity. 361 As 
members of nobility themselves, these early royal forestry officials were best suited to 
represent the authority of the king and of his forested interests in the province.  
 
Louis-quatorzian governments continued to welcome the linkage of forestry and old 
nobility. To buttress the authority of the Réformation commission of Languedoc in 1667, 
Froidour chose noble François de Roux, seigneur de Puivert, to assist him. De Roux came 
from a longstanding financial-judicial family of Carcassonne. One of their members, Pierre 
de Roux-Montbel, was syndic général des Etats in 1662. 362 Capitaines forestiers like 
Pierre de Négré were often gentilshommes, considered “hommes instruits, exerçant des 
fonctions d’encadrement social.” 363 Pierre de Négré belonged to one of the principal noble 
families of the region who provided the baillis of the Pays de Sault. In 1689, when the 
																																																								
361 Poublanc, Compter, 295. 
362 Beik, Absolutism, 232-3, n.20. The three syndics généraux of the Etats were responsible for 
overseeing the implementation of the decisions taken by the various commissions.  
363 Christian Fruhauf, “Les forestiers dans les Pyrénées avant la Réformation des années 1660”, in: 
Andrée Corvol, ed., La Forêt (Paris, 1991), 236. 
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Clairvaux priory dragged their feet over the compulsory survey and delimitation of its 
forests, grand-maître Thimoléon Legras chose noble Anthoine de Dales, seigneur de 
Boisse, maître particulier of Rouergue et Quercy, to deal with the reluctant clerics. 364 In 
the maîtrise particulière of Toulouse, the garde-marteau office belonged to a member of 
the Gramont family, which also included a président des enquêtes at the Toulouse 
Parlement and several bishops. One of them, the baron de Lanta, was a particularly active 
member of the Chambre de la noblesse at the Etats. 365 This historical association of 
forestry and the old nobility was still alive at the beginning of the eighteenth century. In 
1707, the preamble of the edict creating maîtres particuliers alternatifs et my-triennaux in 
every maîtrise used the argument that “ces nouvelles attributions seront d’autant moins à 
charge à l’Etat que la pluspart des maîtres particuliers sont Gentilshommes.” 366  
 
To get a clearer idea of this association, a sample of 144 names of forestry officers of all 
categories, has been analysed with reference to nobility. It covers nine maîtrises 
particulières of the Toulouse Grande Maîtrise between 1644 and 1789 (Table 10). 367 
 
Table 10    Grande Maîtrise of Toulouse: Noble and non-noble officers 
 in a sample of 144 forestry officers (1640s-1789) 
 
 
Intriguingly, only eleven individuals (7.6 %) were confirmed nobles, most of them in the 
maître particulier category, such as Jacques Busquet in Villemur, or Jean-Olivier Dalles de 
Boscaut in Saint-Gaudens. Even more striking is the fact that no member of old noble 
families accessed forestry posts after 1715. After that date, they disappeared from the 
																																																								
364 AN, G7, 1349, f.70r., ‘Lettre T.Legras (24 mars 1689)’. 
365 Durand et al., Des Etats dans l'Etat, 59. 
366 AN, G7,1368, ‘Proposition de création d’un office de maître particulier alternatif et mi-triennal 
(aout 1707)’. 
367 Based on De la Chesnaye-Desbois, Dictionnaire de la Noblesse (Paris, 1766-1778). Also Henry 
de Caux, Catalogue général des gentilshommes de la province de Languedoc...  (Pézenas, 1676). 
Table 19   Noble and non-noble officers in a sample of 144 forestry officers in the 









Maitre particulier 7 35 
Lieutenant 1 32 
Procureur du roi 0 39 
Garde-marteau 3 27 
TOTAL 11 133 
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personnel charts. Joseph-Marie Malpel de Latour, lieutenant of Villemur, became anobli 
after he inherited the post in 1760. He was the son and successor of Pierre Malpel, from a 
prominent bourgeois family of that town. In terms of social status, it appears therefore that 
officers like Jean-Olivier Dalles, Pierre de Négré or Barthélémy de Gramont represented 
the rear guard of a traditional model of foresters anchored in ancient nobility.  
 
The end of Louis XIV’s long reign, then, marked a watershed, as intermediate forestry 
offices were progressively taken over by members of the mercantile and legal bourgeoisie, 
well anchored in the local urban society. When nobility returned to forestry later in the 
century, it was in the form of anoblis. The non-ennobling, unprofitable forestry office 
might have appeared increasingly unattractive for families of old nobility. Overcoming 
their traditional disdain for commercial and financial success, some of them might have 
shifted their social ambitions towards alternative routes bearing better prospects of 
“immense profits, power and prestige.” 368 Seen in conjunction with the inverted hierarchy 
between maîtres particuliers and subaltern officers observed above, this structural change 
is thoughtprovoking. It confirms that after the end of Louis XIV’s reign, the gloss and 
prestige of the old association of forestry office and ancient nobility was being superseded 
by the empowerment procured by the accumulation of wealth and solid financial strategies.  
 
This take-over of the forestry office by members of the third estate, who were the drivers 
of economic life in many small towns, will be part of a wider survey of the qualitative 
aspects of the forestry office, and the socio-professional trajectories of its holders. This 
analysis will go some way towards explaining why the Colbertian foresters and their 
descendants remained so long loyal to an office, which, notwithstanding the limited 
rewards and privileges it enjoyed, remained financially an unattractive option.  
 
The forestry office, qualitative analysis 
 
Maîtrise personnel, a stable framework 
 
The organisational chart of forestry personnel reproduced in Annexe 2 provides an 
overview of our corpus. Predominantly based on information provided by the lettres de 
provisions, it is a visual representation of the diachronic and synchronic evolution and 
																																																								
368 Doyle, Venality, 223. 
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transmission patterns of the office-holders in the maîtrise particulière of Quillan between 
1650 and 1789. 369 Taking into account the existence of kinship ties between families 
bearing different names, we have identified ten major forestry ‘dynasties’ during this 
period of approximately 135 years, of which Table 11 provides a synopsis.   
 




The chart reveals some salient characteristics of the early modern forestry office in terms 
of the status of the post (commission or office) and lengths of tenure, pointing to familial 
monopolies. Firstly, Colbert’s attempts at removing venality by gradually introducing 
commissioned posts across the forestry hierarchy were particularly unsuccessful at the 
level of the maîtrises particulières. In Quillan, lieutenants and gardes-marteaux whose 
office was in the family since the 1640s, continued as before, while the posts of maître 
particulier, procureur du roi and greffier were being reinstated as offices as early as 1674. 
 
Across all categories the periods of tenure for individual officers were generally long, 
occasionally interrupted by brief periods with more rapid changeovers. Their average 
length in post represented roughly one generation, ranging from twenty-three years 
(maîtres particuliers) to twenty-eight years (procureurs du roi). It was somewhat shorter 
for the gardes-marteaux (sixteen years). This post stability even weathered the war years 
																																																								
369 Because of travel restrictions in 2020, some information for the later part of the period could not 




Besset	de	Garard	 Lieutenant	 1676	 –	 1681,	 1690	 –	 1716	 (31	
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and proliferation of alternatif offices of the 1700s, suggesting a stable long-term 
operational basis for forestry work in Quillan. 
 
Scrutiny of the names in the chart (Annexe 2) and Table 11 confirms this impression of 
stability – or, perhaps, closure to outsiders. There was clear aspiration to concentrate 
offices within the closest familial sphere. In the maître particulier category, the office 
remained with the Contigny-Rouzaud cluster for fifty-five years, and when it shifted in 
1734 into Marsol hands, it stayed with them for the same length of time, until 1789. A 
similar picture of familial longevity emerges for Quillan’s procureurs du roi associated 
with the names of Malleville, Pinet, Terrisse and Roillet. While these family lines have 
been separated in the table, closer scrutiny of individual genealogies shows kinship links, 
albeit to a more distant degree than the other lines. Despite a more irregular pattern, just 
two rival families, the Bessets and the Jauberts, monopolised the lieutenancy office for 150 
hundred years. The Cachulet-Loubet clan controlled the garde-marteau post for 142 years, 
seemingly unperturbed by the suspension of Pierre Cachulet in 1670 for his illegal wood 
trading activities.  
 
The hold on the forestry office of this particular family cluster was further strengthened by 
the addition of the office of receveur particulier, a treasury post created by the edict of 
December 1701 in every maîtrise of the kingdom. This creation introduced for the first 
time a financial dimension into the legally oriented maîtrise. It was well endowed. With 
400 livres annually, it carried higher gages, but also more privileges than other maîtrise 
offices, notably the prized exemption from the taille. With Antoine Cachulet’s son Jean-
Antoine, his nephew Estienne Loubet, and their descendants, the Loubet-Cachulet clan 
retained the exclusive monopoly of the combined offices of garde-marteau and receveur 
particulier. 
 
Such familial hegemony was not unique to Quillan. A survey of the names, lengths of 
tenure and office transmission mode of 250 forestry officers in all eleven maîtrises 
particulières of Toulouse between 1674 and 1788, shows that it was a common feature 
across the wider forestry scene. In thirty cases (12 %), the office was passed down to heirs 
bearing the same family name. This could include two, three, or even four successive 
generations. The actual percentage is likely to have been much higher, as successors with 
different names could, as in Quillan, have been close relatives. The average lengths for 
these multi-generational tenures were remarkably similar across all categories: fifty-five 
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years for maîtres particuliers, fifty-three for lieutenants and garde-marteau, and sixty 
years for procureurs. More generally, these analyses confirm that in forestry too, and 
contrary to real estate that could be subject to the complications of partible inheritance, 
“offices offered an appealing element of stability and continuity, safe and indestructible 
down the generations, a hedge against the uncertainties of life and posterity.” 370 
 
Honing down on the specifics of the transmission mode adds another element to the 
characterisation of the forestry office. A transfer of office could happen in one of four 
possible ways: acquired from the Parties Casuelles after a new creation or at a later stage, 
should it return to the crown; transmitted through inheritance after death; designation by 
the incumbent holder during his life time, against payment of the annuel; or sold directly 
on the private market. The corpus overview in Annexe 3 also identifies the mode of 
transmission at each transfer. The results are summarised in Table 12. The most common 
transmission mode was by bequest or resignation before death. It occurred in two-thirds of 
the cases, overwhelmingly to close family members. The office was acquired from the 
Parties Casuelles only in nearly one-quarter of the cases. It rarely touched the open 
market.  
 
From the perspective of the crown, the familial hegemony on the forestry office appearing 
in these analyses might be seen as a warrant of stability in the forestry system. On the other 
hand, more frequent returns to the crown’s treasury would have helped to regain control of 
forestry recruitments, and opening the office to candidates from outside local networks 
would have helped to curb collusion and fraud. The hereditary nature of the venal office in 
the administration of forestry removed it largely from governmental control.   
 
Table 12 Quillan: Mode of transmission of the forestry office  
    (1655-1789) 
 
																																																								
370 Doyle, Venality, 157. 
Table 21  Mode of transmission of the forestry office in Quillan (1655 – 1789) 
 
 
Mode of transmission 
How often 
occurred 
Bought from parties casuelles (PC) 6 
Designated or bequeathed (*) 17 







In a number of cases, the transfer involved an intermediary third party before the office 
reached the intended recipient. These arrangements often concerned widows or other 
female heirs. In 1675, the widow of garde-marteau Pierre Cachulet nominated her oldest 
son François, who, “ne désirant se faire pourvoir,” designated his brother Antoine. As the 
case of Louis Rouzaud and his mother suggests, legal ownership of office and executive 
function could be split, which allowed partners a shared control of finance and profits. 
Even for these modest offices, manipulations like these demonstrate the influence of 
private interests on the administration of a bien public such as forests. As a “portion de la 
puissance publique devenue objet de commerce et propriété privée,” 371 the forestry office 




The smooth generational flow of transmission was at times interrupted by periods of 
turbulence, when disruptive circumstances led to more rapid changeovers and speculative 
trading. The gravest disruptions were caused by a noxious combination of personal failings 
and legal prosecution after instances of fraud and abuse of office. Our personnel chart 
highlights two such troubled periods, at the start of the new regime (1670s to 1690), and 
again from 1719 to 1734.  
 
The first period corresponds to the initial decade after the abrupt regime change of the 
Colbertian réformation. It occurred against the backdrop of momentous changes in the 
upper echelons of the hierarchy. Louis de Froidour, the charismatic reformer and grand-
maître, died in 1685, two years after his mentor Colbert. Froidour was succeeded by 
Thimoléon Legras, an experienced forestry officer, former commissaire des domaines et 
bois in Provence and grand-maître of Poitou. In 1686, a newly-created office of receveur 
général des domaines ousted the longstanding commissioned treasurer of the Grande 
Maîtrise, Aymé Riquier, who had been one of Froidour’s most trusted allies.  
 
In all eleven maîtrises established in 1671, the first decade were years of confusion, as 
posts on commission overlapped with traditional offices monopolised by a small number 
of families. It took more than ten years to staff them fully. Some posts remained vacant for 
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years. By 1677, only three maîtrises, Saint-Gaudens, Saint-Pons and Quillan, had been 
fully staffed. Rodez was in 1681 still missing its maître particulier and garde-marteau. 
The situation of Villeneuve-de-Berg was desperate. In 1682, the first holder of the maitre 
particulier office was Nicolas de Froidour, the oldest son of the grand-maître, who had to 
seek age dispensation because he was only eighteen years old. 372 After a stint of just over 
one year, Nicolas left to continue his career in Paris. Froidour did not harbour any illusions 
about the risks of manning the new structures with men lacking training and experience. 
“Ces officiers, n’ayant ni assez d’expérience ni assez de crédit et d’autorité ni assez 
d’affection pour soutenir avec toute la vigueur qui était nécessaire l’exécution des 
règlements qu’on leur avait confiée et ne voulant pas d’ailleurs se charger de la haine 
publique sans utilité, laissèrent insensiblement reprendre les anciens errements des 
usurpateurs et des délinquants.” 373  
 
In Quillan the situation after 1671 was particularly unsettled. After four transitional years, 
the maîtrise suddenly acquired a whole new generation of officers within just two years. 
The new maître particulier (Jean Gasse de Contigny) who had just received his licence de 
droit, and the procureur du roi (Jean-Francois Malleville) bought their offices from the 
crown as first holders, the latter after a speculative move involving one intermediate 
owner. In parallel, the offices of lieutenant and garde-marteau also changed hands with the 
arrival of Jean Besset and Antoine Cachulet, another young licencié. The lieutenancy 
succession was particularly troubled. Hailed by Froidour as “un officier fort intelligent, 
fort appliqué a sa charge et fort zélé au service du roi,” 374 ageing Pierre Besset had 
resigned his office in favour of his son, Jean Besset. After two brief years in office, Jean 
Besset was prosecuted for fraud and abuse of office, briefly imprisoned, and heavily fined. 
To cover his debts, he sold the office to a family outsider in 1681, the judge of Quillan 
Guillaume Jaubert. After Jean Besset’s untimely death in 1683, his siblings contested the 
sale and claimed the office back for the family. After a convoluted legal dispute, an arrêt 
du Conseil finally returned the post to Jean’s brother, François Besset, pending 
reimbursement of Jaubert’s purchase. 375 A few months later, in June 1687, François 
resigned again in favour of a Gabriel Charpentier, but three years later, Charpentier handed 
the office back to François Besset. Between 1676 and 1690, Quillan’s lieutenant post had 
																																																								
372 AN, V1, 25. ‘Lettres de Provisions (1682)’. 
373	Quoted	in	Bartoli,	‘Louis	de	Froidour’,	73.		
374 ADHG, 8B024, f.47r., ‘Procès-verbal de Réformation de Quillan. Jugements. (12 mai 1673)’. 
375 Details in ADAD, 5J18, ‘Extrait d’arrêt du Conseil intervenu entre Jean Gasse de Gontigny, 
[...], Guillaume Jaubert, [...], François Besset, Jean Maet et autres, au sujet d’offices à la maîtrise de 
Quillan qui remplace le bureau dudit lieu, 27 août 1686.  
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thus changed hands five times. Disruptions like these were not uncommon. In Isle-Jourdain 
the widow of the outgoing holder of the lieutenant post had designated Jean-Jacques de 
Forgia as his successor, but Forgia passed it immediately on to a third party, Sr. du May. 
Following financial difficulties, du May lost it again to a fourth contender, Jean-Jacques 
Soullery. 376 While these acute periods of disorder would have impeded the normal 
functioning of the unit, their effects remained limited to the individual maîtrise and the 
personal sphere of the officers.  
 
Not so with Quillan’s second troubled period. With no less than nine transfers in all 
categories between 1727 and 1734, the turmoil not only severely affected the maîtrise, but 
it also triggered the active involvement of the central authorities. After a long period of 
quiet, a new, inexperienced team took charge in 1727, but here again it was not long before 
the young officers faced disciplinary measures because of professional misconduct and 
fraudulent activities. In 1732, garde-marteau Jean-Antoine Loubet was suspended for one 
year, and maître particulier Louis Rouzaud was fined and forced to sell the family office. 
The case however did not end there. Over the next few years, Louis Rouzaud’s repeated 
complaints and denunciations to the Conseil let the situation spiral into a full-blown crisis, 
compounded by personal hostility and discord within the maîtrise. This second crisis went 
well beyond an ordinary case of personal score settling impacting the lives of individuals 
or local families. Rouzaud’s actions exposed to public scrutiny the extent of collusion, 
fraud and abuse of power that had been left to occur, unchallenged, over the previous two 
decades. According to public rumour duly relayed by the commissioners themselves, Louis 
Rouzaud’s actions had been instrumental in sparking the ten-year long, costly, second 
Réformation of Quillan. By crossing the glass ceiling of official tolerance, this individual 
had prompted a conspicuous response from the authorities in the capital, which, as will be 
seen in chapter four, escalated well beyond a mere judicial redress of individual cases. 




Conflicts were not confined to unusual crises such as these. The source material suggests 
that in day-to-day practice too, maîtrises were riddled with internal strife. The vehement 
quarrel between lieutenant André Boire and garde-marteau Etienne Loubet recounted in 
the first chapter was just one of many similar occurences. Discord between maîtres 
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particuliers and lieutenants were frequent enough to be labelled as “la plaie des maitrises.” 
377 In Quillan, the authority of a lieutenant like Pierre Besset, who had single-handedly 
managed the small forestry bureau for three decades, was abruptly displaced when the 
office of maître particulier was formally established. As a newcomer in Quillan’s forestry 
affairs, and a town outsider, Jean Gasse de Contigny claimed his share of the droits de 
passe the very day of his installation, and issued a corresponding ordonnance. This 
arbitrary action led to a bitter conflict with the Besset family, which destabilised the 
functioning of the maîtrise for over a decade. 378 Many similar conflicts were similarly 
driven by power struggles and financial motives. In Castelnaudary for example, the 
problem resulted from a diverging interpretation of the lieutenant’s title, whereby the 
attribution of certain rights depended on whether the lieutenant was deputy to the head 
(implying personal dependency), or to the maîtrise. 379  
 
The general impression of endemic conflict and lack of collaborative spirit emerging from 
these examples must be interpreted with caution. It could result from the official and 
judicial nature of most of our source material. Given the high levels of endogamy existing 
between forestry families, it could also represent the spillover of ordinary family feuds into 
the professional sphere. Furthermore, no evidence was found of a corporate organisation of 
mid-ranking forestry officers, contrary to the compagnie des grands-maîtres or the syndic 
des marchands de bois, radeliers et autres commercants en bois de Quillan et Esperaza. 
This meant that they lacked a collective structure that could have helped to arbitrate 
internal conflicts in the maîtrises. Accordingly, they did not develop a cohesive esprit de 
corps. They remained a professional group, though linked by a common general legal 
framework, which left individual officers free to develop other forms of allegiance through 
networks of support and beneficial alliances with members of their immediate social 
environment.  
 
Overall, this overview of the mid-ranking forestry post has demonstrated that an outwardly 
stable, centralised system, organized along rational lines, could be critically upset by 
personal factors in the lower echelons of an institution, whose dynamics remained largely 
outside the reach of the authorities. It confirms the fragile nature of an administration 
based on the close interlinkage of public and private interests. These broad assumptions 
can be refined, and further qualified, by examining the career strategies of Quillan’s 
																																																								
377 Waquet, Les Grands Maîtres, 225. 
378 ADAD, 5J18, f.7r., ‘Extrait des Registres du Conseil d’Etat (27 aout 1686)’. 
379 This discussion is developed in Pecquet, Loix, I, 200-217. 
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Legal and local ancestries 
 
The greatest challenge for determining the geographical, social and professional origins of 
social groups is the haphazard availability of biographical data, especially for pre-
Colbertian periods. From the information gleaned from notarial, judicial or genealogical 
records, it was nevertheless possible to identify some characteristics of the ‘lead ancestors’ 
380 for thirteen different forestry dynasties of the Quillan maîtrise. (Table 13) 
 
Two main features emerge from the information collected in Table 13: the predominance 
of the legal professions, and a very narrow geographical base. In half the cases, the 
ancestry of the new foresters of the 1670s included legal professions such as juges, 
procureurs de bailliage, or notaires. Only in two cases did the forefathers come from the 
forestry sector itself: former lieutenant Pierre Besset and garde-marteau Pierre Cachulet 
had been the only officers of Quillan’s minuscule pre-Colbertian forestry bureau. The 
financial milieu was totally absent, and the merchant community was only represented for 
a later ‘starter’ in forestry, Pierre Pinet de Brezilhou, who acquired the procureur du roi 
office in 1700. In 1671, Colbert’s new structure had not been attractive for merchants who 
were well established in their trade, or did perhaps not bring the education requirements for 
the posts. For the sons of Quillan’s old legal families, on the other hand, it provided a 
much-needed new outlet.   
 
In terms of geographical origins, Table 13 describes a particularly narrow perimeter. The 
majority of ‘lead ancestors’ had been town residents. Maîtres particuliers who were 
exempt from residency requirements, lived in nearby towns because of their compulsory 
presence at the weekly court sessions. At thirty kilometres, Lavelanet was the most distant 
place of residency of their first holders, and Pierre Marsol descended from a family of 
notaires and procureurs of Roquefeuil, twenty kilometres west of town. His direct 
successors in the Quillan office still lived there at the outbreak of the Revolution.  
																																																								
380 A ‘lead ancestor’ is defined as the first individual, usually father, grandfather or uncle, entering 
a specific institutional or professional pathway.  
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Table 13 Quillan maîtrise: Socio-professional and geographical origins  

































































































































Forestry descendants, a blurred picture 
 
Reversing the gaze, Table 14 outlines the career trajectories down the line of twelve first 
holders of a forestry office, including sons, nephews, sons-in-law, and their successors. 
The picture is blurred, not least because information about careers of the latter part of the 
century is too sparse to venture conclusive interpretations. The circumstances of the 
departures from the forestry office of receveur particulier Thimoléon Cachulet and 
procureur Louis Terrisse in the 1760s could not be ascertained. 381 The picture is clearer 
for the cases where descendants remained loyal to forestry until the institution’s abolition 
by the Assemblée Nationale in 1791, including at times four successive generations. If the 
familial transmission got severed because the holder died in office, of after voluntary mid-
career departures, descendants showed a preference for staying in Quillan, especially if 
they could access one of the rare legal occupations as a châtellenie agent or local judge. 
The case of Louis Rouzaud is an exception. After his sentencing in 1744, he absconded 
from the region, which marked the end of the family’s forestry line. 382 
 
The addition of the office of receveur particulier in 1701, which introduced for the first 
time a financial responsibility in the maîtrise, added another dimension to this synopsis of 
forestry careers. It was an opportunity immediately seized upon by a member of the local 
wood merchants, Jean-Pierre Pinet. After 1711, it remained firmly in the hands of Pinet’s 
close relatives, the Cachulet-Loubet garde-marteaux clan - the only office that did not 
require a law degree. Working for the archbishop of Narbonne was an attractive alternative 
for officers who wished to leave forestry. After having been the ‘king’s man’ at the 
maîtrise for twenty-six years, procureur du roi Pierre Pinet de Brezilhou became the 
seigneur’s châtelain and judge, looking after the archbishop’s legal interests and judging in 
his name. He followed in the footsteps of his merchant ancestors, who traditionally looked 
after the decimal rights and exploited the forests of the Narbonne prelates. Cardinal de 
Bonzi, archbishop of Narbonne between 1673 and 1703, placed his forestry interests in the 
hands of professionals like maîtrise officers and wood merchants. 383 By entering the 
archbishop’s service in 1726, Pierre Pinet had in reality not wandered far away from his 
roots.  
																																																								
381 Due to travel restrictions in 2020. 
382 Louis Rouzaud might have joined his uncle Bernard Pepratx, who had already left the region to 
become écuyer of Louis XV’s war secretary d’Angervilliers. 
383 ADAD, 3E7749, ‘Registre notaire Me Siau, juin 1699’. 
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Not only did the forestry families show little inclination for leaving forestry, nor the legal 
domain, but they also remained loyal to their town. Regardless of career changes, 
descendants of forestry families remained living in or near their town of origin, sometimes 
well into the nineteenth century. According to Jean Nagle, such sedentary lifestyle was a 
hallmark of officiers moyens, and contrasted with the mobility of officiers souverains, 384 
and for Michel Cassan, “cette sédentarité imposée peut être dévalorisée dans les 
représentations d'une société qui vit dans un monde qui loue la mobilité, le déplacement, le 
voyage.” 385 Furthermore, a study by Josef Smets of the power dynamics at work in 
Languedocian villages suggested that the length of residency of a family carried more 
weight than their economic situation. 386 This hierarchy of values could well have also 




At this intermediate level, the forestry office appears as a self-contained professional 
world, associated with geographical immobility, and allegiance to local structures. An in-
depth analysis covering a larger corpus would be helpful here to confirm this hypothesis 
more conclusively. In the case of Quillan’s foresters, the idea of strong loyalty to the town 
is buttressed by their continuing involvement with honorary public duties (Table 15). This 
concerned officers of all categories, apart, here again, from the maître particulier. The 
loyalty to the town endured: under the Napoleonic and Restauration regimes, long after the 
family had left forestry behind, descendants of the Roillets and Pinets still appeared as 
elected maires of Quillan. Service to the town could include unpleasant, even loathsome 
aspects, but as a form of pouvoir informel it also conferred authority upon its bearer. Even 
the reviled collector of municipal debts enjoyed a degree of control over his fellow 
residents. 387 Such construction ‘from below’ of personal authority was a common feature 
of early modern urban societies. In Normandie, Pierre Doré, a modest-ranking officer of 
justice, significantly bolstered his moral authority by assuming petty supplementary 
																																																								
384 Jean Nagle, ‘Officiers “moyens” dans les enquêtes de 1573 et 1665’, Les Cahiers du Centre de 
Recherches Historiques, 23 (1999).   
385 Cassan, ‘De l’État “moderne”’, 471. 
386 Josef Smets, ‘Les chemins du pouvoir dans le village Languedocien (17e-19e siècles)’, Actes du 
LVIXe Congrès de la Fédération historique du Languedoc méditerranéen et du Roussillon, Libertés 
Locales et Vie Municipale en Rouergue, Languedoc et Roussillon, (Montpellier, 1988), pp. 185-
190, 189. 
387 Marcel, Quillan, 384. 
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functions. 388  For old-established forestry families too, continuing involvement in 
municipal affairs suggests that attachment to the town constituted an important part of their 
identity.  
 






On the other hand, while the combination of royal office and municipal charges 
significantly contributed to define the identity of these officers, the question arises whether 
these functions sufficed to fulfill the officers’ quest for social elevation and political 
influence. After all, they had significant personal assets. As members of forestry families, 
they had first-hand experience of technical and legal matters pertaining to this specialist 
field. In the absence of any official training opportunity in the field, they received a form 
of ‘in-house training’ by their fathers or uncles. After college, this practical training was 
complemented by further legal education, usually at the university of Toulouse. Apart from 
																																																								
388  Zoé Schneider, The King’s Bench, Bailiwick Magistrates and Local Governance in 
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the garde-marteau, most forestry officers came with a legal degree ranging from a two-
year bâchelier course to the four-year degree of docteur-es-droits. While it was not 
required for maîtres particuliers, all in our sample did come with a degree. Ten out of forty 
forestry officers of Quillan between 1671 and 1789 were titled as avocats en/au Parlement. 
389 This higher level of education, which also implied fluency in the French language, was 
a further factor of social differentiation, relative to the predominantly Occitan-speaking 
town residents and villagers. Forestry officers contributed to the regional surge of 
academic qualifications after 1715. (Fig. 17) Out of all students from Quillan, Lavelanet 
and Roquefeuil who studied at the universities of Toulouse, Cahors and Montpellier 
between 1624 and 1789, 61 % bore names related to forestry officers in our sample. 390  
 
Fig.17 Number of law students from Quillan, Lavelanet, and Roquefeuil  
at the universities of Toulouse, Cahors and Montpellier (1624 - 1789) 




Furthermore, their education reinforced the traditional legal orientation of forestry practice 
in the maîtrises particulières, at the expense of a more technical approach apt at fostering 
the scientific management and conservation of the forests, such as was fast developing in 
																																																								
389 The formal distinction between ‘au’ (refering to an actual post as magistrate in the Parlement) 
and ‘en’ (only a formal step for getting a judicature post elsewhere) was blurred in the records. See 
Maurice Gresset, ‘Le barreau, de Louis XIV à la Restauration, Revue d’Histoire Moderne & 
Contemporaine, 36, 3 (1989), pp. 488-496, 488. 
390 Patrick Ferté, Répertoire géographique des étudiants du midi de la France (1561-1793): pour 
un prosopographie des élites (Toulouse, 2002), vol.5 (Bas Languedoc et Roussillon). 
Fig. 16     Number of law students from Quillan, Lavelanet, and Roquefeuil at the universities 
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the German states. 391 While officers might have acquired a certain measure of technical 
knowledge and professionalism through familial training and hands-on experience, their 
approach to forestry remained primarily a legal one. 
 
In principle, then, forestry offcers could have used their education and experience to move 
into other areas of the judiciary, but there is no evidence that they did so. They were 
formally debarred from cumulating forestry with another jurisdictional function in the 
royal, municipal or seigneurial domains, but there was no sign that they sought to leave 
forestry to access a post at any of the présidial seats of Limoux, Carcassonne or 
Castelnaudary. A promotion up the forestry hierarchy itself was unthinkable. Mobilising 
credit of more than one hundred thousand livres to acquire an office of grand-maître was 
out of their reach. Moreover, the Compagnie des grands-maîtres jealously safeguarded 
their status by excluding applicants lacking sufficient social respectability. 392 
Fundamentally, this narrow window of professional opportunities represented a weak spot 
in the monarchical forestry system. Contrary to grands-maîtres who could move up to a 
post in finance (for example as receveur général des finances or maître des comptes), or 
the military (as gouverneur), 393 the officers of maîtrises particulières were restricted to 
making the best of the opportunities within their immediate reach – strengthening even 




The situation described here does not mean that forestry officers were totally devoid of 
means of consolidating personal and professional prestige and authority within the forestry 
system itself. Combining an alternatif office with the ancien (when it was available) was 
an option. In the first decade of the eighteenth century, Jean Rouzaud was one of the few 
maîtres particuliers of the Grande Maîtrise of Toulouse who took it up. A more common 
strategy consisted in taking advantage of the formal distinction between legal ownership 
and executive function, which allowed participants to lease out an office. Greffier offices, 
in the hands of local notaires known for the lucrative nature of their business, were 
																																																								
391 Leading the trend, eighteenth-century germanophone states promoted Forstwirtschaft as an 
autonomous, fully-fledged part of economy, close to agronomy. Out of many works on this: W.G. 
von Moser, Grundsätze der Forstökonomie (Leipzig, 1757); Kurt Mantel, Wald und Forst: 
Wechselbeziehungen zwischen Natur und Wirtschaft (Reinbek, 1961). 
392 The Compagnie des grands-maîtres famously refused the candidacy of  Louis-Augustin Caron 
de Beaumarchais on the grounds that he was a clock-maker’s son. 
393 Waquet, Les Grands Maîtres, 109. 
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particularly coveted. In one striking early seventeenth-century example, the maîtres 
particuliers ancien and alternatif of Toulouse, and the latter’s wife, collected greffier 
offices in several maîtrises in all three forms, ancien, alternatif and triennal, and affermed 
them on to third parties. 394 In 1688, the audit of the accounts of former receveur général, 
Aymé Riquier, uncovered that this treasurer had also been “propriétaire de la charge de 
greffier en la maitrise de Quillan sous le nom du Sr Dordet.” 395 The modalities of the 
changeover for Quillan’s maître particulier office in 1728 are a particularly illustrative 
example. Just before her son Louis was due to assume his duties, Antoinette Pepratx 
obtained a notarial contract whereby, “nonobstant le transfert 'pur et simple' de l'office à 
son fils Louis, elle conservera toujours la propriété de manière qui luy sera loisible et le 
vendre ou de le bailler à telle autre personne qu'elle voudra et quand elle voudra [...] Lad. 
dame se réserve et aura annuellement à son profit tous les gages et augmentations de 
gages, droit du port, droits de récollement; moitié des journées et vacations, commissions 
extraordinaires [...] Louis pourra percevoir à son profit tous autres revenus.” 396 While 
arrangements like these could serve as legal safety clauses, the Rouzaud case, further 
detailed in chapter four, also shows that when things went wrong, the contractors – in this 
case Louis Rouzaud and his mother - also shared the inherent risks and responsibilities.  
 
The most empowering strategy was to cumulate different forestry-related offices within the 
close family sphere, already a common practice among bailliage officers. 397 By allowing 
officers to combine financial and legal powers, the creation of the office of receveur 
particulier in each maîtrise was clearly a winning bid. In Quillan, the new office was 
immediately acquired for 2,500 livres by wood merchant and mayor Jean-Pierre Pinet 
Laprade, the cousin of procureur Pierre Pinet de Brezilhou, and uncle of garde-marteau 
Jean-Antoine Cachulet. 398 After 1711, the Cachulet-Loubet family cluster retained this 
advantageous combination of receveur particulier and garde-marteau office as an 
exclusive monopoly until at least 1767, and most probably until the Revolution.  
 
Opportunities like these remained, however, the exception. Fundamentally, in a small-town 
context such as Quillan, the forestry office represented a poor starting block for social and 
																																																								
394 ADHG, 8B35, B1, ‘Interrogatoire du Sr.Courdurier, 30 mars 1667’, quoted in Poublanc, 
Compter, 299. 
395 AN, G71329, f.247, ‘Mémoire sur les debets du compte rendu par M. Aymé Riquier (21 avril 
1691’.   
396 ADHG, 1C3306, f.217r., ‘Registre du notaire Jacques Forest, Toulouse, 25 fév.1728’. 
397 Gresset, L'introduction de la vénalité (1989), 126. 
398 AN, G7, 1364, n.p., ‘Comptes du traitant Gillet du Fay (22 fév.1707)’. 
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professional advancement. Here again, we can see a parallel with the “faible mobilité 
socio-professionnelle” of the présidial magistrates described by Vincent Meyzie. 399 With 
their enduring social, professional and geographical immobility, forestry offices were a far 
cry from the ideal of the intermediary office as an effective stepping-stone for promotion, 
as suggested in Roland Mousnier’s idealised model for the legal professions. 400 Nor could 
they compete with the intergenerational mobility of the sons of merchants and liberal 
professions described by Richard Kagan. 401 There was especially nothing that heralded the 
future clock-like promotion machinery of the forestry corps of the Second Empire and 
Troisième République. The picture emerging from the preceding analysis is one of a world 
focused on itself, encased inside narrow professional and social boundaries, and very much 
closed to outsiders. In seats like Quillan, the scant prospects of professional advancement 
provided by the royal office tied officers firmly to the local power sphere and its system of 
clientage. As the next section will show, this situation was compounded by a crippling lack 
of practical and moral support from the authorities. This diverted their energies into 





In Quillan, holding a royal office, however modest, was considered to be a badge of 
respectability and social distinction. A clue to the special consideration due to the forestry 
officers can be found in the way they were recorded in the parish registers. While entries 
were rarely qualified beyond a name, or at best a brief mention of occupation, they always 
appeared with their full titles. For the godfather of Jean-Pierre Pinet’s daughter, for 
example, the entry read “Mr Me François Besset, Conseiller du Roy, Lieutenant des Eaux 
et Forêts de la maîtrise de Quillan.” 402 A number of visible privileges like being exempt 
from burdensome services to the military or tutelle et curatelle, or exclusive treatment of 
court cases by the présidial, provided a sense of social distinction. On the other hand, they 
lacked the prized exemption from the taille, a serious dent in their honourability.  
 
																																																								
399 Meyzie, Les illusions perdues, 59-63. 
400 Roland Mousnier, Les institutions de la France sous la monarchie absolue (1598-1789), 2 vols 
(Paris, 1980), vol.2, 357-359. 
401  Richard Kagan, ‘Law students and legal careers in eighteenth-century France’, Past and 
Present, 68, 1 (1975), pp. 38-72.  
402 ADAD, 100NUM/AC304/1E1, ‘Quillan, 27	Août	1699’. 
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As depositaries of royal authority, and highly visible public figures, maîtrise officers were 
exposed to probing scrutiny on a daily basis. They were therefore enjoined to demonstrate 
a dignified countenance. “Nos rois persuadés que tout doit concourir et inspirer le respect 
pour les loix, et qu’il ne dépend pas peu du maintien et de la conduite de ceux qui en sont 
les dépositaires, ont eu soin de recommander la décence par plusieurs de leurs 
Ordonnances. C’est dans cette vue que l’on a ordonné aux officiers de Robe Longue siéger 
en habit de règle, aux Greffiers de porter respect aux Officiers du Siège, aux huissiers de 
faire faire silence, etc.” 403 They were equipped with the usual material marks of honour 
and authority, destined to place “ceux qui en bénéficient en position d’autorité et de 
prestige, et ceux qui les subissent en position d’obéissance et d’humilité.” 404 A distinctive 
apparel and head dress, the ceremonial sword worn by the maître particulier and the 
garde-marteau when they attended official sessions, the surveyor’s uniform when out in 
the field on measuring duties, were some of these signifiers. 405 The tagging hammer, 
securely kept in its casket, carried a particularly high prestige as the material symbol of the 
king’s authority.  
 
These material signifiers were enhanced by conspicuous elements of ritual and ceremony, 
included in ordinary forestry practice. Travelling ‘en corps’ on their regular inspection 
visits of royal or private forests, the riding parties of maîtrise officers would have been 
very noticeable as they passed through the villages. The wood auctions (adjudications) 
held each autumn at the maîtrise seat were colourful public events, which belonged to the 
yearly schedule of Quillan’s social life, on a par with its annual fairs. On that occasion, the 
town was teeming with bidders from surrounding villages, and the presence in town of the 
grand-maître and his “équipage” would have escaped no one. 406 Even the more modest 
ceremonial of the weekly court sessions at the Maison Royale bringing together maîtrise 
officers, gardes and offenders, would have contributed to the moral authority of the 
institution. Duly marking the hiérarchie visible between regardés and regardants 
described by Arlette Jouanna, 407 each of these aspects was part of the broad range of 
																																																								
403 Pecquet, Loix, I, 114. 
404  Guy Chaussinand-Nogaret, et al., Histoire des élites en France du XVIe au XXe siècle; 
l'honneur, le mérite, l'argent (Tallandier, 1991), 12. 
405 Some forestry uniforms have been reproduced in Annexe 4.  
406 A vivid contemporary description of an eighteenth-century wood auction can be read in Bernard 
Desjobert, Un grand maître des eaux et forêts du XVIIIe siècle (Paris, s.d., probably beginning 
nineteenth century). 
407 Arlette Jouanna, ‘Des ‘gros et gras’ aux ‘gens d'honneur’’, in: Chaussinand-Nogaret et al., 
Histoire des élites, pp. 17-141.  
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strategies, “from military force to subtleties of etiquette,” deployed by French monarchs in 
the day-to-day practice of power to uphold royal authority in the eyes of their subjects. 408 
 
In the daily reality of their professional service, however, these symbolic elements were no 
rampart against “la haine publique.” As protectors of public order, “ils ont le malheur de 
n’être établis que pour faire le mal, étant juges de rigueur.” 409 In a letter to the intendant 
des finances Louis Fagon, Quillan’s officers complained that “[l]a conduite que [...] nous 
sommes obligés de tenir pour remplir le devoir de nos charges nous rend odieux aux 
grands et aux petits quy habitent ces montagnes ou quy y pocedent des domaines.” 410 
Dealing with unruly members of the higher orders was a particularly difficult aspect of 
their duties. When they challenged the baron d’Escouloubre in 1677 for not complying 
with the regulations, he threatened them first with “jurements et blasphèmes, les menaçant 
de coups de baston et d’estrivières.” Accompanied by a group of ‘gentilshommes’, he then 
forcibly opened the maîtrise gaol to free a prisoner, “en telle sorte que lesdits officiers 
estoient non seulement sans authorité, mais mesme mesprisables et n’osoient s’entremetre 
d’aucune fonction.” 411 Calling on the maréchaussée was an expensive measure, which 
they used only in extreme situations. Faced with situations like these, the authority of 
maîtrise officers was fundamentally undermined by a crippling lack of effective 
enforcement powers to support the implementation of unpalatable measures.  
 
This delicate position was not helped by the fact that they belonged to an institution that 
had long struggled to establish its authority. As we have seen in chapter two above, the 
distinctiveness of forestry jurisdiction had been a thorn in the eye of rival jurisdictions and 
bodies like the Parlements or Etats, which included influential, forest-owning members of 
the first two orders. On the other hand, many of these institutional contests were 
increasingly fought in the courts, away from the public eye. A far more direct and effective 
way of undermining the institution was to defy the préséance rights of its officers, 
reflecting the perception of social order on the local scene. Order of precedence in 
processions, churches, or public assemblies was a closely watched display of relative 
authority and respectability. When Froidour inaugurated the new maîtrise of Saint-Girons 
in 1671, the seating plan was carefully monitored: “à droite et à gauche [of Froidour] les 
																																																								
408 Swann, Exile, 31. 
409 Quoted in Baudrillart, Traité, vol.1, xv. 
410 ADH, C1255, ‘Lettre des officiers de la maîtrise de Quillan à Monseigneur Fagon, 16 août 
1718’, pièce 21. 
411 ADAD, 63C5, f.69, ‘Procès-verbal de visite, 8 mars 1678’.	
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officiers desdites maîtrise et gruerie chacun selon le rang que lui donne son office, le juge 
et les consuls de ladite ville présents et assis sur un banc au dessous de nous.” 412 Forestry 
archives abound in préséance disputes. In 1708, the maître particulier of Saint-Pons 
deplored that “les offices des maistres particuliers sont fort avilis en ceste province où les 
juges royaux et les consuls des lieus des sièges des maistrises leur contestent et empêchent 
leur préséance aux droits honorifiques, dans les églises et assemblées publiques.” 413 In 
Quillan, the préséance of lieutenant Pierre Besset over the town’s juge baneret had to be 
continually re-affirmed by a string of arrêts du parlement. 414 In Rodez, a particularly long 
and acrimonious precedence dispute involving the Dalles, a dynasty of maîtres 
particuliers, ended in a humiliating public challenge to their noble status, and the 
temporary imprisonment of one of their members. 415 As Beik pointed out, the authority of 
these officers rested on feet of clay if not buttressed by the “intangible crédit based on 
custom and public approbation.” 416 
 
The lack of an adequate official response to ongoing challenges like these is indicative of 
the fundamental attitude of the forestry authorities. It suggests that, in the century-long 
tussle around royal intrusion into local and provincial affairs, officers of provincial 
maîtrises were considered disposable front line pawns. For sixteenth-century political 
theorist Charles Loyseau, Eaux et Forêts officers were not part of the ‘honourable’ 
magistracy “qui ont l’auctorité de commander,”[ ...] ”les seuls officiers dont la puissance 
est un esclat et influence de la puissance absolue du Prince”. 417 Two centuries later, a 
practitioner like Antoine Pecquet, grand-maître of Rouen, deplored that forestry officers 
suffered from a “mépris mal entendu que certains états supérieurs affectent de faire tomber 
sur les officiers des Eaux et Forêts.” 418 In the same way as the sovereign courts considered 
subaltern présidial officers with “un mépris peu charitable,” 419 the upper forestry circles 
refered to provincial agents as  “médiocres personnages”, not much more than “soliciteurs 
de procès.” 420  
																																																								
412 ADHG, 8B8, f.390r., quoted in Bartoli, ‘Louis de Froidour’, 24. 
413 AN, G7,1349, f.160, ‘Lettre de Sr.Royré, (10 oct. 1708)’. 
414 ADAD, 63C3, f.70v., ‘Extrait des Registres du Parlement (31 mars 1665)’. 
415 Raymond Granier, ‘Cinq générations de maîtres des Eaux et Forêts pyrénéens: les Dales, sieurs 
de Boisse (Tarn) 17-18e siècle,’ Revue de Comminges et des Pyrénées centrales, 1 (1981), pp. 79-
86, 85. 
416 Beik, Absolutism, 179. 
417 Nagle, ‘Officiers moyens’, paragraph 6. 
418 Quoted in Baudrillart, Traité général des Eaux et Forêts, vol.1, xvi. 
419 Pierre Goubert, ‘Les officiers royaux des présidiaux et bailliages dans la société française du 
XVIIe siècle’, XIIe siècle (1959), pp. 54-75, 57. 




In sum, officers of the maîtrises occupied an uncomfortable and ambivalent position in the 
post-Colbertian forestry system. They might derive some prestige and some financial 
sustenance from their office, but they could expect little moral and practical support, let 
alone promotion opportunities, from the system itself. By contrast, from a perspective 
outside the institution, longstanding ownership of a forestry office within one family added 
to the honourable status of these officers, who were well anchored in the municipal 
notability, and trusted members of the parish with a long history of service to the town. In 
the course of the eighteenth century, their investing in a lifestyle that brought them closer 
to ‘vivre noblement’ further enhanced this local support. For these modest officers, 
investing in that most desirable cultural model of the eighteenth-century urban 
bourgeoisies was an expensive option, which, crucially, tied them to the mercantile 




A distinguished town house, a court-of-arms, an estate of appreciable size, and above all a 
seigneurie name in the title, were  all basic components of the ‘vivre noblement’, for which 
a solid financial basis was the key. Out of the thirty-three individual officers who were 
active in the Quillan maîtrise between the 1650s and 1789, one-fifth crowned their family 
estate with a seigneurial title. While this title did not confer noble status per se, it was a 
conspicuous sign of local ‘honourability’ traditionally reserved for the second order. 
Emphasis on display and representation meant that acquiring one or more town houses was 
an investment priority, preferably along the grand’rue or facing the main square. In 
Quillan, the family home of procureur Pinet, seigneur de Brezilhou, adjoined a house 
belonging to the évêque d’Alet. The imposing façade of the Maison Roillet owned by the 
greffier’s family rivalled with two stately neighbouring houses of the influential Pinets. 421 
While on average ordinary town houses were valued at 200 to 400 livres in notarial sales 
contracts, the house included in the dowry of the greffier’s daughter was valued at 1,100 
livres. 422 This brings even more into relief the contrasting situation of the Rouzauds. With 
his “maison entièrement ruinée, à ciel ouvert” which he had purchased in 1709 for 100 
																																																								
421 Details from Marcel, Quillan, 460-462. 
422 ADAD, 3E13295, ‘Registre Notaire M.Roillet (26 déc. 1734)’.  
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livres, maître particulier Jean Rouzaud was unable to compete with his subaltern 
colleagues of the maîtrise. 423  
 
As a further marker in this quest, the royal edict of 1696, speculating on bourgeois pride, 
offered individuals, corporations and urban communities the opportunity to register their 
coat-of-arms (armoiries) against payment of a fee. As Table 16 confirms, nearly half of the 
twenty residents of Quillan who flocked to do so were officers of the maîtrise or close 
family members. Here again maître particulier Jean Rouzaud was conspicuously absent 
from the list. 424  
 
Table 16 Quillan: Registration of Armoiries (1695) 




423 ADAD, 3E,13291, ‘Registre Notaire M.Roillet (18 aout 1709)’. 
424 Charles-René, d'Hozier, Armorial général, vols. XIV and XV (1696). 
Table 8    Quillan: Registration of Armoiries (1695) 
(source: Hozier) 
 
Name Socio-professional category 
Bertrand, N. marchand bourgeois 
Besset, François lieutenant Eaux et Forêts 
Bonnet, N bourgeois 
Cachulet, Antoine garde-marteau Eaux et Forêts 
Captier, Germaine de veuve de N.de Mayreville, 
bourgeois 
Delbes, Gabriel bourgeois 
Donnat prêtre 
Jaubert, Guillaume juge châtellenie 
Laforge, N. de marchand, bourgeois 
Loubet, Etienne bourgeois 
Majourel  marchand, assesseur de maison 
de ville de Quillan 
Malleville, Jean-François procureur du roi Eaux et 
Forêts 
Mauleon, seigneur de Nebias noble  
Pinet, N. lieutenant châtellenie de Quillan 
Pinet, Pierre seigneur Laprade bourgeois, maire perpétuel 
Riquié, Aymé bourgeois 
Roillet, Michel notaire  
Roillet, Jean-Pierre marchand bourgeois 
Terrisse, Joseph bourgeois, assesseur ville Quillan 





The preceding survey has amply demonstrated that, in order to get a clearer picture of the 
social positioning and self-perception of office-holders at intermediate levels of the 
forestry hierarchy, their office cannot be studied in isolation. From the broader perspective 
of longterm career moves, it appears that it was just one string in their bow. While it 
confered them a degree of prestige and familial stability, it was financially unprofitable, 
left them feeling inadequately rewarded for their services, and kept them in a modest 
position within the hierarchy. As a result, their identity remained solidly associated with a 
formal and emotional attachment to their town, further consolidated by the quest for a 
conspicuous lifestyle based on astute use of familial resources. Caught between their 
superiors’ lack of support, popular hostility, and the competition for visible signs of 
material prosperity, maîtrise foresters opted for choices that warranted them immediate 
recognition and respectability. Forestry families combined their office with other options, 
such as paid service to the town’s overlord or voluntary involvement in municipal 
governance. Far from being antagonistic, these multiple allegiances were complementary 
and mutually beneficial. They represented a pragmatic response to the limited 
opportunities confered by their office.  
 
Most importantly, the consolidation of this nexus of royal and local assets relied on 
nurturing the networks of kinship, friendship or clientage that connected maîtrise officers 
to the most influential and economically dynamic segments of the local society. This 
strategy prioritised ties to local nobles and merchants. At the same time, and as will be 
expanded further in chapter four, these connections also impacted their official service in a 
way that suggests that, by mid-eighteenth century, there was no more sign of a more 
‘ethical’ approach to service guided by impersonal, rationally-determined rules of conduct, 




Quillan, a narrow social window 
 
To obtain a comprehensive picture of the foresters’ sphere of sociability, the examination 
of their relations with other leading residents of the town has been based on the assumption 
that these relations could be forged, maintained and strengthened by bonds of different 
nature and varying strength. First and foremost came matrimonial choices. By permanently 
associating two kinship groups, these choices are valuable indicators of these groups’ 
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perception of their social identity and position in the local society. At the next level was 
the wider circle of kinship introduced by the marriage partner. While it is impossible to 
speculate on the nature of these relationships, in the social microcosm of Quillan, it is 
reasonable to assume that at least some of these links had a bearing on the officer’s 
conduct and service. Also justifiable is the inclusion of associations with godparents, or 
with witnesses to important acts in their personal lives, as they represented conscious 
choices including an element of personal affinity and trust.  
 
These various forms of ‘relational events’ have been collected from a variety of forestry-
related sources, notarial, genealogical and judicial, and reproduced in Fig. 18. This chart 
distinguishes between the periods before and after 1715, and between two broad degrees of 
‘closeness’. The closest degree (in pink) refers to matrimonial choices of the officers and 
of their direct descendants. 425 The blue section accounts for looser forms of association 
like godparenting, the witnessing of marriages, wills, or actes d’émancipation, and links 
through various business operations outside the professional sphere. The chart also 
distinguishes between nine different social and occupational categories. Alongside the 
better-defined ‘legal’, ‘medical’ or ‘ecclesiastical’ categories, generic denominations like 
‘bourgeois’ and ‘noble’ reproduce the notations found in the sources. 426 Adding to the 
uncertainties deriving from the somewhat haphazard origin of the data, another margin of 
error is introduced by the fact that in certain cases, ‘bourgeois’ could stand for another 
category (such as ‘medical’ or ‘legal’). This listing of ‘relational events’ should therefore 
be read as indicative of certain trends rather than a statistical representation of forestry 
networks.  
 
The first observation deriving from this matrix is the foresters’ special affinity with the 
merchants, at matrimonial and other levels. Most of their ‘partners’ were wood merchants, 
or merchants holding a wood-related trade such as boxwood comb-maker (peigneur de 
buis). They provided more marriage partners than fellow foresters. While this might be a 
consequence of relative group sizes of merchants and officers, an element of voluntary 
choice cannot be excluded. The foresters’ relations with the nobility focused on 
																																																								
425 This naturally assumes that parents had a degree of control over their children’s choices of 
marriage partner. 
426 Here, ‘bourgeois’ is taken as the non-juridical status of the urban rentier, defined by Pierre 
Goubert as a “mode de vie plus qu’un statut.” (Pierre Goubert, Daniel Roche, Les Français et 
l’Ancien Régime (Paris, 1991) vol.1, 172). Here, bourgeois wealth is based on returns from land 
and buildings, and other non-commercial activities.  
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associations of a more distant nature. They were often called as witnesses for marriages, 
appeared as godparents, but were also frequent signatories in private financial deals.  
 
Fig.18          Quillan: 'Relational events' between major forestry families  
                       and other social and occupational categories, before and after 1715  




To accentuate the trends, all fourteen family lines, and the two levels of relational 
closeness, have been amalgamated and condensed into just one broad category. This 
provides us with total numbers of undifferentiated ‘relational events’ for each of the two 
periods, charted in Fig. 19.  
 
Fig. 17     Quillan: ‘Relational events’ between major forestry families and members 















































































Merchant II I II I I I II I I I III
Forestry I I I I I I
Bourgeois I I I II
Finance I I I
Legal I I I
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Finance I
Legal IIIIIII I I I I III
Nobility I II III II I II II I I
Medical III I I I I I







Fig.19   Quillan: 'Relational events' (combined) between  
                       forestry officers and other social and occupational groups,  




This exercise shows that merchants were the milieu of choice, well above fellow foresters 
or ‘bourgeois’. This correlates with the observation of Gabriel Pernet, the lead 
commissioner in Quillan’s second Réformation, who on his arrival in town in 1736 
observed that “il n’y a point de maisons [...] qui ne soient occupées par les officiers, leurs 
frères, beau-frères, oncles gendres, neveux et parents, ou par les marchands 
adjudicataires.” 427 Overall, these preferences suggest an acute awareness of a common 
social status, quite distinct from the more numerous groups of artisans or labourers 
identified in chapter two (Fig. 4). They confirm the perception that merchants belonged to 
the narrow circle of the town’s elites. Another observation from Fig. 19 concerns the 
increase, after 1715, of intra-forestry ‘relational events’, and an equivalent decrease of the 
‘bourgeois’ category. While the uncertainties of the method do not allow us to be 
conclusive, a broader investigation might determine whether this trend could be a sign of 
growing awareness of a distinctive professional identity.  
 
The strong connections of the forestry officers with merchant families and members of the 
local nobility highlighted in the chart are especially thoughtprovoking. They raise 
																																																								
427 ADH, C1255, f.222v., ‘Lettre Gabriel Pernet (23 octobre 1736)’. 
Fig. 18     Quillan: Total number of ‘relational events’ between foresters and other social and 





























































important questions about possible clientage, and its influence on their service. It will 
therefore be useful to consider these two connections in some detail.   
 
Officers and gentilshommes 
 
In 1697, intendant Basville counted 4,486 families of gentilshommes for the whole 
province, of which less than fifteen possessed revenues of 20,000 livres in rentes. 428 As 
Basville noted, “[La noblesse] n’est pas en ce Pays fort distinguée,” most of these petty 
nobles being “sans équipage, évitent toute occasion de dépense, & font profession d’une 
grande économie.” 429 Some families were of ancient nobility, like those of the Maison de 
Foix (marquis de Rabat), or the Montesquieu, Roquefeuil, Niort, or Polastron de la 
Hillière. Basville considered the Négrés (Nigry) as “une des meilleures [familles] de 
Languedoc.” 430 Ownership of forested estates brought some of these gentilshommes in 
frequent contact with the maîtrises. Court cases or other dealings with the Quillan maîtrise 
indicate that their forests were located within a radius of less than forty kilometres from the 
town. 
 
Local nobles also entertained personal relations with the maîtrise officers and their 
families because of their forestry affairs and regular residence in town during the winter 
months. In Quillan, inter-marriage was uncommon, and typically restricted to maître 
particulier circles. In 1721, Pierre Marsol married into the La Barthe, a noble military 
family of Mont Louis, and his two sisters married into the Negré and Niort families. Most 
maîtrise-noble exchanges occured in the form of financial transactions, godparenting or the 
witnessing of notarial acts. Mr. d’Ax de Cessales, seigneur de Cucugna and a seasonal 
resident of Quillan, was heard as a witness in one of the cases concerning Antoinette 
Pepratx, with whom he had business dealings. 431 In 1736, Marc-Antoine de Comignan 
witnessed the marriage of garde-marteau Jean-Antoine Loubet with the daughter of a 
prominent local wood merchant family, and in 1679, François d'Ax, seigneur de St Ferriol 
et Brezilhou (a small place three kilometers north of Quillan) witnessed the sale of the 
lieutenant office of Jean Besset to Guillaume Jaubert. 432 Interactions like these, in turn, 
facilitated real estate transactions: François d’Ax (son) sold the family seigneurie of 
																																																								
428 Basville, Mémoires, 123. Among nobles, 4,000 livres was considered the threshold to penury (la 
gêne).  
429 Ibid. 
430 Ibid., 109. 
431 ADH, C1255, ‘Information par addition, (mars 1738)’. 
432 ADAD, 3E7739, ‘Registre notaire B.Siau, (23 juillet 1679)’. 
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Brezilhou to procureur Pierre Pinet, and in 1754, d’Ax’ estate of Roquetaillade came into 
the hands of Pinet’s successor, procureur Louis Terrisse.  
 
Not all contacts were of an amicable nature. The records of the Table de Marbre are laced 
with legal contests between noble landowners and the maîtrises, some of which could 
acquire a sharp personal edge. In 1692, in one of the frequent boundary disputes opposing 
the maîtrise and the Baron d’Escouloubre, the lieutenant François Besset is labelled as the 
Baron’s “enemy mortel.” 433  Examining the behaviourial aspects of these provincial 
nobles, especially in seventeenth-century decades around the time of Colbert’s first 
Réformation, shines a particularly crude light on the reality behind relationships between 
the maîtrise and rural nobles. Charles Loyseau had already described, in no uncertain 
terms, their propensity for rogue conduct and disregard for royal authority. “L'insolence 
des menus gentilshommes des champs est si grande [...] qu'il n'y a moyen de vivre en repos 
avec eux [...] ; ce sont des animaux sauvages, des oyseaux de proye [...] qui vivent de la 
substance d'autruy.” 434 Until his death in 1677, the Jansenist bishop of Alet, Nicolas 
Pavillon, waged a relentless war against the customary violence and depravity of many 
gentilshommes in his diocèse. The combative bishop excommunicated a number of them 
“pour injustices manifestes,” which led to a coordinated cabal against him. It required the 
intervention of the king and the archbishop in Paris to calm things down.  
 
These cantankerous hobereaux showed little regard for the crown’s authority in matters of 
forestry, whose laws and rules they despised and openly flouted. Froidour’s encounters 
with the dame d’Escouloubre or the marquis de Rabat of the 1660s are eloquent in that 
respect. In one of several stormy exchanges between Froidour and the marquis, the latter 
refered to the authority of the intendants as “petits ordres auxquels il n’avoit point 
d’égard.” 435 Froidour understood the need to tread carefully. “[C]omme tous ces petits 
seigneurs estoient autant de tirans il falloit absolument pour se rédimer de leurs vexations 
partager son bien avec eux et les appeler en paréage pour en retirer quelque protection.” 436 
A frequent cause of friction was that many noble seigneuries adjoined the royal domain. In 
some cases a seigneurie could be co-owned, whereby justice rights were allocated to either 
co-owner, and the profits of the forests shared between them. Numerous paréage disputes 
																																																								
433 ADHG, 8B511, 4B4C, 2, ‘Dossiers de la Table de Marbre de Toulouse, Production contre le 
Sieur Baron d’Escouloubre, 1692’. 
434 Quoted in Jean Nagle, ‘Officiers « moyens » dans les enquêtes’, paragraph 10.   
435 Castéran, Les Pyrénées, 18. 
436 Id., 23. 
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arose from these arrangements, taking sometimes centuries to be settled. At times, noble 
forest owners took matters in their own hands, removing border stones, and using violence 
and intimidation “par les miquelets enrollés” to prevent the exploitation of a forest plot. 437 
In 1673, in a brazen snub to the maîtrise, the managers of Madame d’Axat’s forests chased 
off loggers harvesting a plot in a royal forest adjoining hers. In the early 1660s, Mr 
Coustaussa forcibly sequestered the grand-maître’s own lieutenant who had been sent to 
investigate a case of abusive annexation of parts of an adjoining royal forest. Similarly, it 
took a prolonged and forceful judicial intervention by the Réformation judges to remove 
Mr d’Escouloubre and Mr d’Axat from the crown forests they had unlawfully occupied. 438  
 
Defiance of royal authority did not prevent forest-owning nobles, especially their 
eighteenth-century descendants, from entering financial deals with the crown. The 
opportunities offered by increased royal demand for naval and construction wood were not 
lost on the marquis de Rabat who, after much initial sabre-rattling, settled with Froidour on 
an advantageous contract for one of his forests. 439 Exchanges like these were not restricted 
to higher officials. In Quillan, local nobles regularly struck private deals with maîtrise 
officers. In February 1697, Jean d’Esperonnat, seigneur de Saint Ferriol entrusted garde-
marteau Antoine Cachulet with collecting his seigneurial rights. In 1720, he acknowledged 
receipt of a debt owed him by the late father of Marc-Antoine de Comignan, seigneur de 
Dulhac. 440  
 
In the first decades of the eighteenth century, a certain appeasement in noble-maîtrise 
relations displaced the scathing exchanges from their forefathers. This trend contrasted 
with the unabated and often violent popular hostility against representatives of royal 
authority, gabelle collectors, forestry surveyors, or collectors of forestry fines. Noble forest 
owners focused on a more legalist form of defense against royal interventions. The bulk of 
litigation was of a civil rather than criminal nature, predominantly concerned with issues of 
title deeds or collaborating with the maîtrises to establish firm borders between adjoining 
forests. Rising numbers of compulsory pre-cut declarations by forest-owners of the two 
first orders in Languedoc indicate a more compliant attitude, 441 a trend also observed by 
																																																								
437 Id., 10-18. Also ADAD, 63c4, f.176-177v., ‘Froidour, Mémoire, 29 octobre 1676’. 
438 Roschach, Histoire générale, vol.XIV, 409-411. 
439 Castéran, Les Pyrénées, 50. 
440 ADAD, 3E13292, ‘Registre notaire M.Roillet, (février 1720)’.  
441 To increase control over navy-grade timber in private forests, the 1669 Ordonnance and several 
subsequent rulings requested that owners submit a déclaration de coupe six months before felling 
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Hamish Graham for neighbouring Guyenne. 442 One of these ‘compliant’ eighteenth-
century nobles was Marc-Antoine de Mauléon, whose father had been Froidour and bishop 
Pavillon’s nemesis. Personal proximity and ongoing interaction with the officers of the 
local maîtrises might have persuaded them of the benefit to be had by focusing on 
economic exchanges and collaborative relationships with the maîtrise. The financial affairs 
between the Cachulets and the d’Esperonnats, the Marsol marriages, but also the choice of 
a member of Négré family as Etat delegate for Quillan’s tiers, all demonstrate the broad 
and encompassing nature of this interconnection. Transcending the limits of ‘order’, these 
exchanges were rooted in  mutually-beneficial, overlapping common interests around the 
region’s forests and wood-related issues.  
 
Next to local nobles, the members of the officers’ network who had the highest stake in 
this nexus of interests were the wood merchants. They were in constant and close 
professional collaboration with the officers, but as the following analysis indicates 
however, by mid-eighteenth century, their relations with the royal institution had become 
complex and ambiguous. Their longstanding inclusion in forestry statutes suggests that 
they were a cooopted, non-office-holding professional group within the royal forestry 
system, which also endowed them with a measure of leverage over it. 
 
Wood commerce in Quillan 
 
Officers and wood merchants were both essential cogwheels of the forestry system. In 
maîtrise towns, they shared the same operational spaces – the town square, the auction 
room, the river port, the surrounding forests - and their families lived at close quarters from 
each other. They also shared a common embeddedness in what has been described as a 
‘forestry culture’. “Forestiers et marchands de bois sont ceux qui ont en commun une 
pratique, qui est plus [..] qu’un simple ensemble de techniques de coupe ou de transport, 
mais peut aller jusqu’à prendre la forme d’un véritable mode de vie: ceux qui sont capables 
d’apprécier l’état et la valeur d’un arbre, de négocier un contrat, de conditionner le 
matériau brut, d’en maîtriser le transport. Ils ont en commun des traditions, un language, 
																																																																																																																																																																							
this type of tree. See for example ADAD, 63C8bis, ‘Registre des insinuations (25 novembre 
1737)’. 
442 Graham, ‘Fleur de lys’ (2009), especially 324-327. 
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des habitudes professionnelles, l’acquit de la vie en forêt.” 443 What was the impact of this 
personal and professional promiscuity on the officers’ service to the crown and the forests 
as a bien public? 
The wood merchants were a key group for Quillan’s local economy. Whether as forestry 
entrepreneurs or more modest wood-based artisan-traders, whose names appeared 
regularly in adjudications registers, their success was based on the industrious exploitation 
of the forests, buttressed by an effective defense of their interests through the syndic de 
marchands et radeliers de Quillan et Esperaza. 444 Quillan’s wood merchants served a 
wide and varied market. Operating at the junction between the dense forests of the higher 
Aude basin and the lowland zone along the Mediterranean coast, they supplied the markets 
of Narbonne, Montpellier, and Marseille. They furnished strategic centres of production 
such as the textile manufactures of Carcassonne, the naval merchants of Agde and 
Marseille for the fabrication of oars and small masts, or again the mining and fortification 
works in the upper valleys like Mont Louis or Perpignan. 445  
 
Not all bidders who took part in a wood auction were what Froidour called “les vrais 
marchands.” A cursory glance at Quillan’s wood sales registers shows a small group of 
them regularly towering above a more numerous cohort of local artisans and ordinary 
residents. Small in numbers, this merchant elite was significant not only for the regional 
economy, but also for providing the bulk of the crown’s forest income. Less likely to 
default on payments, their participation in the yearly auctions compensated for the frequent 
financial losses due to insolvent or fugitive adjudicataires. Christian Fruhauf’s analysis of 
wood price evolution in the course of the eighteenth century suggests a fast widening gap 
between successful entrepreneurs and smaller bidders, leaving the bulk of wood commerce 
concentrated in few privileged hands. For the authorities, wood merchants were a 
particularly useful commercial agent, considered by Fruhauf, arguably, as “l’agent le plus 
compatible avec l’économie de marché qui se met progressivement en place.” 446 On the 
other hand, their conspicuous but high-risk financial flights could lead to equally 
spectacular collapses. As Jean Boissière noted for Burgundian Morvan, where the 
																																																								
443  Jean Boissière, ‘Forestiers et Marchands de bois du Morvan à Paris’, Revue Forestière 
Française, Numéro spécial (1980), pp. 180-189, 182. 
444 Esperaza, ten kilometers south of Quillan, was a centre of timber-raft building. 
445 See Poujade, Une société marchande, 88-94. Also Gilbert Larguier, Le drap et le grain en 
Languedoc. Narbonne et le Narbonnais. 1300 – 1789 (Perpignan, 1996).  
446 Fruhauf, Forêt et société, 195. 
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competition for the lucrative Parisian markets was fierce, “on voit tour à tour des 
marchands s’enrichir, et d’autres se ruiner.” 447  
 
High bidders like those of Quillan contributed to the general increase of wood prices. 
Between 1704 and the 1730s, average prices of fir on the Sault plateau were pushed up 
from two to six livres/tree, with spikes of ten livres and more. 448 As individual plots could 
sometimes cover several thousand trees, this could translate into a considerable surplus 
gain for the king. In Quillan, the special status of this group rested on a handful of 
longstanding wood merchant dynasties. Successful trading and strategic networking went 
hand in hand. Their preeminent status on the local scene was based on a high level of 
endogamy. Over time, merchant inter-marriage generated a powerful, close-knit caste of 
wood merchants, whose stellar-shaped networks were centred on names such as Amiel, 
Bertrand, Clerc, Espezel, Majourel or Pinet. These names also appeared regularly as the 
highest bidders in Quillan’s sales records. (Fig. 20)  449 
 
Fig.20            Quillan: Average annual investments by the most important 





447 Boissière, ‘La forêt des marchands’, 135. 
448 Fruhauf, Forêt et société, 66-67. For general price evolution, see ADAD, 63C, 32-37, ‘Registres 
des ventes et adjudications,’ covering the years 1679 to 1733.  
449 The dates following the names refer to their active participation in sales. 
Fig. 19     Average annual investments by the most important adjudicataires of 













The rise of the economic strength of this group of wood merchants can be illustrated by 
charting the number of adjudicataires bidding 500 livres and more at Quillan’s auctions 
between 1678 and 1734. (Fig. 21) 450 
 
Fig.21   Quillan: Number of ‘high bidders’ 




This chart clearly marks the watershed of the 1720s, coinciding with the general recovery 
after the end of the Louis-Quatorzian wars and the uncertainties of the Regency period, and 
the growing influence of Louis XV’s principal minister, Cardinal Fleury, who was a keen 
advocate of the kingdom’s naval and commercial interests. 451 At local scale, the surge of 
1723 also signalled the end of a crisis decade marked by a slump in sales during the war 
years, aggravated by the climatic extreme of the 1709-1710 winter. After 1715, the average 
number of ‘high bidders’ 452 per auction tripled, from 2.6 to 7.2. Scrutiny of the sales 
contracts reveals a particularly aggressive bidding process for the most promising items, 
which could take several days. This striking surge of investment volumes shows a buoyant 
mood and a great confidence in the market. It was also encouraged by the fateful decision 
by grand-maître Legras, back in 1685, to allow sales contracts to cover a number of 
consecutive years. These ‘adjudications perpétuelles’ were expedients intended to 
rationalise administrative processes and after-sales controls, securing by the same token a 
																																																								
450 Some years missing. 
451 Campbell, Power and Politics, 144. 
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Fig. 20   Evolution of the number of high bidders (above 500 livres) in Quillan  








regular revenue for the treasury. It was no coincidence that the officer who had coaxed 
grand-maître Claude Anceau to authorise this venture in Quillan, was procureur du roi 
Pierre Pinet Brezilhou, a cousin of Henri Pinet and a close member of that influential 
merchant family. 453 After a hesitant start, from 1715 this sales method became common 
practice throughout the Grande Maîtrise, until it was revoked again by the arrêt du Conseil 
of 29 May 1731.  
 
In Quillan, the exceptional sales year of 1723 shows merchant Henri Pinet Laprade 
pledging over 11,700 livres/year for the next ten years. Fierce competitive bidding had 
pushed Laprade to bring the unitary price up to 11 livres 14 sols 14 deniers, 454 which was 
more than double the average for that period, tree type and area. 455 The contracts against 
Laprade’s name represented 31% of the total sales figure for that year. We will see in 
chapter four the unforeseen consequences of Laprade’s bold initiative. 
 
Profits from wood trade were not the sole basis of the economic success of merchants like 
Laprade. Like the Pyrenean merchants studied by Poujade, wood merchants combined 
their trade specialism with a number of other profitable activities. They were involved in 
real estate, money lending, land rentals and gazaille. They also contracted various 
affermes, “celles du domaine de la ville, des revenus et rentes royaux et seigneuriaux et la 
levée des dîmes des gros décimateurs.” 456 The management of forges and mills was 
particularly sought after. In 1678, Guillaume Bertrand bought the farm of the forge 
belonging to dame d’Escouloubre. By 1700 he also managed the royal forge of Sainte 
Colombe. To operate these works, Bertrand used his labourer debtors who, having few 
liquid resources, repaid their debts by “working or carting iron.” 457 In the same way, 
Bertrand used debtors for his timber trade for the onerous overland carting of logs.  
 
There is ample evidence that these merchants handled substantial liquidities, following the 
general mercantile principle that “l’argent devait d’abord circuler, s’orienter vers le 
commerce et non pas se figer dans la terre.” 458 As the Réformation judge who prosecuted 
Etienne Espezel for suspected fraud in 1741 remarked, this merchant held most of his 
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wealth "en argent, billets, et peu de fonds de nature." 459 While they placed relatively 
modest amounts in governmental bonds such as that emitted in 1720, 460 in the absence of a 
more developed banking system, merchants and nobles acted as a source of credit for each 
other,  involving sometimes substantial sums. In 1713, a notaried document mentioned a 
debt of over 13,000 livres owed by mayor and wood merchant Jean-Pierre Pinet Laprade to 
noble Jean Rouger, seigneur de Carmain. 461 In 1681, Michel Pinet a manufacturer of 
boxwood combs and a regular high bidder at royal auctions, agreed to a debt repayment of 
5,000 livres owed by noblewoman Françoise de Saint Jean de Moussoulens, Dame 
d'Escouloubre, by way of harvesting 2,200 firs from her estate.462 For these business 
partners, trees were a safe currency. Most importantly, it was the same Michel Pinet who 
also advanced 1,121 livres for the construction of the new maîtrise building in the centre of 
town, the Maison Royale. Foresters too were caught in the merchants’ nets. 463  
 
In the same way as their forester partners, wood merchants invested their wealth in town 
houses, métairies, vineyards and mills, and they also participated in the rush to acquire 
seigneuries. When Jean-Pierre Pinet became “seigneur de Laprade” in the early 1690s, he 
soon had entire families of the village trapped in a most lucrative web of debtors. 464 
Furthermore, the forests included in the Laprade estate allowed Pinet to monopolise the 
supply of firewood for the textile manufactures of Carcassonne. By cumulating contracts in 
crown forests and those of private owners, these merchants also represented major 
employers for the surrounding villages. In 1719, one charcoal merchant who had acquired 
a parcel in the royal forest of Comus was thus able to raise, quasi-overnight, a task force of 
“one hundred villagers.” 465  
 
Forestry entrepreneurs, useful allies of the crown 
 
These wood merchants were not only important regional actors, they were also essential 
intermediaries for the commercialisation of royal forests. Their participation at the yearly 
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auctions was the cornerstone of their collaboration with the maîtrises. After the end of the 
sales event followed the actual exploitation phase, which could last up to two years. 
During this phase, they were legally responsible for any fraud or misdeed committed 
within that area. The exploitation of a plot was a complex and risky task, which central 
authorities were only too happy to delegate to skilled merchants who understood the arcane 
rules of auctioneering, masterminded the complex logistics of logging, transport and 
conditioning of timber, and accepted the financial and operational risks involved in all 
these operations. They were ‘forestry entrepreneurs’ engaging in high-profit-high-risk 
ventures, in the meaning of Hélène Vérin. 466 Together with other forestry professionals 
like the all-important sworn-in surveyor, wood merchants represented a coopted company 
of technicians, upon which the forestry system increasingly relied.  
 
In practice, the association between the wood merchants and the Eaux-et-Forêts was one 
of interdependence and mutual control at multiple levels. The journées and other rights of 
the officers were covered by the adjudicataires who paid the sol pour livre for each of 
their sales items. In return, any dispute arising from contracts, transactions, or associations 
between the merchants themselves or with others could only be treated through the Eaux-
et-Forêts courts, exclusively of any other jurisdiction. 467 Merchants could only start 
harvesting, and their timber rafts could only leave the port, after the loads had been 
checked and tagged by the officers. At the end of the exploitation period, merchants and 
officers worked together at the récollement, checking the sales registers against the tagging 
marks left on the stumps or logs in the forest plot.  
 
For the transport and distribution of wood products, merchants could rely on enabling 
legislation, in particular for urban provisioning - a politically sensitive issue – which drove 
the legislator to support the merchants even at the risk of antagonising others. They were 
mostly exempt of river tolls, and could use any land route they wished. 468 They had right 
of way through private land to cart their loads from the forests to the rivers, whereby they 
could use “streams, ponds and even castle moats, manor houses and residences of other 
individuals,” and drive through their forecourts and parks if necessary. 469 On floatable 
rivers, the owners of mills, sluices and weirs had to keep free passage for the rafts charged 
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with timber. Whilst some material damage was inevitable on these heavy operations, 
merchants enjoyed legal protection against excessive compensation claims.    
 
Wood merchants were also appreciated for their expertise and local knowledge. Some of 
them even achieved a certain degree of fame by advising the Bureau de la Ville in Paris in 
particularly complex cases. 470 In his efforts to improve the control over the illegal 
activities of sawmills in Languedoc, Froidour had already sought advice of “divers 
marchands et notamment Michel Pinet et Guillaume Bertrand.” 471 Sixty years later, the 
Conseil recommended that the commissioners commission local merchants for inspection 
visits, “les seuls capables de juger de ces matières.” 472 Their proposals for technical 
innovations were positively received, even encouraged. In 1678, Froidour consented to let 
Guillaume Bertrand experiment with timber floating on the Puylaurens River towards the 
Roussillon. This would open up forests, which had never been exploited because of 
transport difficulties. In return, Bertrand was exempted, outside the usual fees, of “tous 
autres frais et droits comme droits de foraine.“ 473 
 
Between the crown and the wood merchants as reliable and experienced agents for the 
exploitation of the forests, then, existed a definite convergence of interests. Scrutiny of the 
personal and professional links they forged with maîtrise officers, however, also reveals 
the darker side of this alliance. Merchants, well aware of their usefulness to the 
government, never lost sight of their own particular interest.  
 
Forestry entrepreneurs, ambiguous allies of the crown 
 
For this particular group, economic power and political influence went hand in hand. Out 
of sixty-two consuls of Quillan who could be identified between 1666 and 1741, eighteen 
(30 %) were wood merchants. This high percentage points to the special patronage of the 
archbishop, as he had control over the electoral lists. The political influence of wood 
merchants reached beyond the limits of the town. By dint of their trade, they could develop 
empowering connections with the elites of the whole region. Their connections with the 
local forest-owning nobility reached back many decades before the establishment of the 
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maîtrise, allowing relations of mutual trust to be consolidated. The seigneurs de Sainte 
Colombe, de Roquefort, the comtes de Pibrac, or their descendants, all entrusted the 
management of their forests to generations of Quillan merchants, notably the Pinets and 
Espezels. This particular connection also imparted them with some leverage over local 
forestry politics. In 1705, a group of nine dominant wood merchants of Esperaza, “excitez 
par plusieurs seigneurs qui possèdent des bois en l’étendue de la maîtrise de Quillan,” 
attempted to have toll fees on the river rescinded. The controversy drove other merchants 
to threaten the grand-maître with a boycott of auctions “s’il ne les assure qu’il empêcherait 
cette imposition.” 474  In the neighbouring maîtrise of Comminges, merchants had 
substantial trade interests because of their role in provisioning Toulouse. As grand-maître, 
Froidour deplored the “cabales séditieuses des marchands de Toulouse et des facteurs, 
commis et apprentis qu’ils tiennent dans la montagne pour y faire leurs achats,” which 
substantially weakened the authority of the maîtrise particulière. 475 After Froidour’s 
death, rulings intended to control merchant fraud fell rapidly into abeyance. Over-reliance 
on assertive merchant power also carried a risk for the legitimacy of royal policy and the 
king’s authority. 
 
In Quillan, their longstanding relations with the archbishopric of Narbonne also 
empowered the merchants. Michel Pinet, followed by Jean-Pierre Pinet Laprade in 1688 
and Etienne Espezel after 1720, were all fermiers principaux of the prelates managing their 
forests and collecting their seigneurial rights. These patronage contacts, in turn, helped 
their trade. 476 In 1697, Jean-Pierre Pinet Laprade was contracted by Cardinal de Bonzi to 
have 1,000 fir cut and transported from one of his forests. 477 High-level connections like 
these could at times morph into direct protection against maîtrise interference. After a brief 
spell in the maîtrise gaol for having supplied the army without the officers’ prior 
authorisation, the merchant Guillaume Bertrand went to Perpignan to put himself under the 
protection of de la Chaubruère, lieutenant général de l’artillerie de France en Languedoc, 
and of the duc de Noailles himself. 478  
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Finally, merchants also exploited the opportunities offered by the royal office, cumulating 
various offices in a coherent, calculated way. When the crown offered town mayorships in 
August 1692, Jean-Pierre Pinet acquired the office for Quillan, later adding the alternatif 
and mi-triennal. 479 Soon after, the family extended their reach directly inside the maîtrise 
by placing one of Michel Pinet’s sons, Pierre Pinet Brezilhou, into the seat of procureur du 
roi. From 1701, mayor Jean-Pierre Pinet increased his control of forestry politics by adding 
the newly created office of receveur particulier of the maîtrise. Matrimonial alliances with 
forestry families were a further facet of their strategy. In 1698, one Pinet daughter married 
garde-marteau Antoine Cachulet. This was a particularly judicious connection with a 
professional group operating at the critical junction between the maîtrise and the 
merchants. Later in the century, the only surviving daughter of procureur Louis Terrisse, 
Marie-Thérèse, married Jean-Pierre Espezel de Villar, son of wood merchant Etienne 
Espezel, member of the new robe nobility. His function as secrétaire du roi à la cour des 
aides in Bordeaux did not preclude his continuing association with the thriving wood trade 
business of the new leader of the Pinet clan in Quillan, Claude Pinet Lapinouse. 
 
Where the ascendancy of merchants over the forestry institution was most palpable was in 
the auction room. Like grain, wood as a commodity was highly sensitive to the general 
economic situation. In the offer-demand balance, grands-maîtres may well have had 
control over the offer, but the merchants ultimately determined the success of the auction. 
Sometimes, they had to be cajoled into bidding. In 1681, they refused to bid claiming a 
depressed market because of unfavorable weather conditions and high grain prices. On 
another occasion, pressed by requests that formally contravened the letter of the law, 
Froidour confessed his powerlessness: “tous les marchands furent sur le point de quitter 
l’Audience, & [...] pour les retenir & les obliger à enchérir, je fus contraint de leur accorder 
ce qu’ils demandoient.” 480 One century later, the grand-maître of Compiègne, Louis 
Desjobert, similarly conceded ground, faced with the same situation: “Pour donner aux 
marchands qui se présenteront toutes les facilités possibles, nous nous sommes départis 
nous-mêmes de toucher comptant, suivant l’usage, le sol par livre du prix principal pour 
les journées et vacations, de sorte que le marchand n’aura rien absolument à payer d’ici la 
St Jean Baptiste prochaine.” 481 With their “associations secrettes,” merchants could fix 
upper bid limits, a practice that no law was ever able to curb. Finally, and as will be more 
amply described in chapter four, the exploitation phase in the forests offered merchants 
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multiple and well-worn ways of eschewing controls. The sale by individual tree in fir 
forests which had to be conceded by Froidour left in practice the choice of trees to be 
harvested to the merchant, who, inevitably, chose “les plus gros et les plus beaux, ce qui 
dépeuple bientôt les forests.” 482  
 
From this survey of forestry networks focusing on their relations with local nobility and 
wood merchants, of a predominantly commercial, profit-oriented worldview, the forestry 
office emerges as an important, but subordinate, component of a broad range of strategies. 
In William Doyle’s triad of motives for acquiring an office - prestige, profit, and posterity - 
only posterity could be obtained through the forestry office alone. Prestige and profit were 




It will be useful to summarise the main outcomes of this long chapter. Their establishment 
in the 1670s as new office-holders in Quillan appeared particularly auspicious: the town’s 
longstanding tradition of wood business and pre-existing infrastructures as a raft-building 
river port held the promise of much forestry business, with substantial extra rewards such 
as journées and droits de passe. Initial valuations of these offices placed them in the lowest 
band of Languedoc’s elites, and calculations of their longterm profitability showed that 
after half a century, the return on invested capital dropped to less than 2 %. Inside the 
maîtrises, office values and gages levels suggested the preeminence of the maîtres 
particuliers, but a comparison of their fortunes with those of other officers inverted this 
ranking, which, in Quillan’s case, was most likely due to the non-residency of the family. 
This paradox is also connected to the dramatic change, after 1715, that affected the social 
status of the maîtrise head, moving from members of the old nobility to those of a rising 
small-town robe bourgeoisie. Overall, the pattern of office transmission showed a strong 
dynastic trend, with a small number of families monopolising the office until the 
Revolution, unless the flow was interrupted by the occasional but disruptive court case. 
Most forestry officers were linked to the judiciary. Those who left forestry of their own 
volition moved into the service of the archbishop, overlord of the town and président-né of 
the Etats. The general trend was to remain as close as possible to the town. With minimal 
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support from the upper echelons of the forestry hierarchy, the officers focused on 
consolidating their local anchorage, and nurturing relationships with members of forest-
owning nobles or successful wood traders, each driven by their own vested interests in the 
local forests.  
 
More generally, this chapter has brought into relief the eminently ambivalent position of 
the rank-and-file post-Colbertian forestry officer, caught between an unsupportive state 
hierarchy and the local, social and political, realities in which he operated. Modest 
incomes, limited promotion opportunities and low esteem for his professional status drove 
this royal agent to develop alternative strategies, which would help him maintain his place 
among a small-town bourgeoisie characterised by their education, comfortable wealth 
levels and conspicuous consumption. While this prosopographical survey might point to an 
uncomfortable situation for the officer, there was no sign of a growing discontent with the 
monarchy, perhaps in the way of présidial magistrates towards the end of the century. 
Disillusioned with the devalorisation of the présidial office, their company engaged into a 
desperate attempt at rehabilitation, leading to increasingly acrimonious exchanges with the 
government. 484 Foresters, on the other hand, did not benefit from a corporate structure, 
which could have supported a common defense of their interests.  
 
This lack of sense of a collective identity might have led forestry officers to rely on 
individual solutions, based on the resources offered by their direct local environment: a 
mix of judicious alliances with members of local social elites, honorary or paid municipal 
functions, and the royal office itself. In Quillan, it was the close connection of the foresters 
with a handful of successful legal and merchant families, which allowed them to overcome 
the limitations of their office. This argument helps to go beyond the classic crown-town 
dichotomy. In this interpretation, the ‘intrusion’ of royal structures into smaller towns 
(which also includes the occasional more forceful intervention such as a Réformation 
forestière) was not a predatory move, but a contribution to urban political stability. This 
assumption of harmonious integration of royal and local structures should however be 
counterbalanced by the factors of factionalism and strife it inevitably generates. In this 
sense, the history of early modern forestry administration offers much scope for future 
research in urban history. Analysis of forestry sources covering the last decades of the 
century would especially help to better understand the evolution of the relationship of 
France’s small towns with the monarchy on the eve of the Revolution.  
																																																								




The officers’ relationship with wood merchants is significant in another sense. The close, 
statutory collaboration of forestry agents with local commercial agents was a rational 
policy choice: it ensured optimal conditions for the management and control of the local 
forests, and a profitable and smooth sales process for the demesne. On the other hand, 
monarchical governments were aware of the inherent risk of collusion, administrative 
corruption, and negligent professional practice it entailed, but considered it as a tolerable 
compromise. When the threshold of tolerance was breached, they were forced to respond 
in a more forceful, publicly visible way. The nature of this response, the focus of our final 
chapter, confirms the notion of the fragile basis of royal authority in the provinces. 
Contrary however to a Manichean perception of outright ‘failure’ of Colbert’s reforms, it 
points to a decentralised and more supple approach to forestry, which might have been the 
best possible way for eighteenth-century governments to grapple with the systemic 





FORESTRY FRAUDSTERS AND THEIR JUDGES 
 
 
Having described the social and professional profiles of Quillan’s forestry officers, I will 
now turn to the reality and the limits of their administrative authority, in the context of the 
pervasive culture of fraud and professional malpractice in which they operated. To many 
contemporary observers and subsequent historians, forestry, fraud, negligence, and 
collusion seemed made for each other. Already in 1597 Sully had condemned “la 
négligence ou connivence d’aucuns de nos officiers, et effrénée licence et impunité 
d’aucuns de nos sujets,” [telles que] “nos forêts sont presque entièrement ruinées.” 485 For 
Charles Colbert de Croissy, commissioned by his brother Jean-Baptiste as commissaire de 
réformation, “[L]es officiers de la Table de Marbre du Palais à Paris [...] demeurent dans 
un assoupissement bien blâmable pendant que les officiers des provinces, sur lesquels 
lesdits de la Table de Marbre [...] devraient  veiller comme sur les plus grands ennemis des 
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forêts, les dégradent et les ruinent, la plupart n’ayant traité de leur charge que pour cette 
fin.” 486 In 1703, Louis de Bernage, intendant of Franche-Comté, complained that in the 
maîtrise of Gray there was not one officer “à qui on ne puisse reprocher peu d’habileté et 
beaucoup de négligence.” 487 At the start of Louis XVI’s reign, grand-maître Louis 
Desjobert expressed his dismay at the disputes, negligence and outright fraud he observed 
in the maîtrises of Compiègne. In one case, an officer had encouraged an ecclesiastic to 
fell timber without authorisation: “Coupez toujours, vous serez condamné à une amende, 
mais vous en aurez ensuite décharge.” 488 For Desjobert, the problem was universal. “[L]e 
mal est général, et il n’est pas de région qui n’en pâtisse.” 489 As evidence of professional 
incompetence or ambiguous relations with fraudulent local actors accumulated on the 
desks of the Parisian ministerial bureaux, the notion of ‘the venal-hence-corrupt’ forestry 
officer consolidated into an enduring trope.   
 
There is little doubt that, in practice, France’s forestry was steeped in a long tradition of 
flouting official regulations. For most historians, this was due to the officers’ exclusive 
focus on protecting their privileges and the profits from their office. Analysing this issue 
from the officer’s own perspective, however, provides a valuable corrective to what 
appears as a tentacular, foreordained and incurable phenomenon. Based on the particular 
case of Quillan, the following chapter will focus on practices of ordinary provincial 
officers, situated half-way between the ideal of the perfect Christian magistrate and the 
downright rogue “officier-larron.” 490  
 
If we consider corruption in forestry and official responses to it as one broad and 
interlinked system, two distinct scenarios can be identified: ordinary practice, and 
Réformation periods. Ordinary times were characterised by a ubiquitous culture of low-
level malpractice, fraud, and ‘minor’ infringements of the regulations, which usually 
involved some form of ‘arrangement’ between maîtrise officers with other forestry actors, 
village consuls, land owners, or wood merchants. It appears that this general situation was 
tacitly tolerated by the higher forestry authorities, the grands-maîtres and the Contrôle 
Général. This relatively stable, consensual state of affairs could come to an abrupt end, 
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however, when a certain threshold of tolerance was reached. At that point, the Contrôle 
intervened more forcefully by launching a special operation, a Réformation Forestière.  
 
The structure of this chapter reflects these two tiers of ordinary and Réformation 
conjuncture. After a survey of day-to-day practices, the focus will shift onto the 
Réformation of Quillan (1736 to 1745), centred on a small number of affairs and their 
intriguing ramifications. This part will reveal crucial asymmetries within forestry networks 
that go some way towards explaining the officers’ professional attitudes and behaviour. In 
the third subsection, the perspective will shift again to examine the responses of the 
forestry institution. ‘Forestry corruption’ will be analysed from the purview of the officials 
who presided over the Réformations. Scrutiny of a selection of judicial documents – an 
accusatory mémoire by a former officer, interim reports and final judgments of the 
Réformation commissioners – will allow us to reconstruct the various facets of an official 
narrative of ‘service discipline’.   
 
Rule-bending in daily practice 
 
A pragmatic approach to forestry rules 
 
Given the volume, complexity, and at times inconsistency, of the regulations included in 
the five hundred articles of the 1669 Ordonnance, and the countless subsequent rulings 
that amended and expanded them, it would not be unreasonable to assume that, in daily 
practice, some of them could be ignored or circumvented. On closer inspection, it appears 
that this attitude was rooted in a strong sense of pragmatism. In larger districts the statutory 
schedule of inspection visits could be unrealistic. As a result, “la plupart des maîtres 
particuliers et garde-marteaux ne font pas les visites générales ordonnées par 
l’Ordonnance du mois d’Aoust 1669, ou en dressent des procès-verbaux sans sortir de 
leurs maisons.” 491 Similarly unworkable was the obligation for the garde-marteau to 
perform his tagging operations only in the presence of two other officers. It would have 
been difficult for three officers to reconcile this fieldwork obligation with their other 
office-based tasks.  
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Furthermore, in close-knit social microcosms like Quillan where officers had been inter-
related for generations, the grand-maître used his discretionary powers to circumvent 
incompatibility rules regarding kinship bonds within a maîtrise, reiterated to no effect in 
successive ordinances. An equally lax attitude was apparent when it came to the exclusion 
of adjudicataires who were relatives of maîtrise officers, a precaution against price fixing 
already formulated in the Brunoy ordonnance of 1346. Here too, sales records testify that 
this exclusion rule was frequently by-passed to avoid jeopardising the sales. When the non-
observance of this clause was included as part of a prosecution case, the defense argument 
invoked the small number of merchants able to bid. “Monsr. de Froidour, [...] par necessité 
pour faire valoir lesd.ventes fut obligé d’admettre à icelles les parens des officiers, ce que 
Messieurs les Grands-Maistres ont fait du depuis.” 492  Based on this authoritative 
precedent, grand-maître Claude Anceau presiding the Quillan sales in 1723 authorised 
Claude Amiel, Henri Pinet Laprade and Estienne Espezel to use aliases, so that they could 
take part in the auction notwithstanding their parentage with some of the officers. This 
allowed these important bidders to push wood prices up, and the grand-maître to show 
good sales results. 493  
 
Another frequent source of non-compliance was the statutory prohibition of forestry 
officers to engage in trading activities, another clause on which successive rulings had 
insisted time and again without much effect. In the 1650s and 1660s, father and son Pierre 
and Antoine Cachulet were openly trading wood and operating a sawmill on the Aude, 
while serving as garde-marteau at the maîtrise. 494 The Réformation tribunal officially 
deposed Pierre Cachulet for this offense, but he continued to appear in the personnel rolls 
until his son took over in 1675. Sixty years later, the situation had not much changed. In 
1733, greffier Jean Roillet personally financed a two-man wood trading company 
organised by his son Jean-Pierre, who also acted as part-time greffier for the maîtrise. This 
evident breach of regulations did not seem to attract any negative attention. 495 Between 
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Connivance with merchants, a factor of stability 
 
Less benign was this porosity when it involved abuse of power and complicity with 
fraudulent merchants. The high degree of personal and professional promiscuity between 
officers and merchants has already been highlighted in chapter three. As they shared the 
same operational spaces, the two groups had much opportunity to use their respective, 
complementary and empowering assets to also engage in activities at the margins of 
legality. This more serious form of ‘administrative corruption’ has long been recognised by 
the crown. In his edict of 1597, Henri IV deplored the great abus committed in the royal 
forests by officers, who were “le plus souvent sous noms empruntez les vrais marchands 
ou leurs parens, amis et associez,...” 496 Similarly, the 1669 Ordonnance enjoined the 
grands-maîtres to verify whether “les Officiers des Maitrises ont remis, dissimulé, ou trop 
légèrement condamné les Marchands pour abus & malversations par eux commises.” 497 
The fact that practices like these could go on for decades unnoticed, once again, 
demonstrates that the legislative tool was of little effect for these ordinary cases. It took the 
Réformation of 1736 to identify them and declare them liable to prosecution. From these 
examples, we can deduce the existence of a vast grey zone of commonly accepted norms 
and unwritten conventions, based on the widely accepted general principle that, in forestry, 
practice could supersede law.  
 
This situation poses the question of the response of the regional grands-maîtres, the 
officers’ immediate superiors. The Ordonnance gave them clear disciplinary powers over 
non-compliant officers: “[P]rocèderont contre les Officiers qu’ils trouveront en faute, par 
informations, décrets, saisies & arrêts de leurs personnes & de leurs gages.” 498 In reality, 
serious disciplinary measures of that kind were relatively rare, especially if compared with 
the frequent actions of grands-maîtres concerning the gardes, who were under their direct 
jurisdiction, and could be revoked at will without any possibility of appeal. A cursory 
survey of maîtrise officer cases brought to the Table de Marbre of Toulouse between 1676 
and 1745 suggests that appeals to the higher courts regarding more serious officer 
misconduct were uncommon. Out of all the Quillan cases treated at that appeal court 
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between 1676 and 1736, only two involved forestry officers as defendants. 499 In 1678, 
lieutenant Jean Besset was fined and removed from office for multiple “prévarications,” 
including collusion with merchants and embezzlement. 500 Half a century later, for the 
same charges, maître particulier Louis Rouzaud suffered a similar fate.  
 
As Jean-Claude Waquet pointed out, grand-maître involvement with contentious matters 
of the maîtrises was a delicate affair. It had the uncanny potential to lead to unintended, 
far-reaching consequences. Appeals against decisions of the grand-maître might reach the 
Parlement via the Table de Marbre, two institutions with notoriously little Eaux-et-Forêts 
sympathies. Furthermore, pronouncing a suspension from office was to be carefully 
considered, as the grand-maître could not always rely on support from the Conseil. When 
the grand-maître of Alençon attempted to remove the maître particulier of Domfront, who 
was also bailli of Alençon and former lieutenant des maréchaux, the Conseil turned 
against him and demanded a repayment of 10,000 livres damage and interest. 501 
Conversely, maîtrise officers tried to avoid intervention by their superior, so that many 
conflicts (such as the dispute described in the opening example) never left the four walls of 
the maîtrise. In Toulouse, when the grand-maître toured the maîtrises to preside over their 
auctions, he appeared more focused on that activity and routine bureaucratic work than on 
checking the registers for potential irregularities. In Senlis, the otherwise diligent grand-
maître decided to cancel an inspection visit to a particularly quarrel-ridden maîtrise, 
arguing that he would have “trop d’embarras avec des gens si peu unis entre eux.” 502  
 
The responses of the grands-maîtres faced with cases of officers at fault are also revealing 
in another, more immediate way. Weighing into their decision whether or not to engage 
into a formal procedure against an officer was also the prospect of boosting the fine budget 
of the Grande Maîtrise. Disciplinary cases represented an opportunity for additional 
revenue, but it had to be a calculated risk. In the Besset and Rouzaud cases cited above, the 
fines (together with the additional costs of the procedure which could be enormous) were 
secured by personal property or by the office. Jean Besset, one of four siblings, had his 
share of the family estate, together with the rights associated with his office, immediately 
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seized as a security. 503 The proceeds of the family office which Antoinette Pepratx had 
sold to Pierre Marsol in 1734 had been frozen, which secured payment of her large fine of 
1744. Without her office, the widow would most probably have been insolvent, incurring a 
net loss for the crown.  
 
Also revealing is the personal context in which these two cases occurred. While the formal 
charges were of a professional nature, both affairs were deeply tangled up in acute personal 
crises. Both hinted at the existence of familial strife, aggravated by the grand-maître’s 
personal bias. In 1678, lieutenant Jean Besset had been denounced by his brother François 
because of his liaison with a “femme de mauvaise vie” from Montpellier, whom he wanted 
to marry against the wishes of his family. His brother-in-law Aymé Riquier, whom he 
called his ‘mortal enemy’, was receveur general in Toulouse and a protégé of grand-
maître Froidour. The latter, siding with François Besset, included these damaging personal 
details as part of his official report. 504  Similarly, Louis Rouzaud alleged that his 
prosecution and dismissal in 1732 had been caused by a personal grudge against him and 
his family by procureur du roi Louis Terrisse. During his four-year stint as maître 
particulier of Quillan, he had committed a number of “prévarications” in league with his 
maternal uncle Bernard Pepratx. When Terrisse alerted the grand-maître to the pair’s 
fraudulent undertakings, he sentenced Rouzaud to a fine of 4,000 livres to the crown, and 
to sell the family office. For his part in the fraud, Bernard Pepratx was fined 9,000 livres. 
505 For Louis Rouzaud, his mother, and the whole Rouzaud-Pepratx family, this sentence 
was as much a financial disaster as a public humiliation. Vowing vengeance, the family 
launched a denunciation campaign against the officers and the grand-maître. Bernard 
Pepratx went to Paris in the hope of overturning the sentence, bearing a series of 
accusatory letters and mémoires compiled by his nephew. Not only was he unsuccessful, 
but his initiative alerted the Conseil to the “abus considérables” which had bedevilled the 
functioning of the Quillan unit since the death of Jean Rouzaud in 1719.  
 
During the three years following Rouzaud’s sentence, the affair escalated into an 
acrimonious, public exchange of personal and legal threats. After the procureur du roi 
Louis Terrisse lodged a formal complaint to the grand-maître because of “injure et 
diffamations contre eux tous [officers] par le sieur Rouzeaud,” the subsequent testimony of 
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eleven witnesses confirmed the tensions and high emotional charge that surrounded this 
affair. One of them testified that Louis Rouzaud had publicly insulted the grand-maître 
and his secretary Thimotée Boulanger, whom he called his “âme damnée.” In exchange for 
certain “complaisances et [...] prévarications au profit dudit archevêque [of Narbonne] et à 
l’occasion des forêts qu’il a limitrophes de celles du roi,” Boulanger had, allegedly, 
received “la députation du pays de Razès aux Etats de la province du Languedoc et une 
bourse de jetons valant 800 livres.” 506 Here we find echoes of the tentacular web of 
relations which linked higher forestry officers to influential, forest-owning dignitaries, 
magnified by public rumour and personal spite. 507 After three years of strife compounded 
by Rouzaud’s accusatory mémoires to the contrôleur général, on 29 May 1736 the Conseil 
took the decisive step of launching a wholesale Réformation in that maîtrise. Interestingly, 
the trigger for this decision had not been an official inquiry or some other formal 
procedure, but the actions of a disgruntled private individual who had left the institution in 
disgrace. According to a commonly-held perception, also shared by the commissioners, 
“c’est le sieur Rousaud cydevant maître particulier de cette maîtrise et le Sieur Pepratx du 
lieu de Caudiès son oncle quy sont les autheurs de tous ces mémoires quy ont donné lieu à 
la Refformation.” 508   
 
Fundamentally, this example demonstrates the potential for personal and emotional factors, 
situated at the micro-historical level of an individual family, to destabilise the whole 
system, and trigger an operation, which could affect anyone, including the grand-maître. 
As the commissioners started sifting through the registers, grand-maître Claude Anceau 
felt the need to preempt accusations and consolidate his own position. In one long 
mémoire, he justified his conduct on the grounds of age and ill-health, due to his earlier 
military career. 509  Crucially, he also used personal details to discredit Rouzaud, 
highlighting the “attitude escandaleuse” of this maître particulier “qui ne songea plus qu’à 
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des habits, qu’au jeu, à des maistresses.” 510 By the 1730s, the combination of formal 
business and personal factors was still a powerful driver of official forestry politics.  
 
In sum, what emerges from this survey is very much at odds with official rhetoric, 
purporting to establish a rigorous “bonne police” of forestry practice. It can be argued that 
the apparent inability of the central authorities to curb entrenched practices in day-to-day 
forestry work masked in fact an unwillingness to do so, because it ultimately suited them. 
Case studies from other parts of the country’s justice system suggest the existence of a 
similar rationale. In his example of two eighteenth-century prévôts from Lorraine, Hervé 
Piant observed the reticence of the higher judiciary to respond and sanction their 
misconduct appropriately. 511 Piant explained this hesitancy in terms of the esprit de corps 
that bound the judicial system together, and the need to avoid inflicting moral damage 
upon the whole institution. “[R]econnaître par un procès voire une sanction publics qu’il 
existe des juges malhonnêtes, c’est éclabousser l’ensemble du corps.” 512 In my sources 
however, I have not come across any indication that grands-maîtres were much moved by 
such generous Eaux-et-Forêts solidarity. From their perspective, the benefits to be had 
from tolerating regular minor infringements of the rules were of a less ideological nature. 
Their cautious approach to minor acts of non-compliance safeguarded the smooth 
functioning of the maîtrise, while currying favour among a useful merchant clientèle which 
ensured that a steady revenue from the royal forests trickled into the crown’s coffers. 
Higher up the line of command, the rarity of Conseil involvement with cases at the lower 
end of the hierarchy suggests a desire to leave them at the discretion of the regional grand-
maître. Fundamentally, this disconnection between the central and the regional decision-
making spheres kept most low-priority, ordinary affairs contained within the confines of 
the province. It left maîtrise officers with a large autonomy in the day-to-day conduct of 
forestry affairs, while grands-maîtres could choose to ignore minor breaches of the law. If 
they decided to get involved, the procedures they followed could be tainted by a certain 
degree of arbitrariness, personal affinity and partisanship on their part.  
 
This convenient, consensual situation could end abruptly, however, when a certain 
threshold was reached, and the interests and authority of the king were too openly defied. 
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This situation demanded that the Conseil respond in a cogent and noticeable way, calling 
for a Réformation Forestière.  
 
Crossing the threshold: Réformations Forestières 
 
A multi-faceted operation 
 
Already documented for the fourteenth century, Réformations Forestières were seen as 
“manifestations d’énergie qui venaient de temps à autre secouer l’apathie ou la négligence 
de l’administration, les égoïsmes locaux et les prétentions seigneuriales. ” 513  They 
punctuated the cyclical schema observed throughout the long history of forestry: financial 
demands arising from war led to the proliferation of offices; the resulting mismanagement 
and fraud led to forest degradation and high wood prices; this perceived “wood crisis” 
induced governments to launch a Réformation Forestière, review legislation, and reduce 
office numbers, until a new conflict spun the wheel again. 514 
 
After Colbert’s national operation of the 1660s, Réformations Forestières continued to 
appear sporadically right until the 1780s, with varying emphasis on either penal or 
technical aspects. Without claiming to be exhaustive, Waquet listed some of these 
secondary operations between 1686 and 1788, bringing them into a wider context. 515 After 
Colbert’s momentous Réformation activity followed a period of quiet, coinciding with the 
difficult circumstances of the second half of Louis XIV’s reign. The Regency initiated a 
new spate of Réformations (Quillan among them) in several provinces. Some of these early 
eighteenth-century operations could be large in scale, as those carried out in Bourgogne or 
in the Lyonnais. Between 1745 and the advent of Louis XVI in 1775, governmental focus 
was diverted towards more important matters, religious strife, wars, and economic reforms. 
A final flurry of Réformations occurred in the final years before the Revolution, against the 
backdrop of a particularly high-profile forestry scandal, the Guyon de Frémont affair, 
grand-maître of Caen. As outlined in chapter one, scholarly attention has narrowly focused 
on Colbert’s Grandes Réformations because of their ambitious scope, and immediate 
success, but it disregarded these less conspicuous, smaller-scale interventions. Analysing 
the judicial facet of one of these operations of the 1730s, as is proposed in this chapter, 
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aims to redress this bias, and provide new insights into the underlying strategies and 
political motives of Fleury’s government in its response to malpractice in the forestry 
service.    
 
Réformations Forestières were a multi-faceted set of operations, aimed at refurbishing 
parts of the monarchical administration that had evidently fallen in disarray. They could 
range from a modest operation covering a single forest or one specific object like forges or 
rivers, all the way to Colbert’s nationwide, twenty-year long enterprise. They addressed a 
wide range of administrative and technical issues, but always included a judicial 
component, aimed at identifying and prosecuting all “auteurs, complices & adherans“ of 
present and past misdeeds. 516 In general, Réformations followed four major operational 
lines, the first three occurring in succession: a comprehensive audit of the maîtrise’s past 
administration, a physical survey of all royal and communal forests in the district, followed 
by elaborating a new prescriptive set of management plans. The judicial leg of the mission 
ran along this general agenda because a Réformation was also a tribunal d’exception. In 
their capacity as judges, the commissaires de Réformation pursued as many cases as 
possible of non-compliance with forest law. This included all users and owners of the 
forests in the district regardless of their ‘qualité’, the merchants, and the forestry officers 
themselves, including the grand-maître. The operation ceased after all final judgements 
had been pronounced, new ordonnances issued, and final reports sent to the maîtrise, the 
regional Table de Marbre, and the Contrôle Général. This final step formally established a 
new prescriptive framework for the forthcoming management of all the forests and 
waterways in the district.  
 
Directing these various operations was a specially appointed, well-remunerated head 
commissioner, equipped with wide executive powers and superior jurisdiction. 517 He was 
in principle directly answerable to the contrôleur général, but his main interlocutor was the 
intendant des finances with the “Forêts” in his portfolio. The lead commissioner, usually a 
regional intendant, was helped by a small group of handpicked, subdelegated legal 
professionals from nearby courts. The regional grand-maître could also be involved if 
approved by the contrôleur général. These commissaires de Réformation had wide-ranging 
powers. They had free rein to instruct and prosecute all forms of “abus, délits et 
																																																								
516 ADH, C1255, f.93, ‘Arrest du Conseil d’Estat du Roy 29 May 1736 qui ordonne la Réformation 
des Bois de la Maitrise de Quillan’.  
517  A lead commissioner could receive over 6,000 livres for six months (this included his 
secretary’s wage).  
	
	 193	
malversations” perpetrated by either “officiers; [...] marchands; [...] délinquants; et [...] 
usagers ou coustumiers.” 518 Their reach extended across all social categories of forest 
users and owners, regardless of social status. Their judgments were final, with all other 
courts or judges expressly prohibited from intervening. Crucially, under a Réformation, 
which legally derived from a commission by the conseil, appeals were all evoked directly 
to it. This allowed the judges to by-pass the all too familiar obstruction and dilatory 
chicanes of the sovereign courts.  
 
The commissioners had the power to rule over matters that were vital to the livelihoods of 
individuals and communities, such as access and customary rights in royal forests, and they 
resolved paréage and boundary disputes with influential private owners. On the local and 
regional scene, the arrival of the team of commissioners signified therefore an abrupt 
disturbance of ordinary routines. Potentially, their actions and decisions could affect 
almost anyone in the district. In the Pyrenean region imbued with a fierce sense of 
autonomy and opposition to interventions from the political centre, a Réformation could be 
a threat to social peace. Expensive and potentially destabilising, these operations could not 
be initiated lightly. Their launch signalled that a point of rupture had been reached. It 
indicated that the management and control of the forests could no longer be entrusted to 
dishonest, irresponsible officers of a local maîtrise, and that the leadership qualities of the 
regional grand-maître were open to doubt. The purge of the forestry personnel, then, was a 
crucial part of the Réformation. In Froidour’s words, “[L]a fin principalle de la 
Réformation estant de restablir les forests, ce seroit pescher contre la prudence et bonne 
oeconomie d’en confier davantage la conservation à des mauvais officiers, pourquoy son 
application principalle sera de faire la distinction des bons d’avec ceux qu’il jugera 
incapables de servir, lesquels il privera de leurs charges, les interdira où obligera d’en 
disposer dans un temps lequel passé le Roy y pourvoira.” 519 In this sense, Quillan was a 
case in point. 
 
Quillan’s second Réformation 
 
Sixty-five years after the maîtrise particulière of Quillan was formally established as part 
of Colbert’s forestry reforms, contrôleur général Orry responded to alarming reports of 
serious dysfunctions in that maîtrise by ordering a second intervention in that small, forest-
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rich Pyrenean district. 520 This intervention occurred during the active years of Louis XV’s 
cardinal-minister Fleury, whose Languedocian origins and special interest for commerce 
might suggest that he had also a particular interest in the region’s affairs. 521 Operations on 
the ground were to be overseen by the Languedoc intendant, Louis-Basile Bernage de 
Saint Maurice, committed as principal commissioner, under the aegis of Taschereau de 
Baudry, since 1722 the intendant des finances responsible for ‘domaines et bois’. The all-
important function of procureur de Réformation was allocated to Gabriel Pernet, a 
northerner, procureur du roi of the maîtrise particulière of Reims. 522 Jean de Rouquet, 
avocat au parlement in Toulouse, was committed as Bernage’s direct subdélégué. 523  
 
Another avocat at the Toulouse Parlement, Jean-Louis Anceau de Lavelanet, was also 
called upon. 524 He was the son and heir to the office of grand-maître Claude Anceau, 
seigneur de Lavelanet, who had held the Toulouse office for thirty-seven years. 525 One 
short year after he received his lettres de provision (dated 26 July 1737), an arrêt du 
Conseil, “le Roy Sa Majesté y étant,” ratified Jean-Louis Anceau’s appointment as 
subdelegate to Bernage. 526 The authorities had no objection to including the son of a 
grand-maître who was potentially implicated in the cases the commissioners would have 
to treat. De Bernage argued that “[L]e principal objet de la Réformation concernant 
l’avenir, le fils poura toujours s’abstenir dans la recherche du passé des affaires 
particulières dans lesquelles son père se trouveroit personellement interessé.” 527 For 
judgments on more important cases, outside lawyers were called upon. the judgment of 25 
May 1739 against the officers implicated in the Laprade case (detailed below), de Bernage 
was assisted by six lawyers of Montpellier, the president and juge-mage of the Montpellier 
sénéchaussée, its lieutenants principal and particulier, and three avocats. 528 When Gabriel 
Pernet died in office in 1740, he was replaced as procureur de Réformation by Jean-Pierre 
Pitot, the garde-marteau of the maîtrise particulière of Montpellier, who had demonstrated 
much zeal and professional qualities as an accessory subdelegate. In 1743, Bernage was 
called to the post of prevost des marchands of Paris and was replaced as lead 
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commissioner by his successor at the intendance post, Jean Le Nain d’Asfeld. The Quillan 
operation was terminated under his watch.  
 
When the commission started work in summer 1736, their initial source of information was 
Louis Rouzaud’s mémoires and denunciations. For all their vagueness, personal aspects 
and emotional bias, these documents are also a precious source for our study. They allow 
us to create a crude typology of official misconduct in the service of the king for the early 
part of the reign of Louis XV. By his frequent allusions to officer-merchant complicity, 
Rouzaud raises the important question of the official response to that particular form of 
professional misdemeanour. Would the commissioners respond firmly by applying the 
strictures of the law, or err on the side of leniency and go along with what was considered 
as the inevitable collateral damage of coopting merchants in day-to-day forestry business? 
To give this question some depth, it will be illustrated by the ‘Laprade case’, one well-
documented and particularly revealing example of connivance between unequal partners.  
 
The Laprade case 
 
The ‘Laprade case’ was a multi-layered, convoluted affair, which occupied the 
commissioners - and the public - for the best part of the decade after the start of the Quillan 
Réformation. 529 It was sparked by a relatively minor instance of connivance between some 
of the officers of the maîtrise and one dominant wood merchant, Henri Pinet de Laprade, 
whose activities have been described above. 530 At the grandes adjudications of 1723, 
Laprade had accumulated five separate multi-year bids, pledging in total 129,673 livres, 
payable in equal portions over the following ten years. His largest contract included the 
exploitation of 7,000 firs to be cut in the Gravas forest located in the remote Madrès 
Mountains.  
 
In 1728, halfway through this merchant’s contract, the maîtrise acquired a new maître 
particulier (Louis Rouzaud), a new procureur du roi, Louis Terrisse, and a new garde-
marteau, Jean-Antoine Loubet. In October 1728, during one of their routine inspections, 
these officers also travelled to the Gravas forest with the maîtrise’s tagging hammer to 
authorise Laprade’s allocated cuts for that year. The operation however produced a total 
count of 1,200 trees, which represented 589 in excess of Laprade’s quota that year. The 
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merchant protested his innocence, claiming that half of the trees were top-ends mistakenly 
taken for individual trees. When the commissioners took hold of this particular affair in 
1736, they treated it as a matter of some importance because Rouzaud’s mémoire had 
hinted at the fact that certain registers had been tampered with, a serious offense by all 
accounts. The register listing all martelages was normally compiled by the greffier, on the 
basis of the garde-marteau’s report. For the year 1728, it showed a figure of 611 trees 
against Laprade’s name, which ‘corrected’ the original count of 1,200 trees. This 
inconsistency was interpreted by the procureur as intentional, a “diminution réfléchie et 
méditée [...] d’intelligence avec l’adjudicataire” [...] “pour favoriser l’adjudicataire au 
préjudice des intérêts du Roy.” 531 Time worked against the investigators’ search for 
physical evidence of the fraud itself, as with passing years most martelage marks on logs 
and stumps had faded away or were covered by vegetation. The alleged falsification of the 
register, however, had opened Pandora’s box. Painstaking scrutiny of the registers revealed 
that, year after year, the officers had authorised more trees than allocated in merchants’ 
contracts.  
 
The commissioners’ inquiries took a new turn after they found evidence that, some time 
after the falsification affair of 1728, the cabinet housing the official documents and 
registers in one room of the maîtrise building - which was also Rouzaud’s family home - 
had been forced open, and some documents removed. The remainder had been gathered up 
and stored in a locked chest kept at the greffier’s home. The garde-marteau’s original 
martelage register of 1728 was not among them. After their first hearings of 1737, the 
commissioners spent the following six years attempting to establish the respective 
responsibilities of the four officers deemed most implicated in this affair: former maître 
particulier Louis Rouzaud, garde-marteau Jean-Antoine Loubet, procureur du roi Louis 
Terrisse. They also included greffier Jean Roillet who had accompanied the officers in the 
Gravas forest and was responsible for keeping the registers in order. The three main 
charges pending against these officers included collusion with a merchant, abusive use of 
the forestry hammer, and falsification of an official document. When the new set of judges 
and experts arrived on the scene in 1741 after Pernet’s death in office, they overturned the 
results reached so far, and started procedures anew. They multiplied witness hearings, 
confrontations, and expensive technical expertises, all of which prolonged the legal 
embarrassment of the four officer defendants until final sentence was reached in 1744. 532  
																																																								
531 ADH, C1257, ‘Interrogatoire Roillet, 17 avril 1744’.  




Meanwhile, Henri Pinet Laprade, the merchant whose comparatively minor fraud had been 
the original trigger of this convoluted case, was in trouble too. By 1733, the last year of his 
ambitious ten-year contract, he had only been able to exploit half of it, and accumulated 
substantial payment arrears, suggesting that he had badly misjudged the market. One of 
Laprade’s creditors, Sr de Chirac, capitoul of Toulouse, requested that parts of his estate be 
seized in sequester. 533 Facing insolvency, he sent his nephew – none other than garde-
marteau Jean-Antoine Loubet – to Paris with a plea for moderation for these arrears, and 
full release from the remaining, still standing, portion of his contract. This case of 
insolvency also involved the responsibility of the treasurers. Jean-Antoine Cachoulet, the 
receveur particulier of the Quillan maîtrise, had omitted to request sufficient caution 
money from the merchant, which was a serious mistake, given the amounts involved. 
Laprade’s request was at first turned down, but a compromise solution was reached after 
Laprade made a lumpsum payment of 55,549 livres. The Conseil, “par grâce et sans tirer à 
conséquence,” freed Laprade from the part of his contract which had not yet been marked 
as ‘authorised’ by the officers, and reduced payment for the trees already marked to his 
name to 24,000 livres. This amount was to be shared “solidairement” between Laprade, all 
the involved officers (or their heirs), and the receveur particulier. 534 Assuming an equal 
share, Laprade’s final payment was thus reduced to just 6,000 livres.   
 
To complement this account and provide the personal and social context in which the affair 
unfolded, it will be useful to include some relevant biographical details regarding the 
denunciator, Louis Rouzaud, and his mother Antoinette Pepratx, the legal owner of the 




When maître particulier Jean Rouzaud died in 1719, his widow Antoinette Pepratx, aged 
forty-one, was charged with nine children under the age of eighteen. As noted in the 
preceding chapter, the returns from the family office she inherited were hardly sufficient to 
sustain the lifestyle expected from a member of the town elite. During the minority of her 
eldest son Louis, her brother-in-law Joseph Rouzaud Mourency was acting maître 
particulier from his home in Lavelanet, while she remained living gratuitously in the 
																																																								
533 ADHG, 8B507, n.p., ‘Procès-verbal de Jacques de Peyre, president et juge-mage au présidial de 
Limoux, 25 septembre 1734’.  
534 ADH, C1257, pièce158, 7, ‘Extrait des registres du Conseil d’Etat, 12 avril 1740’.  
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Maison Royale with her family. With the help of her younger brother Bernard Pepratx, 
Antoinette soon turned to fraud and wood theft. 535  She was supported in all her 
endeavours, legal and illegal, by a disparate group of allies, including a local noble, Mr de 
Cessales, various forest wardens and loggers of surrounding villages, the fermier of a 
sawmill on the Aude, as well as Quillan’s apothecary, Louis Rouch. One of the cases 
picked up by the commissioners also mentioned a fruitful association with Etienne 
Espezel, a prominent wood merchant rival of the Pinet clan. 536 As official séquestre, 
Espezel had stored the bois de délit found on the widow’s premises in his yard. Some years 
later, any mention of the stolen wood had vanished from the registers, and the merchant 
sold it for the benefit of the widow - and no doubt also his own.  
  
More unexpected and thoughtprovoking than these ordinary instances of connivance and 
fraud was the undeniable personal leverage that Antoinette Pepratx, despite her precarious 
financial situation, was able to exert on the officers of the maîtrise and former colleagues 
of her late husband. This emerged from the hearings conducted by the commissioners in 
1737. One of them refered to the incident of 1721 described at the start of chapter one, 
which unfolded after the then lieutenant André Boire and procureur Pinet Brezilhou had 
discovered a suspicious timber load at the Quillan port, finding no merchant countermark 
besides the tag from the garde-marteau’s royal seal. When they challenged garde-marteau 
Etienne Loubet for an explanation, he reacted defensively, and with violence. He then 
admitted that he had been asked to hide this unmarked load away from the procureur’s 
scrutiny, and conceded that he had acted in this way because of the “fortes sollicitations” 
of Antoinette Pepratx. A short time after this incident, the same officers standing in the 
town square overheard the widow, standing at her doorstep, boasting that she had ‘good 
guarantees’ for her actions: “j’y ay fait couper mais en bonnes enseignes.” 537 Even more 
telling is procureur Pinet Brezilhou’s statement about that incident. Asked why, having 
witnessed the widow’s words, he did not follow the case up, he replied that he had felt 
obliged “de se retirer, ne voulant pas se compromettre avec une femme.” 538 These few 
elements do not allow us to get a conclusive explanation for the widow’s special 
																																																								
535 Bernard Pepratx was described as wood merchant, and ‘bourgeois’ of Couiza (ten kms north-
east of Quillan). He was fined 9,090 livres in 1733 for fraud and ‘prévarications’, and banished 
from taking part in future wood sales. A record of 1737 titles him as “écuyer auprès de Mr 
D’Angervillier, ministre de la guerre.”  
536 Etienne Espezel was involved in another high-profile Réformation case, accused of exploitation 
fraud on a massive scale. See de Sailly, ‘Les Conséquences d'une Adjudication’.  
537 ADH, C1255, ‘Audition André Boire, 26 octobre 1737’.  
538 Id., ‘Audition Pinet Brezilhou, 25 octobre 1735’.   
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ascendancy suggested by these testimonies. Suffice, for the purpose of this thesis, to 
acknowledge the evident limitations to the authority of royal officers that could be imposed 
by individuals like Antoinette Pepratx.  
 
To comply with the grand-maître’s sentence of 1732, Antoinette Pepratx sold the family 
office for 21,000 livres, but she never received the full amount of that sale. She fought a 
ten-year long legal battle to retrieve at least some of the money which had been seized as a 
security for her son’s fines, and later for her own case, as she faced further prosecution by 
the Réformation judges for charges committed in the 1720s. 539 When the final sentence 
was pronounced in 1744, the combined fine for herself and her son reduced the original 
price of the office by approximately 7,000 livres. The family had lost one-third of the value 
of the family office.  
 
This example demonstrates the crucial influence of kinship loyalties and other personal 
factors in matters concerning the exploitation, commercialisation, and control of the 
kingdom’s forest resources. Taken together, all the elements of the case described here 
confirm the close and complex entanglement of interests around forests, connecting the 
crown with the interlocking interests of its provincial agents and members of the local 
society. Motives for practices that undermined the king’s interest were reaching far into the 
personal sphere of all protagonists. The bonds that interlinked these protagonists were 
however far from neutral and equivalent. In Quillan, as the pressures of Réformation 
litigation mounted, questions of social prestige, economic resources, and political influence 
which differentiated interdependant and unequal actors turned into factors of dissent, 




A comparison of two key players in the Laprade affair, wood merchant Henri Pinet 
Laprade, son of the town’s maire perpétuel, and Jean-Antoine Loubet, scion of an 
established line of garde-marteaux, reveals that their close professional and personal 
collaboration masked their assymmetry in terms of local influence and economic power. 
The advantageous situation of the Pinet dynasty has already been demonstrated: a thriving 
																																																								
539  An intermediate summary of this affair in ADAD, 63C77, ‘Le Nain, Ordonnance en 
réformation, 15 février 1744’; final judgement in ADAD, 63C63, ‘Jugement Le Nain 6 novembre 




family business, patronage links with local nobility and Church dignitaries, and monopoly 
over a range of royal offices, mayor, receveur particulier, garde-marteau and procureur 
du roi. When in 1723 Henri Pinet Laprade started appearing in his own name in the sales 
listings, he could claim a prosperous legacy, based on a successful mix of wood trade and 
other commercial and financial activities, and a strategy of concentrating power by 
combining local political influence and royal office. As the new lead member of the 
family, Henri Pinet Laprade was best positioned to offer personal patronage and create 
obligations. This also included maîtrise officers, and notably his nephew, the young garde-
marteau Jean-Antoine Loubet.  
 
At first glance, the Loubets were not devoid of assets. They were a respected, well-
established local family, with a long history of service to the town. Jean-Antoine Loubet’s 
grandfather, Antoine Loubet, docteur-es-droits, bourgeois of Quillan, had been lieutenant 
of the Quillan châtellenie. His grandmother came from a local merchant family, the 
Laforges. The Loubets were among the few town residents registering their armoiries in 
1695, evidence that they shared the same social ambitions as their fellow forestry officers 
and some prominent wood merchants like the Bertrands, Majorels or Pinets. 540 When 
Jean-Antoine’s father Etienne Loubet received the garde-marteau office in 1708 from his 
father-in-law Antoine Cachulet, he was already 49 years old. For him, this was an end-of-
career move, which complemented his other activities as a small rentier and local 
moneylender. 541 In 1736, as the Laprade affair reached a first peak with the start of the 
Réformation investigations, Jean-Antoine Loubet married into the Bertrands, a family of 
wood merchants boasting a recently-acquired “de la Capelle” codicil to their name. His 
bride, Anne Bertrand, was also the niece of Etienne Espezel, who at the time of the 
marriage was himself heavily caught up in a lawsuit for fraud.   
 
When Jean-Antoine Loubet assumed his office of garde-marteau in 1728, he could 
therefore also rely on certain personal credentials. On the other hand, as a twenty-year old 
applicant, he had to seek age dispensation. More problematically, one of the merchants he 
was due to ‘control’ as part of his duties was his uncle by alliance, Henry Pinet Laprade, 
who clearly towered above him in terms of age (he was 44), experience, and by the 
prestige and political influence of the whole Pinet sphere. The administrative authority that 
																																																								
540 See Table 16, p.162. 
541 ADAD, 3E13294, ‘Registre notaire M.Roillet, 24 novembre 1732’. 
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the young garde-marteau could wield by dint of his office would have appeared slim 
against the tide of kinship loyalties he owed these influential relatives.  
 
This personal dependency was significantly exacerbated when Henri Laprade fell on hard 
times, pressed by the debts he had accumulated during his multi-year exploitation in the 
forests of the Madrès Mountains. In 1732, he sent his garde-marteau nephew Jean-Antoine 
Loubet to Paris with a plea for moderation. In one printed document published in 1744 as a 
defense document in the case made against him by the Réformations judges, greffier Jean 
Roillet accused Jean-Antoine Loubet of having urged his maîtrise colleagues “à 
prévariquer en faveur de cet Adjudicataire [Laprade].” Roillet added that the garde-
marteau had declared ‘in his own words’ that “il avait donné son âme au Diable pour le 
servir. 542 As part of Roillet’s legal defense strategy, this extraordinary statement must be 
interpreted with caution, but it does make sense in the light of the fact that at the time of 
the alleged document alteration, the garde-marteau owed Henri Laprade 1,600 livres, by 
all accounts a vast sum for a young officer. 543 Furthermore, Jean-Antoine Loubet knew 
that his other uncle, the receveur particulier Cachulet, would be accountable to the 
treasury of the large reliquat resulting from Laprade’s failed exploitation, a debt he 
himself, as presumptive heir of that office, would in time inherit. 
 
It is important to avoid the pitfall of overstating the dichotomy between familial 
clientelism and allegiance to professional norms based on particular examples. On the 
other hand, the specifics of the Loubet-Laprade relationship, and the ongoing difficulties of 
the Rouzaud-Pepratx clan all demonstrate that at the lower rungs of the forestry institution, 
office holders, ill-supported by their superiors, had often no choice but to turn to better-
endowed members of the local society who sat outside the royal system. Exacerbated by 
financial hardship, kinship obligations, and other forms of personal dependencies, office-
holding foresters were driven to espouse at least some of the priorities and values linked to 
patrimony and familial honorability. 
 
After this detailed investigation of the Laprade case from the point of view of the 
‘perpetrators’, it is helpful to change perspective and approach the phenomenon of 
‘forestry corruption’ from the purview of the authorities. Following the successive stages 
of the operation, three distinct and successive sets of documents will be analysed and 
																																																								
542 ADH, C1257, f. 128, ‘Mémoire Roillet 1744, p.13’. 
543 Ibid., p.4.  
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compared: the initial denunciations of Louis Rouzaud (1732-1733), the charges brought 
forward by the Réformation prosecutor Gabriel Pernet (1737), and the final sentences by 
the Réformation judges (1744). While the two first documents were copies of the 
compilations written by Rouzaud and Pernet, the actual sentences had to be collected from 
a number of registers. 544 No claim can therefore be made that the list of these judgments is 
exhaustive. They nevertheless provide precious information about the attitudes and 
principles which guided the commissioners’ judgments of disciplinary affairs.   
 
Malpractice and corruption in forestry 
 
Rouzaud’s accusatory catalogue 
 
One of Louis Rouzaud’s letters to the Contrôle Général was a detailed mémoire listing 
forty-eight counts of non-compliance with the 1669 Ordonnance or subsequent 
regulations, which he had observed during his spell as maître particulier. 545 The charges 
were overwhelmingly directed at the grand-maître, Claude Anceau, and his secretary, 
Thimotée Boulanger, whom he considered responsible for his downfall. In this first 
document, Rouzaud targeted his former maîtrise colleagues only twice, albeit with the 
particularly serious allegation of “crime de faux”, the falsification of official documents. 
He reserved his attacks on the officers for his second mémoire, in which he accused them 
of having omitted to follow up irregularities that he had reported during his time in office 
on fifty-five separate counts. 546 Notwithstanding their partial nature as denunciations, 
these two documents are a useful base for establishing a typology of the behaviours and 
practices, which in an eighteenth-century context have been deemed serious enough to 
merit prosecution.  
 
Based on Rouzaud’s first mémoire, Table 17 summarises the charges leveled at the grand-
maître and the officers, and the potential beneficiaries of their actions. Overall, the 
accusations revolved around two major areas of responsibility: matters of personnel, and 
wood sales.  
																																																								
544 Mainly: ADHG, ‘Registre des arrêts de la Table de Marbre, (1689 – 1790)’; and ADAD, 
63C8bis, 63C63, 63C64, 63C75, 63C76, 63C77; ADH, C1256, C1257.  
545 ADH, C1255, f.250-255, ‘Mémoire des contraventions à l’Ordonnance commises par le Sr 
Anceau, grand maître..., depuis l’année 1719’. s.d. (prob.1732). Only the most relevant thirty-five 
points were considered here.  
546 ADH, C1257, pièce 84, ‘Mémoire du nombre des procès-verbaux faits par le maitre particulier 




Table 17 Professional malpractice as observed by Louis Rouzaud 





In matters of personnel, Rouzaud accused the grand-maître for repeatedly ignoring 
prohibited bonds of parentage between officers of the same maîtrise. While this constituted 
a formal breach of rules (reiterated in successive forestry codes to prevent collusion), it 
was probably the weakest of Rouzaud’s points. A small place like Quillan resulted 
inevitably in high levels of endogamy. The readiness of the monarchy to grant exceptions 
on kinship rules was a common occurrence among similar courts. For the présidiaux, 
Meyzie concluded to a “pratique libérale de la monarchie en la matière.” 547 In some cases, 
parentage bonds have even been considered a token of local trustworthiness, as in the case 
																																																								







































of the lieutenant général of the bailli of Mantes, mentioned by Neithard Bulst. 548 In 
another snub to the rules, ten further points in Rouzaud’s document referred to prohibited 
kinship bonds linking officers and wood merchants wishing to participate in wood 
auctions. He for example revealed that the merchants Laprade, Pinet Lapinouse and 
Bertrand, all relatives of the garde-marteau Jean-Antoine Loubet, had formed a profitable 
company under the alias of Sr Ticheyre de Carcassonne, and regularly appeared as bidders 
at the Quillan auctions.  
 
The most frequent source of abuse mentioned in Rouzaud’s list (29/35) concerned 
irregularities in grand-maître Anceau’s dealings with wood merchants, or his influencing 
the modalities of the auctions to favour one of them. This particular focus on commercial 
aspects of forestry is not surprising, given that it constituted one of the grand-maître’s 
most important duties. He enjoyed much latitude with regard to the organisation and 
operation of the auctions, or the treatment of adjudicataires. Here too, Rouzaud’s 
document outlines the broad range of tactics he could use, not all of them strictly within 
the letter of the law. He could for example determine the nature and the volume of the 
yearly plot to be auctioned off in a way that would favour certain bidders over others. 
Another stratagem was to issue post-auction ordinances, which changed the nature, 
composition or volume of the merchant’s original contract. He could simply choose to 
ignore reported ‘over-cuts’ beyond the merchant’s contracted quota, or allow the 
construction of additional sawmills on the river, well aware that they could also serve to 
mask fraud. 549 According to Rouzaud, the grand-maître had for example allowed a 
merchant to convert precious fir stands into charcoal, a tree species that was strictly 
reserved for large constructions or the navy. He was even accused of performing private, 
hence un-recorded, “ventes sous la cheminée.” Undesirable reports of irregularities could 
also be left dormant on the grand-maître’s desk, until the case fell into oblivion. If it did 
come to prosecution and sentencing, the fine could subsequently be moderated arbitrarily, 
as in one case against Henri Pinet Laprade, where the original fine of 42,000 livres was 
reduced to 8,000 livres. After the intervention of his secretary Boulanger, it was further 
reduced to 2,000 livres, the payment of which, after ten years, was still outstanding.   
 
																																																								
548 Neithard Bulst, ‘Les officiers royaux en France dans la deuxième moitié du XVe siècle. 
Bourgeois au service de l’Etat?’ in: Genêt, Lottes, L'Etat moderne et les élites, pp. 111-121, 114. 




If there is some truth in the notion of merchant favoritism, the question arises of the reward 
the grand-maître could have expected from it. In eight of twenty-five cases Rouzaud 
explicitly noted or hinted at a gift, alleging that “chaque ordonnance a été bien payée.” 550 
To obtain certain contract modifications, one day after the auction a wood merchant of 
Roquefeuil had presented the grand-maître with “deux charges de jambons, [...] et une 
belle peau d'ours pour couverture d'un cheval de main et deux chiens de chasse de grand 
prix.” 551 Even without such explicit references, behind all the points was the underlying 
assumption of a reciprocal exchange mechanism that included a ‘reward’ of some kind. As 
Rouzaud concluded, "tous les jugements du grand-maître s'achètent et qui n'a pas d'argent 
se trouve terrassé.” 552  
 
In his second accusatory document, Louis Rouzaud turned to a direct attack on his former 
maîtrise colleagues. 553 It was a compilation of irregularities, mostly involving merchant 
fraud, wood theft or illegal livestock grazing, all instances, which had been reported but 
not followed up by the procureur du Roi. Here, Rouzaud played on an argument of ‘gross 
professional negligence’, detrimental to the interests of the king. This, however, proved in 
fine to be a grave miscalculation. Not only were the commissioners able to dismiss most 
allegations on well-founded grounds, but in the process they were alerted to other, more 
serious irregularities, especially concerning the undue perception of the droits de passe, 
which would also precipitate the denunciator’s own downfall.  
 
Altogether, the nature of Rouzaud’s document as a willful denunciation might have 
coloured the impression of accumulated abuse, negligence and malpractice by part of the 
grand-maître. On the other hand, this document underscores the wide margin of autonomy 
the grand-maître enjoyed in ordinary forestry practice, especially when dealing with 
commercial aspects of his duties. Keeping wood merchants cooperating would have 
ensured that the proceeds from the sales were sufficient to pay the gages of the forestry 
personnel (including his own), and leave enough surpluses to show on the returns sheet 
sent to the crown’s treasury.  
 
These initial accusations by a disgruntled officer contrast with the ‘counter-catalogue’ of 
officer malpractice compiled by the procureur de Réformation, Gabriel Pernet, just one 
																																																								
550 ADH, C1255, f.250, ‘Mémoire des contraventions’, items 4 and 5. 
551 Ibid., item 16. 
552 Ibid., item 28. 
553 ADH, C1257, pièce 84, ‘Mémoire du nombre des procès-verbaux..., 7 aoust 1737’. 
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year after the start of the investigations. The procureur’s assessment allows us to get a 
glimpse into official perceptions of service discipline in forestry matters. It provides 
insights into the way eighteenth-century officials defined the fluid boundary between the 
‘ideal’ of administrative practice in the service of the king, and unacceptable behaviour on 
the ground.  
 
The prosecutor’s black list 
 
Having examined all the reports, registers and accounts between 1721 and 1736 that he 
could find, procureur Pernet informed his superiors by way of two summarising mémoires. 
In a forty-three page report, he detailed the “contraventions et négligences des anciens et 
nouveaux officiers de la maitrise de Quillan.” 554 The second mémoire was designed as a 
response to Rouzaud’s allegations against the grand-maître Claude Anceau. 555  The 
various points made by Pernet are summarised in Table 18 below.  
 
Pernet’s first mémoire: the officers 
 
With the procureur’s point-by-point indictment of officer behaviour of the preceding 
fifteen years unfolds a familiar narrative of professional malpractice by the officers in the 
maîtrises. It was stated in the preamble of the arrêt that launched the Réformation that 
“partie de ces abus paroissent provenir de la negligence des officiers et gardes et de leurs 
intelligences avec les adjudicataires auctions et certifficateurs des ventes, ce qui tend au 
detriment entier des forets.” 556 Themes such as ‘negligence’, ‘collusion’, and multiple 
other forms of professional malpractice appearing in the Réformation dossiers, can be 
divided into two distinct categories, separated by the fuzzy notion of ‘degree of intent’.  
 
In many cases, it is not possible to assess the degree of intent behind the action. The 
numerous instances of technical or bureaucratic negligence, which would superficially be 
seen as careless practice, might mask the darker purpose of favouring a certain merchant 
for a reward. At the very least, it would have, indirectly, provided an incentive for the 
merchant to commit fraud. In any case, the merchant was the main beneficiary. 
																																																								
554 ADH, C1255, f.323-344, ‘Mémoire des contraventions et négligences des anciens et nouveaux 
officiers ..., 15 [illegible] 1738’.  
555 ADH, C1255, f.244-255, ‘Mémoire des contraventions et negligences du Sr Grand-maitre de 
Languedoc dans les fonctions de sa charge..., 10 mars 1737’.   
556 AN, E2153, f.290, ‘Arrêt du 29 May 1736’. 
	
	 207	
Bureaucratic negligence could cause significant prejudice to the king’s interests. It could 
result in substantial losses for the king by generating substantial, unrecoverable reliquats. 
Pernet was particularly alarmed at discovering that the collector of forestry fines (garde 
général collecteur des amendes) had been allowed to operate without being covered by the 
400 livres caution "pour la sûreté des deniers de la collecte," as requested by the statutes. 
This precautionary measure also concerned bidders at the wood auctions. In theory, their 
contracts could only be finalised if secured by a suitable guarantor, but this requirement 
was rarely enforced. This could have disastrous consequences, most spectacularly in the 
case of Laprade’s monumental (and ultimately botched) enterprise of 1723, which 
amounted to 129,673 livres payable in equal parts over ten years. 557  
 
In a different domain, Pernet also found fault with technical issues around the official 
authorisation of the cuts (martelage en délivrance”), which was a central element of fraud 
control. 558 In fir forests, where merchants acquired timber “par pied d’arbre” instead of a 
whole plot, the Ordonnance required the garde-marteau to select and tag the trees before 
the merchants started their felling operations. Much to his dismay, the procureur 
discovered that, in Quillan, the tagging occured after the cut, which effectively gave the 
merchant first choice of trees. Here, Pernet blamed Froidour for having set a damaging 
precedent for this practice: "Monsieur de Froidour autheur du règlement en a négligé 
l’exécution, en procédant aux ventes sans désignation de triages, sans assiettes et sans 
martelage préalables; Les grands-maîtres et officiers ont successivement suivis cet usage, 
parce qu’ils évitoient un travail pénible.“ 559 This convenience shortcut, sanctioned by 









557 ADH, C1255, f.327r. and 328r., ‘Mémoire des contraventions ... officiers, (1738)’; and ADH 
C1257, pièce 158.  
558 Titre XV, article xi, specifies that trees to be offered for sale must bear the mark of the garde-
marteau. If trees were found to have been cut by a merchant without that mark, they were 
considered “bois de délit”.   
559 ADH, C1255, f.324v., ‘Mémoire des contraventions ... officiers.’ 
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Table 18 Professional malpractice of maîtrise officers according to the list of 
Procureur de Réformation Pernet (1737) 













































































































Furthermore, martelage operations that were performed by the garde-marteau alone were 
in principle illegal. The law demanded that he be accompanied by the maître particulier 
and the procureur du Roy 560 to reduce opportunities for fraud. As Pernet soon picked up, 
year after year, martelage reports had been signed by only one officer. In their defense, the 
officers invoked the fact that this rule was unworkable. “La plupart des délivrances se 
faisoient par un officier en seul, ce qui n’étoit toléré par mrs les Grands-Maitres que par 
raport à la situation rude et montueuse de cette maîtrise, et parce qu’ils croyoient que les 
officiers ne pouvoient soutenir la fatigue de suivre le marteau en corps.” 561  
 
What all these cases have in common is the fuzziness of the boundary between a pragmatic 
motive of convenience and efficiency, hardened by practice, and intentional malfeasance in 
connivance with the merchants whom they directly or indirectly favoured. This ambiguity 
made this category of offense particularly difficult to consider for prosecution. It might 
explain why Pernet repeatedly insisted on the primacy of law over practice. “La loy 
quoique négligée n’est pas moins restée dans sa vigueur. L’usage contraire est abus dont 
on ne peut se prévaloir parce que l’abus ne peut faire cesser la disposition de la loy." 562 
Clearly, the prosecutor’s role was not to find a feasible remedy to a problem linked to the 
circumstances, but to insist on professional ethos defined by strict compliance with the 
letter of the law.  
 
Contrasting with these instances of ‘professional negligence’ were cases which in Pernet’s 
list pointed positively to intentional malpractice. Cases grouped under the label ‘contract 
manipulations’ were unambiguously done with the intention to favour certain merchants. 
As such they constituted a form of “abus de pouvoir.” Sometimes, evidence could be 
retrieved from the registers. The commissioners for example recognised that martelage 
records could differ, sometimes vastly, from the original sales contracts. This obvious 
fraud was compounded by the fact that compulsory after-exploitation inspections 
(récollement) were nearly always omitted. Large numbers of trees thus ‘disappeared’ in the 
commercial system, representing, here again, a substantial loss for the king. 
 
More serious was the allegation of document falsification linked to the Laprade affair. In 
his initial report about this case, Pernet described at some length the details of this affair, 
																																																								
560 Règlement 6 November 1665; arrêt du Conseil 16 November1688. 
561 ADH, C1256, pièce 49. ‘Lettre en supplique de Pierre Pinet Brezilhou à Mr. de Bernage, 27 




as far as they were known after just one year of inquiries. He strongly suspected the 
officers of having deliberately reduced the actual number of felled trees “grâce à une 
substitution de la feuille du registre par le greffier.” 563 Given the gravity of this offense, 
finding a sound proof to support this claim was a priority, which occupied the 
commissioners and a host of experts for several years. Equally serious was the officers’ 
collective and abusive perception of the droits de passe for the verification of the rafts 
passing through the port. Here, Pernet denounced the “accroissement des droits à leur 
profit par défaut d'exercice” or their fraudulous allocation “pour un officier interdit ou 
décédé.” 564 These maneuvers were tantamount to embezzlement. Having meticulously 
audited the registers, the commissioners advanced a total of 7,940 livres “indûment 
perçus” by all past and present officers since 1720, 565 an over-perception that would have 
represented a substantial addition to their gages. 
 
Altogether, Pernet’s catalogue was a statement of no confidence in the competence, zeal, 
and probity of the forestry officers. On the other hand, the accusations formulated by 
Rouzaud and Pernet were not new in Réformation history. In 1663, Colbert had already 
produced a similar catalogue of potential failings to advise his newly appointed 
commissioners on what to look for when they embarked on their mission. He particularly 
enjoined commissioners to examine “touttes les circonstances dans lesquelles les officiers 
peuvent estre d’intelligence avec les marchands pour frauder le Roy.” 566 Half a century 
on, it appears that the stricter regime he had set up did not have much effect on entrenched 
routines.  
 
Pernet’s assessment of grand-maître misconduct 
 
Pernet’s evaluation of the grand-maître, the focus of his second mémoire, is far more 
equivocal. While the commissioners’ brief included holding all officials to account for 
their misdeeds or errors of judgment regardless of their qualité, in the “Mémoire des 
contraventions et négligences du Sr Grand-maitre de Languedoc” he sent to the Conseil in 
March 1737, 567 Pernet frequently softened the blame by invoking personal - hence 
‘pardonable’ - weaknesses. On a whole, the message emerging from this second document 
																																																								
563 ADH, C1255, f.330v., Mémoire des contraventions ... officiers’. 
564 Id., f.324r. 
565 ADAD, 63C64/2, f.439r. ‘Ordonnance des commissaires de réformation, 18 juillet 1744’. 
566 AN, KK952, f.19, ‘Mémoire pour la réformation’ (1663). 
567 ADH, C1255, f.244-255, ‘Mémoire des contraventions et negligences du Sr Grand-maitre de 
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appears more confused than his assessment of the officers, including some contradicting 
statements. The conventional style of a legal document is interspersed with emotive 
outbursts. A contributing factor to these inconsistencies might have been that, despite his 
special powers as procureur de Réformation, as a ‘mere’ procureur du Roi of the maîtrise 
particulière of Reims, Gabriel Pernet was in a subordinate position relative to the grand-
maître.   
 
Pernet’s list of charges ran along twenty different “articles”. As before, its contents can be 
classified in terms of either ‘negligence’ or ‘intentional malpractice’, with much porosity 
between them. Aspects of ‘professional negligence’ appearing explicitly or implicitly in 
most articles formed the bulk of Pernet’s criticism. Many points simply mirrored criticisms 
already leveled at the officers. Anceau had for example neglected his yearly duty of 
inspecting personally the forests of his constituency, and failed to control the conduct of 
the officers adequately. He had allowed them to receive droits de passe without checking if 
the work had been done, and signed off their certificats de service despite being aware of 
this deception. "[C]e grand-maitre a donc surpris la religion du conseil [...], c'est un vol fait 
au Roy qui doit lui être restitué.” 568 Commenting on his lack of response to a bornage 
issue, potentially an encouragement for illegal forest clearance, Pernet accused the grand-
maître of "s'endormir sur un objet si intéressant au bien du service.” 569 Anceau was 
especially blamed for his management of the wood sales. Throughout his long tenure, he 
had consistently allowed auctions to go ahead without the statutory pre-sale delimitation of 
the plots (assiette), which in effect handed over control to the merchants. He was 
especially reproached a serious lack of judgment for having allowed multi-year sales “pour 
faire plaisir à qui on vouloit," 570 a familiar hint at his pro-merchant bias.  
 
Pernet underlined Anceau’s deliberate manipulations of the sales modalities in favour of 
prominent merchants such as Espezel or Laprade. According to the vox populi, he stated, 
“le sieur grand-maître [était] gaigné par Laprade,” 571 and to favour merchants like him, 
“on se réservoit adroitement les changements de clauses.” 572 These merchants easily 
obtained additional sawmill facilities, with potentially nefarious consequences for the 
forests. "Abandonner des forêts pour faire tourner continuellement deux moulins à scie qui 
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consomment journellement six et sept arbres, c'est authoriser des dégradations de gayeté de 
coeur." 573  His partial treatment of the merchants was especially obvious in the 
modifications to the original sales contracts he contrived after the official end of the 
auction event. He had thus granted “certaines facilités” to some selected merchants. This 
included authorisations for more conveniently located sawmills, the easing of constraining 
exploitation schedules (prorogations des délais de vidange), or changes to the nature of the 
end product, such as “bois longs” changed to “rouls.” 574 For Pernet, practices like these 
were tantamount to ‘price fixing’: “si pareille permission avoit été insérée dans les clauses 
de l’adjudication, certains marchands auroient portés la vente à plus haut prix." 575 The 
main rationales driving the procureur’s indictments were revenue losses for the king (“SM 
a souffert par le deffaut des ventes depuis 37 ans”), and the physical degradation of the 
king’s forests, which, after many years of this practice, had become “totalement degradées, 
defrichées et abrouties.” 576 
 
Interestingly, Pernet mitigated his assault by occasionally shifting the blame away from the 
grand-maître on to minor actors, his secretary, the merchants (who will commit fraud 
anyway), and the officers. While Pernet thought of the multi-year sales method as a 
fundamentally misguided choice, he diverted his attack on to the procureur du Roy of the 
Quillan maîtrise, who had pressurised the grand-maître into allowing it. This officer, “sans 
estre authorisé du Conseil, s'avisa indiscrettement de presser le sieur grandmaitre et les 
autres officiers de vendre par avance pour nombre d'années qu'il poussa jusqua dix." As a 
result, Anceau “se presta [...] sans authorité aux remontrances de ce procureur du Roy et 
vendit aux choix des marchands.” 577 Timothée Boulanger, the grand-maître’s personal 
secretary, was a special target of Pernet’s ire. All correspondence should have been in the 
hands of the greffier: "[E]tant revêtus de la religion du serment leurs signatures sont les 
seulles qui fassent foy en justice. Celles du secrétaire qui n'a provisions ny caractère 
demeurent sans foy." 578  By managing single-handedly this part of the bureaucratic 
process, the secrétaire had overstepped his rank and duty. He had exercised a dubious 
influence on the bureaucratic control chain, even demanding payment for it. "Tous ces 
																																																								
573 Id., item 6. 
574 Bois longs were more difficult to transport, and were to be floated to the port to be checked, 
whereas the rouls “se transportent de nuit et se précipitent [...] aux moulins à scie; et les planches 
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575 ADH, C1255, ‘‘Mémoire des contraventions ... grand-maître’, item 5. 
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changements étoient adroitement ménagés par ce secrétaire qui avoit le bénéfice des 
requêtes qu'il dressoit et des gratieuses ordonnances qu'il faisoit accorder.” 579 
 
Even if Pernet recognised the grand-maître’s share of responsibility in the malfunctioning 
of the institution, he invoked arguments of personal weakness and credulity presented as 
‘pardonable’ faults. He dismissed any doubts about Anceau’s personal integrity, claiming 
that among Rouzaud’s denunciations, “il n’y en a point qui attaque sa probité, n’étant 
accusé d’aucunnes exactions; sa confiance aveugle pour son secrétaire, et sa grande 
complaisance pour les officiers sont la source des désordres qu’on luy impute.”  580 By 
contrast, Pernet comprehensively condemned the practices of the lesser actors in the 
forestry system, the officers and the secretary, who had authorised themselves an 
unacceptable margin of autonomy in the exercise of their duty. This particular bias was 
echoed, one month later, in the letter intendant Bernage addressed to contrôleur général 
Orry: “Il paroist en général au moins beaucoup de négligence de sa part dans les fonctions 
de sa charge, et de violens sujets de soupcons contre la conduite de son secrétaire.” 581  
 
In sum, the procureur de Réformation demonstrated great zeal in his role as main 
investigator. Within just one year, he had established a rounded catalogue of the practices 
and faults that impaired the functioning of the maîtrise, ranked on a sliding scale from 
vague notions of ‘professional negligence’ to clearly punishable cases of embezzlement, 
forgery, and fraud. The preceding analysis has especially highlighted the predominance of 
issues pertaining to wood commerce and the complexities of its control. In addition, while 
the grand-maître was duly included in the investigations, the onus of legal responsibility 
rested with subordinate individuals inside the forestry system, or those closely associated 
with it.  
 
With the third and final step in this analysis, our focus will shift to the judgments 
pronounced in the final phase of the Réformation process, mainly between 1739 and 1747, 
when the various cases brought forward by the procureur had been well documented and 
supported by a solid body of evidence. Out of the mass of judgments of all users and 
owners of the forests pronounced by the commissioners in the course of the Réformation, 
those concerning the officers represented numerically only a minor part. On the other hand, 
the patterns emerging from them are a good indicator of official perceptions of service 
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discipline in royal institutions. As France was embarking on a new costly war, this part of 
the analysis will help to establish how far the practices described above were considered 





After 1742, the sources suggest a marked acceleration of legal proceedings, leading to a 
string of final judgments on all outstanding cases, including the Laprade affair. This 
acceleration coincided with the personnel changes in the commissioners’ team mentioned 
above. Most of the final judgments were found in the registers housed at the Archives 
Départementales de l’Aude in Carcassonne, while some of the corresponding dossiers were 
spread between Carcassonne and the Archives Départementales in Montpellier. (Table 19)  
 
Certain patterns and trends emerge from analysing the judgments meted out at forestry 
personnel. Firstly, no mention could be found in our sources of any sentence against 
grand-maître Claude Anceau, despite his activities and failings having been pointedly and 
repeatedly denounced. Nor did his name appear in the special register “Arrêts et 
Jugements” of the Table de Marbre, located at the Archives Départementales in Toulouse. 
In his thorough account of the Anceau family, Coincy did not mention any significant 
trouble around that time, even though he had access to their private archives at the 
Lavelanet castle. 582 Claude Anceau’s death at the start of the proceedings might have 
‘conveniently’ averted an embarrassing fallout on the general image of the forestry elites, 
and specifically on his son, his successor in the office of grand-maître of Toulouse and a 
prominent member of the Réformation team. Ultimately, the lack of mention of any 
judgment on the grand-maître contrasts sharply with the heavy-handed treatment of this 
category of foresters by Colbert’s Réformation judges. There, the two grands-maîtres of 
Isle-de-France, de Candé and de Cartigny, had been fined 82,500 livres each. In 
Languedoc, Jehan Caulet de Cadars and Jehan de Fottes had both been suspended for two 
years and sentenced to respectively 8,000 and 6,000 livres. 583 In Poitou, grand-maître 
Jean-Baptiste Joulard, sieur d’Airon, had not only been fined and removed, but he also 
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suffered the public humiliation of having to submit to the infamous “amende honorable.”  
584 









































































































With regard to the officers, very few instances of the ‘negligent’ category highlighted in 
Rouzaud and Pernet’s catalogues made it to a final judgment. Rouzaud’s claims were not 
considered as acceptable evidence because the original document was unsigned, even 
though he eventually conceded its authorship. Similarly, most of the fifty points included 
in his “procès-verbaux impoursuivis” did not withstand scrutiny and were rejected as 
unfounded. Procureur Louis Terrisse was only enjoined to pursue a small number of 
unfinished cases within a given time limit. 585 Maître particulier Pierre Marsol, who had 
omitted to pursue and fine a fraudulent adjudicataire, was sentenced to a restitution of 960 
livres. 586 While collusion between officers and merchants had been denounced time and 
again, at sentencing stage most of these cases dwindled into insignificance. In one instance 
of mismatch between martelage and register entries, the judges simply ruled that the 
“contraventions prétendues étaient trop équivoques pour hasarder une information 
coûteuse.” 587 Even the unduly perceived droits de passe, which had cost so much time and 
ink, produced a surprisingly moderate fine. For the 7,940 livres overpaid rights advanced 
by Pernet, the fine amounted to a mere 900 livres, moreover to be paid collectively in 
proportion of each officer’s specific allowance and time in office. Greffier Roillet, the 
officer formally responsible for recording and collecting these rights, was acquitted. 588  
 
A more severe sentence was pronounced on the charge of forgery, in conjunction with the 
Laprade affair. Since Colbert, the protection of registers and official papers had become a 
symbol of improved bureaucratic control by the monarchical administration, and one might 
have expected a heightened sensitivity towards irregularities in that domain. The forgery 
allegation certainly attracted a great deal of attention. The bulk of the inquiries and 
proceedings included multiple hearings, confrontations in court, complemented by the 
costly and repeated involvement of outside experts to find corroborating evidence. After 
eight years of investigations, the case narrowed down to establishing the responsibility of 
the four officers in post at the time, including Louis Rouzaud. In February 1744, Rouzaud 
and the greffier, Jean Roillet, were sentenced “à être pris et saisis au corps, menés dans les 
prisons du présidial [of Montpellier] pour être interrogés.“ 589 Jean-Antoine Loubet and 
Louis Terrisse too were summoned. While Roillet handed himself over voluntarily to face 
further hearings and confrontations, Rouzaud did not wait for his summons to abscond 
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from the region. Final judgment on this complex affair was pronounced on 8 July 1744. 
For the “indues délivrances” they had made to Laprade, and for their participation in the 
substitution of the page in the register, Louis Rouzaud was condemned (in absentia) to a 
fine of 3,000 livres and banishment from the maîtrise district. Greffier Roillet was deposed 
for one year, and was to remain in jail until payment of his fine of 3,000 livres. 590 The 
commissioner declared that “s’il échappa à la peine de faussaires, ce fut parce que les 
preuves résultantes d'une information par l'expert en fait de faux sont conjecturalles, et 
n'ont pas la même force que des preuves évidentes auxquelles les juges ne peuvent pas se 
refuser.” 591 Garde-marteau Loubet was deposed for one year. Procureur Terrisse was 
acquitted altogether. 592 For his part in the affair, Henri Laprade, the insolvent merchant 
whose role in the forgery affair could never be convincingly established, was freed of 
further court proceedings, pending repayment of a fraction of the outstanding debt on his 
contract. 593   
 
Cases of collusion between officers and merchants, like the Laprade affair, posed a 
particular conundrum for the judges. Their assessment of the two ‘partners in crime’ rested 
on a subjective perception of their respective roles, which forced them weigh up two 
conflicting rationales: insist on internal discipline to maintain the credibility of the royal 
institution, or exercise political prudence towards merchants seen as members of a useful, 
coopted commercial task force. Favourable treatment of wood merchants had already been 
a feature of Réformation policy under Colbert, who, in 1663, advised the commissioners to 
use wood merchants to elicit denunciations of the “mauvais officiers,” while reassuring 
them that “ce n’est point eux que la Réformation attaque, mais bien les officiers ausquels 
le Roy à confié la conservation de son Domaine.” 594  
 
A similar bias seemed to animate eighteenth-century grands-maîtres and Réformation 
judges in their treatment of prominent cases of merchant fraud. In 1732, Claude Anceau 
pronounced a fine of 20,000 livres against Claude Amiel for having committed fraud in a 
royal forest on a particularly massive scale, but after appeal, the fine was reduced to a mere 
1,000 livres on the grounds of insufficient evidence. 595 The Etienne Espezel affair was a 
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particularly high-profile Réformation case, which, like the Laprade affair, lasted nearly a 
decade and required the services of outside experts. 596 At each stage of the process the 
merchant fought back vigorously, supported by legal expertise from within his family. To 
buttress his defense, he used a judicial factum printed at his own cost. While he was 
eventually found guilty, his fine of 3,417 livres was vastly disproportionate to the scale of 
the fraud, and to his substantial financial capabilities. 597 
 
Why this lenient treatment? Merchants like Amiel, Espezel and Laprade were needed as 
essential commercial operators, especially at a time when Languedoc developed its 
manufacturing potential, mostly in the textile and glass-making sectors – both great 
consumers of firewood. They provided the whole region with wood in all its various forms: 
charcoal, timber for large constructions, smaller buildings, domestic fuel, and accessorily 
tar and resin for shipbuilding, or ash for soda manufacturing. Most importantly, they 
guaranteed the provision of the various woods needed for the country’s navy and military. 
In the regional supply-demand system, the grand-maître determined the offer, but the 
merchant determined the demand. By evaluating the fluctuations of the regional markets 
down the line, he could impose limits on prices, or even refuse to bid. They also played a 
crucial role in the commercialisation of communal woods and the conflicts generated by 
the claims of local seigneurs over them. 598 Especially where the stakes were high, as with 
the supply of Paris or other regional capitals, their powerful lobbies could exert leverage 
on prices and influence policies. 599 In Toulouse, the Corporation des marchands de bois 
de Toulouse defended their interests. 600 Antagonising these powerful commercial agents 
was not in the interest of a government intent on supporting commerce.  
 
Another significant observation emerging from the judgments is the apparent lack of 
concern with the aspect of gift-exchange. In earlier centuries, the oath sworn by the 
maîtres des forêts had included the solemn promise “de servir fidèlement le roi, d’observer 
les ordonnances des eaux et forêts, d’exercer son office fidèlement, sans fraude et sans 
																																																								
596 The Espezel case has been described in de Sailly, ‘Les conséquences’, although he does not 
provide any sources. Some elements can be found in ADAD, 63C63 and ADH, C1257, ‘Mémoire 
d’Estienne Espezel, probably 1740’.     
597 ADAD, 63C63, pièce 61, ‘Jugement Estienne Espezel, 17 juillet 1747’. 
598 See for example Andrée Corvol, ‘Forêt et communautés en basse Bourgogne au dix-huitième 
siècle’, Revue Historique, 256, 1 (519) (1976), pp. 15-26.  
599 Jean Boissière, ‘Forestiers et Marchands de bois’ du Morvan à Paris’; id., ‘Exploitation et 
commerce’; and Poujade, Une société marchande, especially 88-94. 
600 Some of their archives for the period can be found in ADHG, 1E 1258, 1259, 1260. 
	
	 219	
rien donner à la faveur, de rendre le compte bon et fidèle des ventes, exploits et dons.” 601 
This ideal of virtue and justice, in practice, remained a pious hope, unable to hold sway 
against the tide of gift-exchanges that oiled the administrative, financial and judicial 
machinery of the kingdom. Even an official hailed a loyal and virtuous servant of the king 
such as Froidour accepted gifts during his reconnoissance tour of the Pyrénées. Based on 
events around 1719, one particularly telling case recounted in Rouzaud’s mémoire about 
Anceau’s misdemeanours bears testimony to the fact that exchanging gifts, favours and 
influence was a practice involving all parts of the local forestry system, the grand-maître, 
his secretary, wood merchants, maîtrise officers, municipal consuls, and local residents 
(Annexe 5). Four decades later, Louis Desjobert, who had just inherited the office of 
grand-maître of Ile-de-France, received his father’s advice: “C’est pour avoir conseillé et 
rendu des services particuliers à tant de personnes que j’éprouve réputation, agrément et 
facilités pour grands, inférieurs et tous autres de leurs états.” 602 The fact that not one of the 
Quillan judgments of the 1740s referred to a suspicious “don”, then, fits in well with a 
cultural pattern that was considered a universal and acceptable practice.   
 
More surprising and revealing is the case of Antoinette Pepratx, which occupied the 
investigators for a whole decade, not least because of the widow’s desperate battle to 
evade, or at least reduce, some of the fine she and her son had incurred. For the 
Réformation judges, it was more than an ordinary case of criminal prosecution. It was an 
opportunity to plug a loophole in the law and establish clearer rules regarding the use of 
the Maison Royale. 603 The judges declared its occupation by the Rouzaud family from 
1696 until 1734 retrospectively illegal, and requested an additional 1,900 livres unpaid rent 
for thirty-six years occupancy (corresponding to a rental average of 54 livres/year.) This 
sentence was also applied to the new maître particulier, Pierre Marsol, who, for the same 
reason, was asked for 175 livres for three years’ rent. 604 The judges ruled that the room on 
the first floor “qui a vue sur la place publique” would henceforth serve as courtroom and 
council chamber “avec coffres et armoires pour marteaux et pièces du greffe.” The ground 
floor would be used as the maîtrise prison and lodging for the concierge, while the upper 
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floor would be leased to the town for municipal assemblies, school activities, and its own 
archives. 605 In this case, prosecution and policy change went hand in hand. 
 
In sum, from Rouzaud’s initial denunciations in 1732 to the final judgments of the 1740s, 
we have observed various facets of a contemporary narrative of ‘corruption’ in forestry, a 
broad notion that ranged from negligent pursuit of official duties to outright intentional 
malfeasance. It was mostly connected with financial issues of wood sales and their control. 
The general overtone emerging from the responses of the judges was one of leniency, in 
sharp contrast with official rhetoric based on Colbert’s Ordonnance. Fraudulent merchants 
were spared the heavy fines that would have been proportional to the severity of their fraud 
and their financial capabilities. The broad palette of tactics and maneuvers used by the 
grand-maître and the officers, which were strictly speaking outside the law, incurred 
overall only limited punishment. Definite dismissal from office (such as grand-maître 
Froidour had applied to Jean Besset in 1677, and Claude Anceau to Louis Rouzaud in 
1732) was never requested. In just two cases - for Quillan’s greffier and the garde-marteau 
- did the judges demand a one-year suspension from office.  
 
After the Réformation: what changed? 
 
Stability over turbulence 
 
After the commission was dissolved and the agitation had receded, a contemporary 
observer would have noticed little change in the composition of the maîtrise, or on the 
wood merchant scene of Quillan. Pierre Marsol, Louis Terrisse and Jean Roillet all 
remained in post, or soon resumed it. 606 Suspended for one year, Jean-Antoine Loubet 
transfered his office to an ally, Jean-François Arcens, but he returned to forestry six years 
later when he inherited the office of receveur particulier from his uncle, Jean-Antoine 
Cachulet. After the financial predicament of merchant Henri Pinet Laprade during the 
1730s, his younger brother, Claude Pinet ‘Lapinouse’, seigneur de Laval, emerged as the 
new leading figure in the Pinet clan. While the judicial Réformation proceedings might 
have been afflicting for individuals and their families, they did not affect their public 
image in the town. Lapinouse’s role as first consul in 1741 indicates that the family had not 
lost any of their standing in municipal life, and as the son-in-law of greffier Jean Roillet, 
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he could also count on insider support in the maîtrise. With Claude Pinet Lapinouse, the 
family fortunes were set to return to their former strength. This also applies to the officers. 
In 1741, while the case against him was still pending, Jean-Antoine Loubet was deputised 
to represent Quillan at the Etats, held that year in Narbonne, where he journeyed together 
with procureur Louis Terrisse and merchant Lapinouse. At the height of the lawsuit 
against him, greffier Jean Roillet transferred all legal powers attached to his additional role 
as collector of certain forestry dues to his father-in-law, Etienne Espezel. 607 The merchant, 
who was heavily embroiled in the Réformation case against him, was entrusted with 
collecting all outstanding debts from adjudicataires between 1736 and 1743. More 
generally, the truculence and ability to rebound demonstrated by the merchants during the 
Réformation years appeared to have consolidated their local credit, and their position as 
privileged partners of the state. 
 
One can wonder, then, why the contrôleur général agreed to invest so much time, energy, 
and funds in what appears to be a series of dilatory procedures and judicial chicanes, 
leading to a relatively meager result. Superficially, just like the treatment of corrupt 
financiers by the Chambres de Justices, a Réformation Forestière was a public spectacle, 
which reasserted monarchical authority in the eyes of the public and enhanced their trust in 
the king’s justice. From a macro-historical perspective, reasons for the government’s 
lukewarm commitment could be of exogenous nature, linked to France’s specific pattern of 
forest ownership. 608 With only a contribution of 1.74 % of the total regular income of the 
state in 1699, forestry was, at least in financial terms, not a ‘firefighting issue’ for Louis-
Quinzième governments, and curbing corruption within its ranks was not part of the blaze. 
Furthermore, these interventions also touched on political sensitivities. After centuries of 
regulations imposed on privately owned forests impinging on the sanctity of private 
property, the fear of antagonising landlords who were often influential public figures 
remained a powerful motive for restraint.  
 
By focusing on endogenous processes, however, this study has identified political motives 
of a different nature, driven by a deep sense of political pragmatism, and by the need to 
adjust an unwieldy body of forestry law to the local circumstances. In a functionalist vein, 
the sentencing pattern described above could suggest that the government chose to avoid 
major administrative and economic disruption at the level of the region. Leaving maîtrise 
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officers who were best equipped with the necessary local knowledge and experience to run 
the day-to-day routines, warranted the smooth functioning of the unit, regardless of the 
risks of fraud and ‘corruption’ it entailed. With their restricted professional ambitions and 
promotion opportunities, they remained bound to their provincial seats, while the social 
order within the forestry hierarchy was also left intact. Caught between the grand-maître 
and their own local patronage webs, maîtrise officers were participants - not necessarily 
willing ones - in a praxis that consolidated urban stability, ensured the provisioning of 
manufactures and towns, and kept a steady trickle of forest revenue flowing into the 
crown’s coffers.  
 
A similarly functionalist rationale can be applied to the pro-merchant bias that has emerged 
from this study. The convergence of interests between the state and the wood merchants 
resulted in official indulgence towards coopted ‘allies’ in an important branch of 
commerce. If officers and merchants, two major pillars of the regional forestry system, 
were to remain operational, their actions had to be treated on an individual, case-by-case 
basis. This assumption of an individual, rather than structural, approach to ‘corruption’ 
resonates with the interpretation of Stéphane Durand who studied such cases in eighteenth-
century Languedoc in the domain of ordinary, civil and criminal, justice. Recognising that 
neither oath of office, nor repeated legislation, nor the threat of harsh punishments, were 
effective anti-corruption measures, governments, he contended, were driven to imagine 
“sophisticated new regulations that would enable the administration to detect malversation 
whenever and wherever it was committed.” 609  
 
In sum, for the governments of the early decades of the eighteenth century, the multiple 
occurrences of non-compliance with the law were the ‘acceptable’ price to pay for keeping 
the whole forestry system functioning in a balanced, orderly way. This pragmatic approach 
is well summarised by Doyle’s statement that “it was only when practices admitted to be 
corrupt, but recognized as effective, ceased to be effective, that their corruptness came to 
seem significant.” 610 In this perspective, stability, not disruption, was the major rationale 




609 Stéphane Durand, ‘Corruption and Anticorruption in France between the 1670s and the 1780s: 
The Example of the Provincial Administration of Languedoc’, in: Kroeze, et al., Anticorruption, 
pp. 153-166, 161. 




Réformations, an opportunity for structural change 
 
On the other hand, the impression of ‘do-nothing policy’ that could be infered from this 
functionalist interpretation is also misleading. While the 1730s Réformation had clearly not 
been a wholesale anti-corruption undertaking, it led to a fine-tuned approach to a wide 
range of local forestry problems that took into account underlying social and geographical 
realities. Based on the lessons of the Quillan operation, the Règlement of 1754 significantly 
expanded on the first Règlement for the district’s forests set up by Froidour on 13 
December 1668. 611 While some of the articles of the new code merely restated and 
reinforced old rules of practice for the personnel, the bulk addressed technical measures of 
management and control, designed to increase effectiveness and reduce opportunities for 
fraud. 612  
 
Recognising Quillan’s situation as a river control post, Titre VI was entirely dedicated to 
the minutiae of control processes of the timber rafts passing through it. Titre II addressed 
matters of exploitation and sales. Here, the code re-affirmed the exceptional permission to 
sell fir trees  “par pied d’arbre,” but, as a direct consequence of one of procureur Pernet’s 
criticisms, merchants could only begin harvesting after the officers had selected the trees. 
The numerous cases pertaining to local sawmills, forges and glassworks, which continued 
to proliferate in the region, alerted the legislator about their increasing role as facilitators of 
forestry fraud, and Titre V redefined control measures against the owners of these 
facilities. The sections concerned with private owners restated their obligation of 
“déclaration de coupe” for their high-forest trees. Customary use rights were also adjusted, 
but with a favourable consideration of the specific needs of mountain communities, who 
were particularly reliant on local wood supplies for their buildings (Titre IV).  
 
These few examples show a commitment to adapt Colbert’s rigid principles to the social 
and physical characteristics of the district, whilst taking care not to contradict the 
fundamental tenets of the 1669 Ordonnance. The frequent use of a technical, 
‘sylvicultural’ vocabulary suggests a growing interest in linking forest preservation to the 
																																																								
611 ‘Règlement provisoire... concernant la police et administration des forêts du bureau de Quillan’, 
in: Chabrol, ‘Histoire de la maîtrise de Quillan’, (1959), 6. 
612 ADH, C1899, ’Règlement .... pour la Régie, l’Administration et la Conservation des Bois & 




new insights of the natural sciences. This was especially important for the region’s mixed 
fir-and-beech stands (hêtraies-sapinières), which contained large reserves for regional and 
national needs. The importance given to these matters suggests that a more technical 
approach to forestry problems was starting to displace the traditional legalist stance. While 
the 1754 code re-affirmed the state’s primary aim of preserving and managing the forests 
according to its own interests, it is also an example of carefully calibrated regulation apt at 
reconciling competing claims on a limited material resource. Most importantly, the 
Règlement endured: it was still in use in its original form by the middle of the twentieth 
century, sparking some commentators to quip that in Quillan, de Gaulle was keeping the 
promises of Louis XV. 613  
 
This analysis of ‘corruption’ in forestry has demonstrated that allowing practice to 
supersede law, ultimately, represented more than the normalisation of unlawful behaviours 
by disinterested governments. It was more than a form of ‘white corruption’ based on the 
‘everybody-does-it’ argument, still in use today, which made it acceptable by political 
elites and the wider society. 614 It was a praxis, which nudged lawmakers into developing a 
more functional legal and executive framework of forestry, better suited to tackling 
structural deficiencies of a rigid body of law, increasingly ill-adapted to changing norms 
and economic and social structures. A good illustration of this is the re-dedication of 
Quillan’s Maison Royale by commissioners who had recognised that time had come to 
impose a physical separation between public and private use of buildings. The 
improvement of professional discipline was also contingent on the change of physical 
structures. 
 
More fundamentally, our analysis has demonstrated a far more flexible approach to 
forestry politics than interpretations considering Colbert’s Ordonnance alone have 
suggested. It mitigates the simple notion of ‘failure’ of Colbert’s forestry regime at the 
hands of inept and ‘corrupt’ executors. The long string of regional Réformations 
Forestières right up to the eve of the Revolution points to the fact that, from Fleury to 
Calonne, contrôleurs généraux and ministers, keenly aware of the strategic importance of 
the production, distribution, and control of wood, continued to resort to region-specific 
solutions to forestry problems, including a certain tolerance of improprieties and non-
compliance with Colbertian rules and follow-up regulations.  
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Reforming forestry, a doomed initiative? 
 
Three main features of forestry in the first half of the eighteenth century have been 
particularly relevant for this thesis. Firstly, despite tentative inroads in mineral coal usage 
and continuing timber imports from the Baltic region, the domestic production of wood 
promoted by Colbert was still an important strategic factor of economic development, 
social stability, and international prestige. Secondly, while France’s forested cover might 
have appeared abundant at a superficial glance, two thirds of it were in private hands. A 
diplomatic approach was needed to induce private owners to manage their forests in 
accordance with principles at work in royal forests, to encourage the growth of certain 
species perceived as especially ‘useful’ for the needs of the state and for the ‘bien 
commun’. The third, and perhaps most relevant, aspect is the fundamentally regional ambit 
of the production, exploitation, commercialisation and distribution of wood – mainly due 
to the limitations of transporting bulk material. This regional factor in forestry has 
important implications for the socio-political dynamics that underpinned the management 
and control of the forests. 
 
Access and control of the forests and their resources represented an arena for competing 
stakeholders - prominently among them the monarchical state – all jostling for an essential 
and limited resource. The confusion resulting from the clash of these interests led Bamford 
to conclude that “[m]any of the institutional maladies that enfeebled the Bourbon 
monarchy as a whole – the laxity of executive controls, the incompetence and venality of 
officials, and the extremes of financial confusion and pressure – concurred to weaken the 
effectiveness of legislation in a period when the demands on the forests greatly increased.” 
“Pressed by financial need,” he added, “the contrôleurs généraux, ostensibly the managers 
and protectors of the forests, were unable to control their use. Long before the end of the 
Ancien Régime, they joined the ranks of those intent on exploitation. The navy, and all 
other agencies, dependent on forest resources, suffered the consequences.” 615 
 
Our examination of ordinary practice of forestry at the beginning of the eighteenth century 
has produced an explanatory framework that challenges such pessimistic views. It has 
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shown that there was more to the state’s approach than a narrow concern with profitability 
alone. There was also more to the fraudulent actions of agents like Estienne Loubet or 
Antoinette Pepratx than a foreordained propensity to fraud and corruption, resulting near-
axiomatically from the venal status of their office. Historiographical emphasis on the 
Colbertian operation has obscured the complex social and institutional reality that 
underpinned ordinary forestry practice. Recovering this reality from the point of view of 
the ‘actors’ themselves has provided a more nuanced approach to the notion of the state’s 
alleged failure to control and manage the forests because of the shortcomings of its ‘venal-
hence-corrupt’ officers. 
 
Two major conclusions can be drawn from this study. Firstly, mid-ranking forestry officers 
constituted a group apart within the hierarchy, uncomfortably perched between the 
unattainable status of grand-maître and a socially unacceptable alliance with the rural 
gardes. Similarly to officers of the présidiaux (with whom they shared a number of 
characteristics), they were caught inside a closely circumscribed horizon of professional 
possibilities, with scant access to empowering webs of patronage. Secondly, a close 
reading of Réformation material allowed us to re-examine classic views of forestry politics 
in the wake of Colbert’s intervention, and conclude to a continuing preference for 
devolved form of governance in forestry. Ordinary forestry practice was largely left to a 
regional system of management and control in the hands of the grand-maître, forestry 
entrepreneurs, and landowning elites. The price to pay for this deveolved form of forestry 
power and governance was a certain tolerance of collusion and abuse of office– at least so 
long as the financial interests of the crown and the prestige of the institution were not too 
seriously jeopardised. 
 
The mid-ranking forestry office, the end of the line 
 
In forestry, as elsewhere, the symbolic authority conferred by holding a royal office was an 
important aspect of career strategies, which could facilitate social advancement and 
professional mobility. Our case study has pointed instead to the institutional 
marginalisation of forestry officers, characterised by a conspicuous absence of official 
recognition, adequate financial rewards for their service, and scant effective support in 
their professional duties. While the evolution of office values beyond the 1730s could not 
be ascertained, it is unlikely that they substantially increased towards the end of the 
century. Being of little speculative value, they remained within the same local forestry 
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dynasties until the Revolution. Furthermore, in an increasingly saturated market of mid-
ranking legal offices, their narrow specialism impeded a move towards other career paths 
within the judiciary. A shift to other maitrises particulières was also unlikely as, there too, 
posts were the jealous preserve of local families. Their local knowledge and the technical 
know-how acquired through longstanding familial transmission made these officers best 
suited to control the forests in their own district. There was also no sign that they attempted 
to access posts in the military, the Church, or the university.  
 
Even more inauspicious were their chances of reaching up to the next rung in the forestry 
ladder. In terms of prestige, social status and wealth, a gulf separated them from the grand-
maître. Not even the maître particulier, despite the traditional association of this office 
with the old nobility, could ever envisage this leap upwards. Their professional 
dependency on the regional grand-maître, and the disciplinary powers he held over them, 
meant that they must strive to remain in good terms with him, or that irregularities and 
conflicts had to be kept out of his sight. In case of hardship, the personal dimension of this 
relationship became even more crucial. Altogether, intermediate forestry officers appeared 
unable to access networks that could have provided them with more effective pathways for 
social and professional advancement. 
 
Their personal and emotional insertion in the town provided them with an alternative. The 
seats of many of the kingdom’s maîtrises were situated in small places, poorly equipped 
with institutional infrastructures. Their multiple and longstanding connections with other 
members of local elites anchored forestry officers solidly in their native urban environment 
and allowed them to access resources located in local governance. On the other hand, they 
also locked them into other forms of dependency. Bonds of kinship, or other forms of 
personal associations and economic interactions, connected them with the economically 
most dynamic and influential segments of the local society. Forestry ‘actors’ (such as the 
archbishop of Narbonne as overlord of the town), local forestry entrepreneurs and noble 
forest owners formed a cohesive system centred on forestry interests that drew its strength 
from the social, economic and political opportunities it offered each of its members. Based 
on reciprocity, this system contained however an element of asymmetry between dominant 
and dependent members, conducive to professional misconduct: the inclusion of forestry 
officers in this symbiotic system allowed them to maintain the level of wealth and 
conspicuous lifestyle expected from them as members of the urban bourgeoisie, but it also 
entailed the use and abuse of the duties and rights associated with their office. Firmly kept 
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in a subordinate place, and little supported by the forestry authorities, provincial mid-
ranking officers were denied the necessary moral authority that could have lifted them out 
of the dependency on their dominant counterparts. By ignoring the need to rehabilitate this 
component of the office hierarchy, the apparent failure to reform forestry along the 
Colbertian model was, in this sense, of the government’s own making. 
 
Next to underscoring the distinctive nature and lack of perspective of the mid-ranking 
forestry office, this study has also provided insights into the political rationales that 
underlay eighteenth-century Réformations Forestières. Examination of their judicial leg 
has revealed the ‘provincialisation’ of forestry politics, quite at odds with the centralising, 
modernising stance posited by historians narrowly focused on Colbert’s reforms alone. 
 
Devolved forestry governance 
 
With the rigid principles enshrined in his Ordonnance of 1669, Colbert instituted an 
authoritative grid of reference, which, formally, remained the gold standard of forestry 
practice until the Revolution, and even beyond. The success of his rational, standardising 
approach to the management of the forests has long attracted the attention of forestry 
historians. By prioritising the Colbertian operation over less spectacular subsequent 
interventions, Réformations Forestières were conceptualised as key components of a 
centralising, modernising state. Consequently, and logically, the mismanagement of 
provincial forests has been attributed to infancy problems of a budding forestry 
bureaucracy, whose efficacy was undermined by its failure to control privilege and 
corruption. From a revisionist perspective, this assumption was a paradox. Pre-modern 
societies could not be bureaucratic because they continued to be “bounded by notions of 
patronage, hierarchy, corporatism, privilege and honour.” 616 In forestry too, as our case 
study amply confirmed, most formal processes of eighteenth-century forestry were still 
driven by face-to-face interactions.   
 
This argument has important interpretive consequences. After Colbert, governments were 
faced with the fundamental paradox of demanding strict implementation of regulations in 
an institutional context that continued to be driven by personal values and emotions. In 
practice, forestry was caught in a web of systemic inconsistencies, which ultimately 
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generated an apparently intractable mixture of administrative inefficiency and ‘corruption’. 
This prevented Colbert’s rigid forestry system from developing in a flexible, organic way. 
A good illustration of this paradox is the persistence of legal prescriptions rooted in 
Colbert’s naval programme well after autarky in the provisioning of arsenal woods was 
abandoned. In the long term, Colbert’s hope for reaching self-sufficiency proved illusory 
in terms of both, quantity and quality of the material. Masts of lesser quality and size 
reduced the fighting potential of France’s war ships, most dramatically in the battle of La 
Hougue in 1692. 617 These difficulties, compounded by ongoing mistrust between the 
departments of Forestry and Navy, brought about a swift return to former trading 
connections. By 1784, importation of arsenal wood ranged from Mediterranean European 
countries and the Ottoman Empire to Holland, Denmark, German, Polish and Hanseatic 
towns in the north. 618 Paradoxically, Colbert’s regulative provisions to achieve autarky, 
however, remained in force.  
 
This study has demonstrated that fraud and ‘corruption’, which continued to be a pervasive 
feature of eighteenth-century forestry, is a phenomenon that cannot be interpreted as a 
straightforward failure of the regime established by Colbert. What emerged instead was the 
existence of a compromise regime, based on a pragmatic approach by governments 
attempting to reconcile the systemic inconsistencies introduced by the Colbertian reforms. 
Colbert’s intervention had been an integral part of a powerful political drive to assert the 
authority of a young king in a ‘prestigious’ and useful part of the administrative apparatus. 
His most innovative policy decision had been to promote domestic wood production as 
part of his ‘mercantilist’ approach to political economy, leading to sweeping administrative 
and legal reforms. He was successful in achieving critical advances in terms of knowledge 
of France’s forests, metrological uniformisation, harmonisation of technical procedures. 
He also streamlined a dangerously overgrown personnel structure. With his 1669 
Ordonnance, he established a legal frame of reference applicable at national level. 
Developments after 1715 demonstrate, however, that Colbert’s reforms had been a 
forceful, but brief, window of opportunity for establishing a forestry regime applicable to a 
vast, diverse and evolving kingdom. Operational principles, which had crystalised into 
unassailable tenets, collided in practice with the herculean challenges of being successfully 
																																																								
617 See Bamford, Forests and French sea power. Also H.M. Scott, The Importance of Bourbon 
naval reconstruction to the strategy of Choiseul after the Seven Years' War, The International 
History Review, 1, 1 (1979), pp. 17-35. 
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applied to social and natural contexts as different as those of Artois, Bretagne, Guyenne, or 
the Pyrénées. 
 
The pragmatic, non-ideological, stance of subsequent governments suggests that, in order 
to deal with such problems, they favoured a decentralised, regional approach to ordinary 
forestry problems, under the aegis of the regional grand-maître. With his wide 
discretionary powers, he could adapt the less workable parts of Colbert’s code to the 
circumstances, and adopt a case-by-case approach that took local or regional specificities 
and sensitivities into account. On the other hand, links of clientage connecting the grand-
maître with members of the circles close to the king (illustrated by Froidour’s close 
connection to Colbert) counterbalanced his freedom of action and ensured a measure of 
control from above. Crucially, the policy of decoupling central and regional decision-
making managed to leave untouched a historic, central body of law, closely associated with 
the authority and glory of the king, while, in practice, its least workable parts could be 
adapted to local circumstances. The price to pay for this devolved approach was a certain 
tolerance of day-to-day administrative malpractice. Eighteenth-century Réformations 
Forestières, therefore, must be sen as conceptually distinct from their precursor operation 
of the 1660s and 1670s. Although both share the same name, they should be studied as 
distinct operations, each on their own terms and merits. 
 
The fact that governments continued to resort to this kind of regional adjustments until the 
Revolution signals that this devolved forestry regime was endowed with a high degree of 
‘integrity’ in the meaning given in ecological scholarship, but applied here in a wider 
political sense. 619 A similar interpretation also emerges from a recent collection of essays 
on the ecological theme of ‘sustainability’ in historical perspective. In his contribution 
regarding Froidour’s intervention in Languedoc from the perspective of woodland 
preservation, Sébastien Poublanc concluded that “[A]chieving the objectives of the state 
required walking a fine line between coercive management and respecting regional 
practices. “ 620 For this author, the persistence of the regional outlook was deeply rooted in 
medieval social and administrative structures. In this sense, Louis XV’s governments, far 
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from seeking a fundamental reform in forestry matters, remained loyal to centuries-old 
practices in forestry governance. 
 
Devolution in forestry empowered not just the grand-maître. It also incorporated the wider 
regional system of wood merchants and influential members of forest-owning elites 
described above. This resonates with Roger Mettam’s view that Louis XIV’s dominant 
interest in maintaining authority, pursuing international glory and directing military 
operations rooted in a belief that provincial society could largely “take care of itself.” 621 
With this approach, Mettam contended, the crown could exploit the bureaucratic 
experience of hereditary office-holders without having to confront the interests of powerful 
social and institutional elites. By relying on existing power structures, monarchical 
governments could work within the constraints of a hierarchical and aristocratically 
dominated society, use influential families and reduce the influence of obstructive ones. 622 
Similarly in forestry, a self-regulating regional system could handle contestations and 
negotiations more effectively than royal diktats. With forestry politics of the first half of 
the eighteenth century, we are far from the notion of a public service operated by new-age 
commis of a depersonalised, highly-centralised administrative system, “pensionnés par 
l’Etat car devoués mais sans fortune”, new pillars of a modern administrative apparatus 
designed to operate “presque indépendamment des hommes qui la peuplèrent.” 623 When 
Réformations were instigated, the commotion they created locally reaffirmed in the public 
eye the presence of royal authority as arbiter in regional forestry problems. Behind the 
scenes however, the judgments were carefully calibrated to maintain the regional system 
broadly balanced. This demanded a commensurate response to cases of fraud, negligence, 
‘corruption’, collusion, or abuse of office, leveled at those perceived as the custodians of 
the status quo.  
 
Preference for devolved forestry governance does not mean, however, that the central 
authorities had become entirely disconnected from forestry politics. The intendants des 
finances and contrôleurs généraux advising the Conseil were not just rubber-stamping 
instances for suggestions and mémoires sent by the grands-maîtres, auditors of yearly états 
des bois, or arbiters of the occasional high-profile disciplinary case. 624 Throughout the 
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eighteenth century, the Conseil went on deciding over important, strategic questions that 
could affect the country as a whole. In the economic domain, it promoted the use of 
mineral coal, 625  and adjusted regulations concerning fuel wood provision and the 
localisation of key manufactures such as forges and glassworks. The  most far-reaching 
policy decision, on a par with Colbert’s autarky policy, – and in complete opposition to its 
main underlying principle of forest preservation - was official encouragement to clear 
private forests. With their edict of 5 July 1770, contrôleurs généraux imbued with 
physiocratic ideas offered an exemption from all taxes for fifteen years to forest owners 
who had cleared land to make space for cereal cultivation. While the consequences of this 
abrupt change of policy have not yet been fully understood, it is widely considered to be 
one of the main causes of the wood crisis and price increase of the pre-revolutionary years. 
 
The two main results of this study –the intermediate forestry office as a dead-end for social 
advancement, and the devolution of forestry powers as a pragmatic response to an overly 
rigid body of law – have paved the way for future research on forestry politics. Exploring 
ordinary forestry practice during the final decades of the old regime through the lens of 
provincial Réformations Forestières can shed light on fundamental re-orientations in this 
part of monarchical administration. It can provide precious insights into changing 
perceptions of the paradigmatic role of the state in controlling and managing a limited 
material resource, in the face of fast-changing social values and norms, and increasing 
pressure from the ‘public opinion’. One hundred years after Colbert’s reforms, as ardent 
reformers increasingly challenged the principle of state monopoly over the management 
and control of France’s forests, the question must be asked of the timing, trigger, deeper 
causes, and consequences, of the changes, which were likely to upset the compromise 
status-quo that I have described. How did the system of decentralised forestry practice, 
which had so long been quietly teetering on the margins of legality, respond to the whirl of 
new interests and challenges emerging after the Seven Year’s war: acceleration of 
population growth and industrialisation, rise of urban luxury consumption and industrial 
needs, and, above all, calls by Louis XV’s minister Choiseul to revamp France’s navy in 
preparation for new conflict with Great Britain? A micro-historical approach into the lives 
and professional conduct of maîtrise officers solidly rooted in their local, social and 
cultural environments when the institution collapsed, can also bear testimony to the vast 
political and societal tensions and shifts that drove governmental forestry policies 
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throughout the long century after Colbert’s reforms. This  could constitute a rewarding 







Position of the ‘Grand-Maître enquêteur et général réformateur’ and the 
‘maître particulier des Eaux et Forêts’ in Charles Figon’s  






Annexe 1      
Position of the ‘Grand-Maître enquêteur et général réformateur’ 
and of the ‘maître particulier des Eaux et Forêts’   





Source: Charles de Figon (Conseiller du Roy, & maistre ordinaire en la chambre des 
Comptes, Montpellier), Discours des États et Offices tant du gouvernement que de la 
justice et des finances de France,...(Paris, chez Guillaume d'Avray, 1579). 
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Personnel of the maîtrise particulière of Quillan 





Annexe 2  
Personnel of th  Maîtrise Particulière of Quillan  
















1661		 n/a	 PIERRE	BESSET																PIERRE	GERMAIN											JEAN	CACHULET																				n/a	 n/a	
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1665	 		 		 		 		 		 		
1666	 		 		 		 		 		 		
1667	 		 		 		 		 		 		
1668	 FRANCOIS	DE	
ROUX					
		 		 		 		 		
		 	commissioned	 		 		 		 		 		
1669	 		 		 		 		 		 		
1670	 		 		 		 		 		 		
1671	 		 		 		 		 		 		
































1678	 LP	14	janv	1677	 		 		 		 commissioned		 		
1679	
	
		 		 		 		 		





		 		 		 		
1682	 		 	LP	14	juin	1682		 		 		 		 		
1683	 		 		 		 		 		 		






		 		 		 		 JEAN	DORDET																				 		
1686	









		 GABRIEL	CHARPENTIER		 		 		 		 		
1688	 		 	LP	30	juin	1687	 		 		 		 		
1689	 		 		 		 		 		 		
1690	
		 FRANCOIS	BESSET	DE	GARARD																									 		 		 		 		
1691	 		 LP	31	mai	1690		 		 		 		 		
1692	 		 		 		 		 		 		
1693	 		 		 		 		 		 		
1694	 		 		 		 		 		 		
1695	 		 		 		 		 		 		
1696	
JEAN	ROUZAUD											 		 		 		 		 		
1697	 TM	15	mars	1696		 		 		 		 		 		
1698	 		 		 		 		 		 		
1699	 		 		 		 		 		 		
1700	
		 		 PIERRE	PINET	DE	BREZILHOU																								 		 		 		
1701	
		 		 LP	31	août	1700		 		 		 JEAN-PIERRE	PINET	LAPRADE							
1702	 		 		 		 		 		 LP	1701	
1703	 		 		 		 		 		 		
1704	 		 		 		 		 		 		
1705	 		 		 		 		 		 		
1706	 		 		 		 		 		 		
1707	 		 		 		 		 		 		
1708	
		 		 		 ESTIENNE	LOUBET		 		 		
1709	 		 		 		 	 		 		
1710	 		 		 		 LP		21	mai	1708			 		 		
1711	
		 		 		 		 		 JEAN-ANTOINE	CACHULET		
1712	 		 		 		 		 		 LP	5	déc.	1711	
1713	 		 		 		 		 		 		
1714	 		 		 		 		 		 		
1715	 		 		 		 		 		 		






		 		 JEAN	ROILLET																			 		













LP	13	janv.	1719		 		 		 		
	
1721	 		 		 		 		 		
	










		 			 		 		
1725	 		 LP	31	mars	1724	 		 LP	16	juin	1723		 		 		
1726	 		 		 		 		 		 		
1727	






1729	 LP	9	juillet	1728		 		 		 		LP	26	mai	1728	 		 		
1730	
		 		 		 		 		
THIMOLEON	
CACHULET		
1731	 		 		 		 		 		 LP	?	
1732	 		 		 		 		 		 		
1733	 		 		 		 		 		 		
1734	
PIERRE	MARSOL												 		 		 		 		 		
1735	 LP	29	mars	1734		 		 		 		 		 		
1736	 		 		 		 		 		 		
1737	 		 		 		 		 		 		
1738	 		 		 		 		 		 		
1739	 		 		 		 		 		 		
1740	 		 		 		 		 		 		
1741	 		 		 		 		 		 		
1742	 		 		 		 		 		 		
1743	 		 		 		 		 		 		
1744	 		 		 		 		 		 		
1745	 		 		 		 		 		 		
1746	 		 		 		 		 		 		











1750	 		 		 		 		 		 		
1751	 		 		 		 		 		 		
1752	











1754	 		 		 		 		 		 		




1756	 		 		 		 		 		 		
1757	
		 		 		 CLAUDE	LOUBET																		 		 		
1758	 		 		 		 TM	16	nov	1757		 		 		
1759	 		 		 		 		 		 		
1760	 		 		 		 		 		 		




		 		 		 		 		
1763	 TM	30	mai	1761		 		 		 		 		 		
1764	 		 		 		 		 		 		
1765	 		 		 		 		 		 		























1770	 		 		 TM	juillet	1769		 		 		 		
1771	 		 		 		 		 		 		
1772	 		 		 		 		 		 		
1773	 		 		 		 		 		 		
1774	 		 		 		 		 		 		
1775	 		 		 		 		 		 		
1776	 		 		 		 		 		 		
1777	 		 		 		 		 		 		




		 		 		 		
1780	 		
	
		 		 		 		
1781	 		 		 		 		 		 		
1782	 		 		 		 		 		 		
1783	 		 		 		 		 		 		
1784	 		 		 		 		 		 		
1785	 		 		 		 		 		 		
1786	 		 		 		 		 		 		
1787	 		 		 		 		 		 		
1788	 		 		 		 		 		 		
1789	 		 		 		 		 		 		
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10	 Guillaume	Jaubert	 lieutenant	 1681	-	1686	 office	 £	
11	 Gabriel	Charpentier	 lieutenant	 1687	-	1690	 office	 *	
12	 François	Besset	de	
Garard	
lieutenant	 1690	-	1716	 office	 *	
13	 André	Boire	 lieutenant	 1719	-	1723	 office	 PC	









procureur	du	roi	 1700	-	1726	 office	 *	
17	 Louis	Terrisse	 procureur	du	roi	 1727	-	1753	
(at	least)	
office	 *	
18	 Pierre	Cachulet	 garde-marteau		 1655	-	
1670/74	
office	 *	
19	 Antoine	Cachulet	 garde-marteau	 1675	-	1706	 office	 *	

















greffiers	 1674		-	1684	 commission	 n/a		
24	 F.P.	Roillet	(with	Jean	
Dordet)		
greffier	 1685-	1716	 office	 PC	










































PC Acquired from the Parties Casuelles 
 
* Acquired through bequest or resignation 
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(Source: Michel Bartoli, Louis de Froidour)	
 
Annexe 4       Uniforms of some maîtrise officers (1669 – 1699) 
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Figure 73 : Uniformes des personnels des maîtrises vers 1669-1699. 





Extract from Louis Rouzaud’s Mémoire des contraventions à 
l’Ordonnance commises par le sr Anceau, Grand Maître des Eaux et Forêts 







de	 Coumus	 au	 pays	 de	 Saut	 une	 forêt	 entière	 de	 sapin,	 pour	 le	 prix	 de	 700:#	 pour	 la	






douleur	 que	 cette	 foret	 perdroit	 son	 nom	 et	 qu’il	 n’y	 reviendroit	 jamais	 un	 arbre,	
vouloient	en	porter	leur	pleinte	aux	Seig.rs	du	Conseil,	ce	que	led.	Caulet	qui	etoit	sur	les	
lieux	 evita,	 en	 faisant	 un	 pont	 d’argent	 pour	 les	 arreter,	 et	 après	 avoir	 distribué	 une	
bourse	dont	les	Consuls	eurent	bonne	part;	il	fit	preparer	un	grand	repas	chez	le	nommé	
Petiton	 dud.	 lieu,	 ou	 il	 pria	 environ	 30	 desdits	 habitans	 des	 plus	 distingués,	 distribua	
beaucoup	de	vin	dans	le	lieu,	ce	les	rendit	faisans;	on	estimoit	alors	que	le	Sr	Caulet	avoit	
eu	au	moins	les	arbres	pour	un	denier	pièce.	La	preuve	de	ce	fait	est	trop	eclatante	pour	
la	manquer	 puisquelle	 se	 justifie	 par	 les	 Registres	 des	 ventes	 qui	 sont	 au	 greffe	 de	 la	
meme	Maitrise,	et	par	la	degradation	entiere	de	cette	forêt;	Le	Grand	Maitre	en	reçut	un	
present	en	diferentes	qualités	de	 vins,	 et	 son	 secretaire,	outre	 l’expedition	du	 contract	
















Abus    "Dérèglement, ce qui est fait contre la raison & le bon  
    ordre" (Furetière). 
 
Acte d'émancipation  Public ceremony marking the coming of age of a son or  
    daughter, which removes them from paternal tutelage  
    and entails their own legal responsibility. 
 
Adjudicataire   Bidder at the wood auction who won an item.   
 
Adjudication   Wood auction held each autumn in every maîtrise   
    particulière. 
 
Afferme   Outsourcing of the collection of certain taxes or fees. 
  
Apanage   Part of the royal demesne given to younger royal heirs  
    to the throne in compensation for not claiming a share  
    of power.  
 
Assiette   Geometrical delimitation of a forest plot to be offered at  
    the next auction. 
 
Augmentation de gages A loan imposed by the government on certain office- 
    holders, which increased their regular income (gages.  
    Sometimes, they guaranteed continuing enjoyment of  
    certain rights.  
 
Bailliage   Lower criminal and civil court under the Parlement   
    (sénéchaussée in the south).  
 
Baliveaux   Well-grown young trees to be reserved during a   
    harvesting operation in short-rotation coppice woods.  
    They were to be left to grow as high-forest timber trees.  
 
Bureau des Finances  Financial sub-unit of France's généralités, charged with  
    allocating and collecting tax in the provinces which did  
    not have Etats. 
 
Capitaine forestier  Officers formally responsible for controlling the work  
    of the gardes. They disappeared as an independent   
    category after the Colbertian reforms. 
 
Chauffage   Firewood destined to officers and certain individuals or  
    institutions. 
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Collusion   "Intelligence de deux parties qui plaident en fraude d'un  
    tiers." (Furetière). 
 
Compoix   A form of cadastral record in Languedoc for taxation  
    purposes. 
 
Concussion   "Volerie, exaction faite par un Juge, par un Officier   
    public, qui se fait payer de plus gros droits que ceux qui  
    luy sont attribuez ; par un Receveur, qui fait payer de  
    plus grosses taxes que celles qui luy sont deuës"   
    (Furetière). 
 
Corruption   "Action par laquelle une chose se corrompt, se change,  
    s'altere. C'est un axiome en Philosophie, que la   
    corruption de l'un est la generation de l'autre."   
    (Furetière). 
 
Cour des aides  Financial tribunals treating fiscal affairs, including   
    fiscal privileges. 
 
Délit    "Faute, crime leger." (Furetière). 
 
Divertissement de deniers Embezzlement. 
 
Droits de foraine  Royal tax perceived on goods circulating between   
    provinces of a different regime of aides, i.e. indirect  
    taxes on different kinds of goods and services. 
 
Droits de passe  Special fee perceived by maîtrise officers in river ports  
    for the control of timber rafts. 
 
Eaux-et-Forêts  “Waterways and Forests'”, generic name of France's  
    forestry administration. 
 
Election   Financial sub-unit in the 'Pays d'Elections', subordinated  
    to the Bureaux des Finances. 
 
Engagiste   Physical or moral person who has acquired parts of the  
    royal demesne as usufruct. As the royal demesne is in  
    theory inalienable, the contract can always be revoked. 
 
Epices    A form of financial reward for ancien régime   
    magistrates. 
 
Exaction   "Vol que fait un Officier à une partie, quand il luy fait  
    payer des droits qui ne luy sont point deus, ou qui sont  
    au-delà des legitimes. "(Furetière). 
 
Futaie    ‘High-Forest', trees destined to grow large, usually for  




Gabelou   Official charged with collecting the gabelle, the impost  
    on salt. 
 
Gages    Yearly financial reward of an office-holder. 
 
Garde    Forest warden, responsible for daily policing in a   
    specified portion of the forests.  
 
Garde-marteau  The maîtrise officer custodian of the embossed tagging  
    hammer serving as royal seal to authorise felling or   
    mark trees to be reserved. 
 
Gazaille   Leasing out of farm animals. In Languedoc, contracts  
    with pastoral farmers particularly included driving them  
    to highland summer pastures.  
 
Grand maître   Head of the grande-maîtrise. 
 
Grande-Maîtrise  One of France's eighteen to twenty regional forestry  
    districts headed by the grand maître. 
 
Greffier   Court Clerk; here clerk of the maîtrise particulière, often also 
    a local notary. 
 
Grenier à sel   Salt depot in certain généralités, staffed with officers  
    responsible for the distribution and sale of salt. 
 
Gruerie   A smaller branch of a maîtrise particulière, with   
    reduced staff and powers, to support the work of larger  
    districts. 
 
Herm    An uncultivated, deforested piece of land. 
 
Hobereau   Petty rural noble. 
 
Journées et vacations  Fee perceived by maîtrise officers to compensate them  
    for expenses incurred by duties involving travel and  
    overnight accommodation. 
 
Juge baneret   Seigneurial judge. 
 
Lettres de provision  Official document that confirmed that the applicant for  
    a venal office has been 'pourvu' because he fulfils the  
    specific requirements of the office and has paid the   
    corresponding fees.  
 
Lieutenant   Deputy head of the maîtrise particulière. 
 
Main-morte   Refers to communities such as congregations or   
    hospitals that did not entail a transferof property by   
    death, and whose material possessions were subject to a  
    specific jurisdiction.  
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Maître Particulier  Head of the maîtrise particulière. 
 
Maîtrise Particulière  A sub-unit of the grande-maîtrise. 
 
Malversation   "Prevarication commise en l'exercice d'une charge,   
    d'une commission, d'un maniement, concussion,   
    exaction, divertissement de deniers." (Furetière).  
 
Marc d'or   Fee perceived by the crown at eachacquisition or   
    transfer of office. 
 
Martelage   Operation consisting of marking selected trees to   
    delineate plots to be offered for sale.  
 
Métairie   Farming method involving sharecropping, whereby the  
    métayer cultivated the land owned by another, with   
    whom he shared the profits. 
 
Officier moyen  Mid-ranking venal officer. 
 
Paréage   Joint sovereignty over a specific territory by two   
    overlords having equal rights. 
 
Parties casuelles  Bureau which collected for the crown the rights   
    associated with acquisition or transmission of venal   
    offices. 
 
Péculat   Embezzlement; "crime de vol des deniers publics par  
    celuy qui en est l'ordonnateur, le depositaire, ou le   
    receveur." (Furetière). 
 
Présidial   Tribunal with more extended powers than the bailliage,  
    appealing to the Parlement. 
 
Prévarication   "Abus commis dans l'exercice d'une charge publique,  
    d'une commission donnée par un particulier."   
    (Furetière). 
 
Prévôt    In general, a subaltern justice officer which could   
    receive appeals from seigneurial judgements. The   
    prévôt de Paris is the head of the Châtelet (centre of  
    justice), charged with representing the king's interests in  
    the capital. 
 
Procureur du Roi  The 'king's man' in the maîtrise particulière, magistrate  
    representing the king's interests in forestry matters. 
 
Quart-de-réserve  Management rule aimed at supporting the production of  
    construction and naval timber. It stipulated that in one- 
    quarter of a given forest, trees could only be harvested  
    after one-hundred years, sometimes much longer.  
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Radelier   Makers of timber rafts to be floated down on certain  
    rivers. 
 
Receveur Particulier  Treasurer of the maîtrise particulière (from 1701). 
 
Récollement   Cross-checking of stumps left after the end of the tree  
    harvest with sales registers, to control merchant fraud.  
 
Réformation Forestière Set of judicial and administrative operations initiated by  
    the Conseil, to address a whole range of problems   
    perceived as detrimental to the preservation of the   
    forests. 
 
Reliquat   A sum still owed by a treasurer; "le reste ou debet dont  
    le rendant compte se trouve debiteur, toute sa despense  
    deduite par la closture & l'arresté d'un compte."   
    (Furetière). 
 
Table de Marbre  Forestry appeal court located within a regional   
    Parlement that received appeals from maîtrise   
    particulières rulings. 
 
Taillis    Short-rotation coppiced wood, usually to produce   
    firewood and woods for small constructions. In the   
    seventeenth century meaning, it specifically refered to  
    the underwood of a mixed stand, including higher   
    growing trees. 
 
Tire-et-Aire   Harvesting method imposed by the Ordonnance:    
    geometrical plots were to be cut in a yearly rotation,  
    whereby each plot was to be felled sequentially, moving  
    directly from one plot to the next, whilst preserving a  
    ixed number of the most promising standard trees   
    (baliveaux), and border trees (pieds corniers) for re-  
    growth. 
 
Tutelle et Curatelle  Custodial responsibilities for royal or seigneurial minors  
    in ancien régime France. 
 
Ville de tour   In some administrative districts (diocèses), several   












Archives Nationales (AN) 
 
 
AD 4, 9 Minutes d’arrêts du Conseil d’Etat, édits, déclarations, ordonnances  
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  dans les forêts royales arrêté au Conseil des Finances (1669-1677) 
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1-16	 	 Divers	Mémoires	et	Projets	sur	les	bois	de	construction,	leur		 	
	 	 exploitation,	transport,	prix	et	leurs	proportions	(1672-1798);			
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  particulière de Villemur (1666-73); Règlements, Jugements, Arrêts  
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  verbaux de visites, mesurages; Réformations des forêts des communautés  
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